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DECISIVE ROLE OF FIELD TRAINING STRESSED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 78 signed to press 2 Aug 78 pp 3-8

[Editorial: "Work Hard to Raise Field, Air, and Sea Training"]

[Text] Summer combat training is in full swing. It is marked by the great patriotic enthusiasm and fervor of the personnel of our units and ships arising from the orders, recommendations, and advice given by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in his talks during his trip through Siberia and the Far East, in his speeches at the 18th Komsomol Congress, in his talk in the hero-city of Minsk, and in his books "Malaya Zemlya" [Small Land] and "Vozrozhdeniye" [Renaissance].

The fighting men of the army and navy greeted with profound satisfaction and enormous enthusiasm the results of the July 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, which adopted the decree "Further Development of USSR Agriculture" on the basis of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report, and the results of the 10th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which ratified the laws "On the USSR Council of Ministers," "On the Procedure for Concluding, Executing, and Denouncing the International Treaties of the USSR," and "On Elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet." The defenders of our socialist fatherland, together with all Soviet people, warmly and unanimously approve of the domestic and foreign policy of our native Leninist party and are doing everything they can to accomplish the tasks which it has defined.

In accordance with their constitutional duty, our soldiers, seamen, sergeants, petty officers, warrant officers [praporshchki and michmany], and officers are working hard to master contemporary combat equipment and weapons and effective ways of using them. They are strengthening military discipline, organization, and order day after day and steadily increasing vigilance and combat readiness. The outstanding units of the branches of the Armed Forces and the atomic submarine of the Red Banner Pacific Ocean Fleet, the initiators of the All-Army socialist competition, are setting an example in this. Many other military collectives

have achieved significant successes in combat and political training by measuring themselves against the leaders. We should take special note of the improved level of field, air, and sea training. This is convincingly illustrated by the results of exercises held in the districts, groups of forces, and fleets.

The combined arms tactical exercise in the Khabarovsk region has already been reported in the press. The Far Eastern fighting men, motorized riflemen, tank soldiers, artillerymen, antiaircraft gunners, and aviators, observed by General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, accomplished their difficult missions skillfully in a situation maximally approximating that of combat and used the full power of the equipment that has been entrusted to them. The actions of the detachment of fighting ships in the two-sided naval exercise also earned praise. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev observed that the Pacific Ocean sailors demonstrated good training and waged a skillful battle against submarines, surface ships, and aircraft. Leonid Il'ich also appreciated the combat skills of the missile troops who participated in the exercise near Novosibirsk.

Many other examples could be cited to illustrate the continuing rise in the level of field, air, and sea training among army and navy forces, the improved performance of combat duty, the increased accuracy of rocket launches, bombing missions, and artillery and torpedo firing, and confident mastery of their weapons by personnel. All this is a result of the purposeful work of commanders, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations to improve the military skills of personnel and indoctrinate the defenders of the Motherland in the spirit of communist ideology and political vigilance, internationalism and combat cooperation with the fraternal armies, loyalty to the revolutionary and combat traditions of the older generations, and absolute devotion to our socialist Fatherland.

The experience of leading military collectives, everything valuable and instructive that they have accumulated in the process of training and indoctrination must be summarized and disseminated among army and navy forces and made available to all personnel. This is particularly necessary because shortcomings in combat and political training have not yet been eliminated in all military collectives. Certain servicemen and even whole subunits are satisfied with mediocre scores over several periods of training, and sometimes even fall far behind. Subunits that had earned the title of outstanding occasionally surrender the position they won. Some of them assume lofty obligations but do not fulfill them. This was observed, for example, in the N motorized rifle unit. In it the battalion commanded by Maj V. Puchinin and several companies assumed the obligation of becoming outstanding during the winter period of training. However, they did not keep their word. The unit as a whole also failed to meet its obligations.

Such cases are, needless to say, rare. But under army and navy conditions they are also intolerable. It is a matter of honor for every Soviet fighting man to zealously perform his military duty and vow of loyalty to the Motherland, to steadily improve his training, and to strengthen the combat readiness of the subunits, units, and ships.

"A high level of training and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces as a whole and of each individual in particular," Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, points out, "confident mastery of contemporary military equipment, and the ability to endure any of the hardships of war — these are our primary objectives." Success depends on many factors, above all on the quality and effectiveness of the training and indoctrination process, on how fully the scientific principle of troop training is followed: teach that which is necessary in war.

It follows from this principle that field, air, and sea training are decisive. Only in the field, in the air, and at sea, under conditions maximally approximating those of real combat, do fighting men acquire solid skills and the ability to wage aggressive combat actions and defeat a strong, technically well-equipped enemy. That is why the leaders of the training and indoctrination process have a great responsibility for the precise organization and effectiveness of field, air, and sea training.

Our job is to continue improving the quality of every training period, every tactical, flight tactical, and command-staff exercise and to conduct them in exact conformity with the programs and plans of combat training, taking account of the requirements of modern combat in conditions which inspire the trainees to exert all their mental, moral, and physical strength. We must put an end to stereotyped situations, simplification, and indulgence, introduce new, progressive forms and methods of training into practice by every means, and concentrate efforts on intensification of the training process and intelligent use of training time and physical facilities. Exercises, flights, and cruises are more valuable and useful when the situation in training periods is more complex, the terrain on which troops operate is more varied, missions are more difficult, and there are more critical situations. That kind of training helps personnel form the essential moral-fighting-psychological, and physical qualities, and in addition, it facilitates the tactical thinking of commanders, their creative approach to accomplishing the missions given to them, and the development of solid skills in controlling subunits, units, and ships.

One of the lines of action in improving field, air, and sea training is making training periods comprehensive. A close connection between different training subjects and tactics makes it possible to arm the men with solid knowledge and develop a high level of training and teamwork among the teams, crews, groups, and subunits in a short time. By skillful use of the comprehensive approach it is possible at the training period to create a situation that demands constant activism and

original solutions from the trainees. Experience indicates that when tactical procedures are worked through in close unity with fire, technical, special, drill, physical, and other types of training, the fighting men operate skillfully in training battle and handle their missions well.

However, all officers are not yet sufficiently aware of the importance and necessity of combining fire, technical, special, and other types of training with tactics. How else can we explain the fact that certain commanders are timid in their use of the opportunities of this progressive method of training. We must root out this weakness quickly, and help the organizers of the training and indoctrination process to overcome outdated views and habits. Correct procedures are followed in those military collectives which give consistent support to good initiatives by innovators, use every means to create an atmosphere that inspires creative thought, develops the initiative of the men, and promotes growth and professional maturity and methodological sophistication.

The primary condition for effective combat training is high qualifications among command personnel. Every officer, warrant officer, sergeant, and petty officer should have adequate political, military, and technical knowledge and have a clear idea of the requirements for training and indoctrinating subordinates and ways to meet these requirements. It is the direct obligation of every commander to hunt for new methods and ways of organizing and conducting training periods, drills, exercises, flights, and cruises and to steadily improve his methodological skills and level of professional training.

Knowledge and experience do not, of course, come by themselves; they are the result of hard work and persistent study, above all in the system of Marxist-Leninist and commander training and at teaching methods and demonstration training periods. In addition, the commander must work a great deal on his own, supplementing his theoretical knowledge day after day. This makes it possible to keep up with the latest advances in military science at all times and take a creative approach to the training and indoctrination of subordinates. We must continue raising the level of training of command cadres and do everything possible to see that officers, warrant officers, sergeants, and petty officers learn not only how to train subordinates in a methodologically correct way but also to control battle skillfully, use unexpected procedures against the enemy, and defeat him.

The interests of our work also demand a further improvement in the workstyle of staff officers and the chiefs and specialists of the services and arms of troops. The staffs, as control agencies, must keep constant watch on the entire training process and socialist competition, carry on studies, summarize information received from above and from below, stubbornly oppose shortcomings, especially attempts to evaluate the results of military labor uncritically, and quickly introduce new, progressive methods of training and indoctrination into practice. The staff officer should be an example for others. He must be a master

of his work and provide a model of zealous performance of military and party duty.

It is inconceivable that a high level of field, air, and sea training could be attained without a further improvement in the organization of socialist competition, whose slogan is "Reliably defend the socialist Fatherland, remain in constant combat readiness, work hard to master weapons and equipment, and improve combat skills." Another typical feature of the current phase of all-Army socialist competition is the fact that the patriotic movement to be an outstanding large unit and the struggle of personnel of the Southern Group of Forces for the best training and work indexes among the groups of forces have taken on broad scope in the army and navy.

In the hands of skillful organizers socialist competition is a powerful lever for increasing the creative activism of Soviet fighting men. It is an effective weapon with which commanders, political agencies, party organizations, and staffs strengthen their influence on the men, work to strengthen discipline and the solidarity of military collectives, instill communist conviction and political consciousness in the defenders of the Motherland, and develop their desire to go further and achieve more. The ability to organize competition and use its great strength in the interests of a further improvement in field, air, and sea training and to achieve a general increase in the combat readiness of army and naval forces is evidence of the maturity of our military cadres. Nonetheless, formalism and cases of slackened leadership in competition have still not been eliminated. Competition is not always carefully organized and aimed at accomplishing the missions facing military collectives. Sometimes the results of competition are summarized at the wrong time, winners are determined in an unobjective, non-operational manner, propaganda for the know-how of the leaders is poorly organized, and moral and material stimuli are not used well.

The challenge is to put an end to shortcomings in the organization and management of competition and consistently implement the Leninist principles of socialist competition and the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee on increasing its effectiveness and its mobilizing and indoctrinational role. We must strive for greater publicity for the results of competition and introduce progressive know-how from the struggle for outstanding indexes in combat and political training, for the title of best team, crew, department, and subunit, for first place among units and ships, and for the right to carry the name of outstanding large unit. We must work tirelessly to see that every training period is conducted with a competitive spirit and develop healthy rivalry among the men for exemplary performance of combat training missions, surpassing standards, and unconditional fulfillment of socialist obligations at exercises, flights, and on cruises.

Achievements in combat training in general and in field, air, and sea training in particular, are directly dependent on the effectiveness of party political work. The military councils, commanders, political

agencies, and party organizations are expected to work steadily to raise the level of this work and develop conscious, skillful defenders of our Soviet Motherland, devoted to the cause of communism, possessing lofty moral and fighting qualities, and capable of mastering their weapons and equipment and using their full capacities to achieve victory in modern battle over any enemy. Correct procedures are followed in those places where they strive for continuous, effective party political work, seek for and incorporate the most effective methods and forms of political influence on the course of field, air, and sea training, and work steadily to mobilize personnel to fulfill the missions given by the USSR Ministry of Defense for the summer period of training. Party political work must always be carried on in strict conformity with the operational-tactical intent of exercises and with due regard for the special features of the branches of the Armed Forces, the arms of troops, and the theater of military actions.

Party political work in the Strategic Missile Forces is concentrated on seeing that personnel steadily raise combat readiness, serve combat duty vigilantly, improve their special training, work hard to master their powerful weapons, and strive for outstanding results in training missile launches.

The activities of commanders, political agencies, and party organizations of the units of the Ground Forces aim at a further improvement in the quality of field training periods and tactical and command-staff exercises. They give considerable attention to developing teamwork in subunits and units and seeing that the servicemen acquire solid skills in making concealed marches at top speed over long distances, carrying out swift attacks, crossing water obstacles, using weapons and equipment effectively, and cooperating with precision in crews, teams, squads, platoons, companies, and batteries.

For the Air Defense Forces, who vigilantly guard the air frontiers of the Fatherland day and night, the summit of combat training is, of course, tactical exercises with field fire, during which combat training missions involving real missile launches are worked through. This makes it possible to have a thorough and objective check on the working harmony and interaction of all the elements — the means of fire, means of control, and support services. It is such exercises, maximally approximating a real combat situation, that determine the level of training of combat teams and crews, the maturity of commanders at all levels, the smooth operation of staffs and political agencies, and the ability of personnel to stand combat watch vigilantly. An important mission of party political work is to give the men thorough preparation for this difficult test of combat maturity and mobilize them to pass it with honor.

Commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations direct the efforts of the personnel of aviation units to improving air and fire training, mastering their aviation equipment, maintaining and servicing it in an exemplary manner, performing flights without

accidents or possible causes of them, and conducting flight-tactical exercises, bombing and firing missions, and intercepts of aerial targets day and night, at different altitudes and ranges, and in any weather conditions.

The increased skills of navy men are tested during prolonged sea and ocean cruises and torpedo and missile launches. The organizers of party political work in the navy give constant attention to performing their missions completely and well. They try to do everything possible to see that ship crews, working through sets of missions in conditions close to those of actual combat, strive persistently for a higher level of sea and fire training and mastery of their weapons, equipment, and modern tactical procedures for waging combat at sea against a powerful enemy. Moreover, they must master the art of navigation.

Party political work in all military collectives, regardless of the branch of the Armed Forces and arm of troops, aims at making every training period, every exercise, every flight, and every cruise helpful in developing courage, determination, and initiative in the defenders of our socialist Fatherland and instilling in them a desire to smash the enemy with the full might of their fire right from the start and to continue fighting until the enemy is completely routed. A great deal is also being done to improve the quality of command and control of army and navy forces, make efficient use of the combat capabilities of complex modern equipment, and acquire an outstanding knowledge of automated systems and how to use them.

The experience of the leading military collectives shows that party political work is more effective where the political workers themselves have good military training and have solidly assimilated the combat training programs and plans and the objectives of tactical, flight-tactical, and command-staff exercises and sea cruises. A thorough knowledge of military affairs combined with a high level of professional training allows them to organize the work in a concrete, purposeful manner and skillfully direct the activities of the party and Komsomol organizations.

The question of strengthening troop discipline and organization requires fixed attention from commanders, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations. Not even minor deviations from the military regulations, manuals, instructions, and other controlling documents can be ignored; there must be a response to cases of indulgence and simplification in troop training and indoctrination. Every possible support should be given to demanding commanders. Their responsibility for the situation in the military collectives must be increased; every communist and Komsomol member should set a personal example in training, service, and discipline.

The ideological toughening of our fighting men and raising their political consciousness are a special concern. No matter where the subunits, units, and ships may be, at exercises, in flight, or on cruises, we must

continue to give the fighting men thorough explanations of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress, the December 1977 and July 1978 Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and the 10th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. It is also important to continue our thorough study of the USSR Constitution, anniversary documents dedicated to the celebration of the 60th anniversary of Great October and the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy, the documents of the 18th Komsomol Congress, and the instructions and recommendations given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev during his trip through Siberia and the Far East and in his books "Malaya Zemlya" and "Ozrozhdeniye." The achievements of the Soviet people in carrying out the grandiose plans of communist building and fulfilling the assignments of the 10th Five-Year Plan must be widely disseminated. All forms of political influence must be used to indoctrinate the fighting men in a spirit of loyalty to the ideals of communism and boundless devotion to our Soviet Motherland, in a spirit of socialist internationalism and burning class hatred for the imperialists.

In these intense days of summer combat training, Soviet fighting men are tirelessly improving their field, air, and sea training in classrooms and at ranges, at proving grounds, tank grounds, and airfields, at the control consoles of missile complexes, and on sea and ocean cruises; they are working hard to master the art of victory, which is forged in battle. Against the tricks of the enemies of detente they pit their great vigilance and constant readiness, together with the fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact countries, to decisively repulse any aggressor.

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METHODS OF CONDUCTING PARTY POLITICAL WORK IN THE FIELD EXAMINED

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 16, Aug 78 signed to press 2 Aug 78 pp 18-24

[Article by Col-Gen A. Debalyuk, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Red Banner Belorussian MD: "Actively, Purposefully — Party Political Work at Exercises"]

[Text] Intensive summer combat training is underway among the troops of the district. Inspired by the grandiose successes of the Soviet people in building communism, the personnel of our units, like all the armed defenders of the Motherland, are working hard to improve their combat skill and learn the art of defeating a strong, technically well-equipped enemy. There is no mission for fighting men of the district that is more important than constantly raising the combat readiness of the subunits and units and performing their sacred, constitutional duty in an exemplary manner.

Commanders, political agencies, staffs, and party and Komsomol organizations have fixed their attention these days on questions of improving the field and air training of personnel and raising the quality and effectiveness of training periods, exercises, and flights. Guided by the most important principle of combat training, which is to teach the troops that which is necessary in war, they are striving at all times to see that the fighting men work their hardest in the field and in the air, make full use of the capabilities of the combat equipment and weapons, and acquire good moral-fighting, psychological, and physical qualities. It is precisely at tactical training periods and exercises conducted in conditions maximally approximating those of combat that the skills and qualities necessary for victory in modern battle and the ability to use the weapons and equipment, accomplish missions with initiative and intelligence, and demonstrate strong will, boldness, determination, and organization are successfully formed.

Using the experience gathered during the period of winter training and at the Berezina exercise, the commanders, staffs, political agencies, and party organizations are concentrating their efforts on improving the training process, conducting tactical and command-staff exercises

and special tactical training periods in an instructive manner, and continuing to develop teamwork in small subunits and improve the individual training of the servicemen. All units and subunits are showing concern that party political work done at field training periods and tactical exercises be on the proper level, with concrete guidance of socialist competition, and that exemplary regulation order and strong discipline be maintained in all troop elements.

These questions are always at the center of attention for the military council. The council reviews them systematically at its sessions, discovers problems in time and criticizes them properly, takes steps to eliminate them, and organizes propaganda for the experience of the leading military collectives among the troops.

The district political directorate is constantly concerned about improving party political work at exercises. The directorate analyzes the exercises carefully, tries to increase the activism and responsibility of political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations, and directs them to struggle for high-quality performance of field training missions. These matters are regularly discussed at meetings of party activists of the district and large units, sessions of top command and political personnel, reviews of troop exercises, and other such places.

The political directorate is always studying the level of political influence on the quality and effectiveness of tactical training periods and takes an active part in the preparation for and conduct of troop and command-staff exercises. We prepare various materials on the organization of party political work based on an analysis of exercises held in the district in recent years; this information was disseminated to the troops in the form of surveys. These documents were discussed at assemblies and seminars for various categories of commanders and party political workers.

The work of officers of the political directorate at exercises is usually discussed in the directorate administration and collective views are worked out on ways to achieve further improvements. For example, after one of the recent exercises training periods with officers of the political directorate discussed forms and methods of managing the activity of political agencies and party organizations in different types of combat, in a complex and dynamic situation.

This is one of the most important problems in all our work. Many practical suggestions were made which, in our opinion, helped introduce the most effective working methods into practice. The functional duties of each officer were defined in greater detail and a more rational distribution of the personnel of the directorate administration was made, including their placement at all control points. This makes it possible to keep in touch with the situation at all times and exercise operational leadership over subordinate political agencies and party organizations.

The order of work by branches and officers of the political directorate, a brief description of the activities, and the time allocated for them are reflected in special scheduling charts. This makes it possible to organize the work precisely and maintain constant checks on performance.

This organizing principle of the military council and district political directorate has fostered a situation where most commanders, political agencies, and party organizations of units and large units now structure their activity more purposefully.

The troops of the district offer many good examples of party concern for field training. For example, the political branch of the Guards Motorized Rifle Rogachev Division imeni Verkhovnogo Soveta BSSR exercises an active and useful influence on improving the training of unit and sub-unit personnel. They strive to see that every trip to the field, every training period in tactical training, driving combat vehicles, and other types of combat training, is conducted on a proper level and that party political work is continuous and effective.

Troops of the district took part in the Berezina exercise this year. Among them was the Rogachev Division, whose personnel demonstrated improved field training. One of the components of their success was effective, purposeful party political work. Substantial credit for this goes to the political branch, which worked in a practical, effective manner under the difficult conditions of a march and battle situation. It should be observed that the officers of the political directorate did a great deal of work in this division during the period of preparation and during the exercise itself. While in the units and subunits and in the battle formations they helped the commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations of the units and subunits to organize political indoctrination work and develop socialist competition. They taught Party and Komsomol activists how to work with the men under the complex conditions of modern battle.

As soon as it was learned that the division was going to participate in the exercise, the political branch held a thorough discussion about what had to be done, by whom, and when. They wrote out a specific plan of action for periods of the exercise. Col. S. Averin and Maj A. Kalin, veterans of the Dnepr and Dvina combined arms maneuvers, spoke to the political workers and offered valuable advice. A science-practice conference dedicated to forms and methods of organizing party political work at a troop exercise was also useful.

Political training periods on the topic "The Field Is a School of Combat Skill" were held in all subunits. They were conducted by senior officers, staff workers, members of agitprop groups, and non-T/O propagandists. Political information sessions and exchange of progressive know-how by officers who demonstrated a high level of combat training at earlier tactical exercises were also organized. For example, communists A. Kalashnikov and N. Lysyak shared their experience in organizing party political work under difficult field conditions.

The political branch took care to see that the secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations, agitators, editors of operational news sheets, and other activists had a clear idea of the combat training missions and their place and role in accomplishing them.

Seminars were also held with the secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations. At them the forms and methods of political influence on personnel during an exercise were discussed, as were questions of insuring that communists lead the way in the performance of combat training missions.

When planning party political work during the exercise the political branch envisioned thorough preparation of commanders and political workers for it. The officers were helped to deepen their knowledge of troop control and organizing party political work in the field. Considerable attention was given to having them study the regulations and manuals. Talks with individual commanders were held. Theoretical conferences were set up for them, lectures and reports were presented, and consultation was organized. The preparation of political workers was also done in a differentiated manner.

They devoted a great deal of attention to preparing not just personnel but also the combat equipment and to servicing it carefully.

Propaganda for technical knowledge intensified in the units and sub-units. Technical conferences were held with mechanic-drivers at the initiative of communists. The best specialists shared their know-how in operating combat equipment under winter conditions and driving the vehicles off roads.

The traveling Lenin corners set up in all companies and batteries became centers of mass agitation and political work at the assembly region. At these points the men continued studying the materials of the 25th CPSU Congress and subsequent Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the new USSR Constitution, and other party documents.

Political training periods and information sessions were held in all groups under difficult field conditions. Party and Komsomol activists of all levels talked about events in the country and abroad and the requirements of the combined arms regulations. Newspapers, magazines, and letters for the fighting men were delivered to the companies and batteries at the right time. Every subunit had a transistor radio to hear the latest news.

Meetings with veterans of the division, participants in the Great Patriotic War, and working people of the Belorussian towns and cities were arranged in the units at the initiative of party activists. For example, Col (Ret) K. Anosov, former chief of the political branch of a division and a participant in the Bagration Operation, spoke to the Guardsmen. The fighting men were also very excited by the talk given by Maj Gen M. Kuznetsov. During the war he was commander of the tank company in which Hero of the Soviet Union Pavel Rak served. Rak was

the commander of the fearless crew which was the first to break into the City of Borisov during the Belorussian offensive operation of 1944.

"Take pride in the combat glory of your fathers, but you too distinguish yourself!" This was the call presented by activists at talks, in operational news sheets, and in local radio broadcasts. And their appeals, like the words of the veterans, ignited the hearts of the soldiers and inspired them to new feats.

During the period of the exercise activists organized visits to monuments in Belorussian territory in honor of fighting men and partisans who died in the battles for our Motherland. Political meetings were held at the monuments and local residents as well as military men took part in them. The kolkhoz members and workers of the communities, villages, and cities through which the route of the exercise passed met the fighting men warmly, with hospitality.

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's memoirs "Malaya Zemlya" [Small Land] were published during the exercise. The Guardsmen read them during the short halts and during breaks between attacks. The simple, heart-felt words, permeated with a love for the Motherland and our Leninist party, went straight to the heart and the men received an additional charge of energy and inspiration and developed an unquenchable desire to accomplish the missions facing them. Political workers, party and Komsomol activists, and all fighting men drew many valuable and instructive things for themselves from these memoirs.

Morale. Success in military affairs depends greatly on it. And at the exercise the commanders and political workers maintained morale by effective party political work and skillfully choosing the most expedient forms of influence on the men in the particular situation. For example, when the weathermen warned of an approaching snowstorm and cold spell this did not catch the commanders and political workers off guard. Officers N. Sazonov, S. Cheremnov, and others immediately assembled party and Komsomol activists and gave them instructions. A 24-hour duty watch was set up at all warming points with their assistance. Communist officers situated themselves in the key sectors and promoted the general success. As a result of the steps taken by the commanders and political workers difficulties were avoided, and in response to this paternal concern the fighting men worked with tripled energy.

Among those working enthusiastically during those days were chief of the political branch Lt Col V. Oleshchenko, secretary of the party commission Col S. Averin, political branch propagandist Maj A. Kalin, senior political branch instructor for party organizational work Capt V. Baranov, and the headquarters communists. Working with the unit and subunit commanders and political workers and with party activists they carried on explanatory work among the fighting men, familiarized them with upcoming missions, and advised them on the best way to act in the particular case.

During lulls in the field and during the breaks between training battles party and Komsomol meetings were called. They were run front-style. Let us take one example. This meeting was held before the beginning of the "battle." It was brief, and the resolution adopted at it was terse. After the report and comments in the discussion secretary of the Komsomol organization Pfc A. Makarevich read the collective resolution: "Following the communist example, be first on the attack, stand firm in defense, and fulfill all combat training missions with outstanding scores." And the Guardsmen did just that.

While carrying out the decisions of the meeting subunit and unit activists explained the combat training missions to their fighting men, aroused and mobilized the men to outstanding actions, and at the same time responded sensitively to their wants and needs, and to the moods of the personnel. Operational news sheets and special issues of the wall newspapers were put out at their initiative. Party and Komsomol activists of the subunits where captains Yu. Gromov and A. Limarov are political workers were particularly effective in their work.

In a fast-changing situation it is very important to get the word out on time about who has distinguished himself and to encourage intelligent initiative. I remember the following instance. The motorized riflemen of the company commanded by officer V. Voloshin were operating boldly and courageously. Communists led by the secretary of the company party organization were setting the tone. The exercise leader observed their efforts. Steps were immediately taken at the division to see that all units learned about the skillful, aggressive actions of this subunit. Before the exercise ended the outstanding soldiers had received letters of commendation from the unit commander and their story had been told in broadcasts on local radio and in special combat news bulletins. All this was possible thanks to the efforts of the political workers and members of the unit party committee.

During the exercise the fighting men had to spread out. A small group would sometimes find itself cut off from the main body. The division foresaw this possibility and took care to see that there were communists in all groups performing particular missions. Each of these communists was instructed and told about the situations the men might find themselves in and what it was important to watch for. Needless to say, it is difficult to anticipate everything. Nonetheless, these instruction sessions proved worthwhile.

We have also accumulated considerable useful experience in organizing party political work at flight-tactical exercises. We can refer to the experience of the political branch of one of the aviation units where questions of improving the air, fire, and tactical training of personnel are always a focus of attention. They make broad use of the progressive know-how of military sniper-pilots, masters of combat application, and flight support personnel. The political branch skillfully directs the efforts of leadership personnel to improving the professional skills of the airmen and instilling high fighting, moral-political,

and psychological qualities in them. Experienced worker I. Bezrukavyy sets a personal example here. He is a military sniper-pilot and one of the unit's skilled teachers and methodologists.

The party committee where Maj N. Chubarov is secretary organizes party work in a concrete, purposeful manner right in the crews, flights, and squadrons and tries to see the communists play a leading part in training, work, and discipline. At a recent flight-tactical exercise the communists of the unit demonstrated excellent combat skills and successfully performed the socialist obligations they had assumed.

Success in troop field training depends greatly on how effective and purposefully staff party organizations work, and this includes work at exercises. Particularly important jobs are working out and disseminating resolutions and orders, monitoring and checking on performance, cooperation, and skillful use of all means of automating troop command and control. Staff party organizations are aware of this and are doing a great deal to raise the responsibility of CPSU members for the field training of their personnel. Staff communists today take a more highly skilled approach to the organization of party political work and participate actively in it at tactical exercises.

The working practices of the party organization where communist A. Kazantsev is secretary deserves commendation in this respect. This organization exercises a steady influence on staff communists, who perform their missions well. Discussions, seminars, lectures, reports, and political and military-technical information sessions held just before exercises have been very helpful to them.

During the exercise too the party organization does not slacken its demands on communists. It makes every effort to see that they, all staff officers, carry out their functional duties irreproachably, above all with respect to timely and careful preparation of combat training documents and precise, continuous control of subordinate services. The communists give reports on their activities at the exercise. The party bureau has taken the initiative to organize activities for officers to improve their tactical and special training, thoroughly master the weapons and tactics of the probable enemy, and organize cooperation and mutual information among the services. Party activists always keep communists and all staff officers up to date on the events within the country and in the international arena. They work with them individually. Officers who are new in their positions receive specific assistance. All this helps create a creative atmosphere, an atmosphere of great responsibility and high party standards, in the party collective.

When we talk of further improvement in party political work at field training periods and exercises and making this work more effective the first question that arises is how to eliminate shortcomings which are still encountered in the organization and conduct of this work.

Despite the beneficial experience we have accumulated, certain political agencies still do not give enough attention to improving the forms and methods of party political work at tactical exercises. Certain commanders and political workers are too slow in explaining the tactical situation and mission to personnel. But our war experience provides evidence that timely explanation of the situation was a key factor in party political work and insured conscious action by the fighting men.

Cases still occur where political workers are not well-informed of the situation and missions of their own subunits. Political worker officer L. Bazarnyy, for example, found himself in this situation. In the first stage of the exercise he did not have a clear idea of the mission being performed by the men. For this reason party political work did not cover several sectors involved with the combat actions.

Continuity in party political work has not always been achieved. In some places effective steps to overcome simplifications have not been taken, especially when troops and equipment were supposed to be spread out and the rules of camouflage needed to be strictly observed.

The formalistic attitude toward organization of socialist competition has not yet been eliminated during preparation for and conduct of exercises. The obligations of servicemen and military collectives are sometimes unclear about the goal that they place before the competitors for the exercise period, fail to take account of normative indexes, and do not envision a struggle to surpass them. When publicizing the successes of outstanding and highly rated specialists inadequate attention is given to the ways that they achieve their specific results in mastering equipment and weapons, which makes it difficult to repeat the know-how of the masters on a broad scale.

The combined arms tactical exercises that have been held, the Berezina exercise among them, have confirmed the increased technical training of our troops and the ability of personnel in the units and subunits to use the full capacities of the weapons and equipment entrusted to them and to maintain them well. Nonetheless, political agencies and party organizations must continue to work even harder to mobilize fighting men to improve their mastery of combat equipment and weapons.

During exercises party and Komsomol organizations show a high level of activism. They work hard to see that communists and Komsomol members set an example. They skillfully mobilize the men to accomplish the missions facing their subunits and units. But at the same time, it must be admitted that some party and Komsomol organizations at exercises are not purposeful and practical enough; they lack initiative and the ability to prevent miscalculations and omissions.

The district political directorate is analyzing the causes of these and other problems and taking steps to eliminate them. It sees its duty in work, guided by the instructions of the party, its Central Committee, and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally, to steadily improve

party political work and train command and political cadres and party and Komsomol activists to carry on this work creatively, with initiative.

The books "Malaya Zemlya" and "Vozrozhdeniye" [Renaissance] reflect enormous experience with party political work. When we today turn to the ideas in these works by Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, we see how profoundly they fit with his report at the 18th Komsomol Congress and his speeches to working people and fighting men during the trip through Siberia and the Far East and when presenting the lofty award to the hero-City of Minsk.

The memoirs of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, his instructions and advice, are a rich source for learning about party political work at the front and in a peacetime situation. They give us a clear picture of the combat political worker, a person able to lead the men with his passionate words and personal example, a person who can find and use those forms of work which are most appropriate to the particular conditions and most effective from the standpoint of joining the men ideologically with the party.

These books deal with events of the past. But they are also profoundly contemporary. In "Malaya Zemlya," speaking of the bitter fighting of 1943, Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev constantly calls attention to our present-day work and challenges. And when, for example, he speaks of the qualities of the political leader at the front, we understand that these are the same qualities that are required in peacetime. This remarkable book gives a striking picture of the sources of the high morale of Soviet fighting men and presents reliable ways to shape and strengthen this morale. These propositions enrich our understanding of the problems of guiding the psychological state of personnel, for in essence party political work aims at achieving high troop morale and maintaining it at the required level. It aims at instilling patriotic feelings in the fighting men and making every soldier, officer, and general mentally ready to perform his duty to the Soviet Motherland to the end.

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CRITICISM AND SELF-CRITICISM IN THE ARMED FORCES DISCUSSED

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[Article by Vice Adm N. Shablikov, member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet: "Criticism and Self-Criticism Are a Norm of Party Life"]

[Text] The statements of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev about criticism in his book "Vozrozhdeniye" [Renaissance] made a deep impression on us all. He said: "The more open and public criticism is, the better things will go" and "Criticism awakens the energy of real Bolsheviks; fervor and striving to do better are born from discontent."

These statements cannot help causing us to think about how our commanders, political agencies, party organizations, and all communists use criticism and self-criticism, the party's powerful and sharp-edged weapon in the fight against shortcomings, in their work.

A high-level of political and work activism is seen in the everyday life and combat training of the personnel of the subunits, ships, and units of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet. The decisions of the recent July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee evoked a new surge of creative effort in our personnel. The activism of communists is brilliantly expressed in the improving example they set in combat training, taking greater responsibility for the affairs of their collectives, and striving to completely fulfill socialist obligations adopted in the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces. Commanders, political agencies, and party organizations are carefully analyzing what has been achieved, and assessing existing shortcomings in an objective, principled manner. Healthy party criticism helps collectives identify weak points in their activity, overcome backwardness, and achieve greater goals in combat and political training.

It is common knowledge that as the scale and complexity of the missions being performed increase, a strict, critical approach to all

work assumes special importance. The 25th party congress and the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "The State of Criticism and Self-Criticism in the Tambovskaya Oblast Party Organization" pointed out that all aspects of the activity of a particular organization or particular worker should be objectively evaluated, existing shortcomings must be thoroughly analyzed in order to eliminate them, and a tolerant attitude toward shortcomings and those responsible for them must not be allowed. "We are acting correctly, in a Leninist manner," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 25th CPSU Congress, "when, while giving due credit for achievements, we concentrate our attention on the shortcomings that still exist, on the unresolved problems."

All these statements and instructions concerning the further development of criticism and self criticism are the basis of the activities of the commanders, political agencies, and party organizations of our fleet. The party collectives systematically explain Leninist principles, the instructions and advice of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, the requirements of the CPSU By-Laws, the Instructions to CPSU Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy, and the USSR Constitution concerning criticism and self-criticism. In this the political agencies and party organizations are striving to see that criticism and self-criticism is high-principled, permeated with concern for party interests, public, truthful, and well-founded and that it gives every collective a healthy atmosphere of high standards and intolerance of shortcomings. Employing the method of criticism and self-criticism, fleet party organizations are forthrightly revealing shortcomings in personnel training and indoctrination, party political work, the activities of party committees, party bureaus, and political agencies, and in domestic material support for the fighting men. They work determinedly to overcome instances of conceit, carelessness, and indifference and oppose every omission which in any way diminishes combat readiness.

Our own experience confirms that where criticism and self-criticism is developed and supported and the appropriate conclusions are drawn from it, difficulties and shortcomings are overcome more quickly, the work goes more smoothly, and discipline and order are stronger. In this respect, the example of the party organization of the outstanding shore missile unit where Lt Col P. Pavlenko is political worker can be instructive. This collective of communists discusses important, fundamental questions in an atmosphere of high mutual demandingness and objective evaluation of the results of their own military labor. Criticism is constructive. For example, at a recent session of the party committee the question of political training in the unit was discussed. Before the discussion members of the party committee visited political training periods and analyzed how the men were assimilating the subject, what difficulties were being encountered, and where help was needed. It became clear that the quality of training periods in the groups led by Capt A. Gudko and Sr Lt V. Tolcheyev did not fully meet requirements. The reason for this was mainly that the communists were not working hard enough on self-education. The party committee demanded

that they change their attitude toward political training and it gave them the necessary help. The party committee was also dissatisfied with the work of the unit methods office with respect to propagandists.

Party activists took care to see that the necessary political and military-patriotic literature was assembled there. Now teaching methods training periods for non-T/O propagandists and seminars have begun to be held more often at the office. At one of the recent seminars, for example, group leaders had a useful discussion on ways to raise the effectiveness of political training in light of the demands of the 25th party congress and the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "The State of Lecture Propaganda and Steps to Improve It." This party organization devotes constant attention to increasing the responsibility of communists for the situation in their units and for their own contribution to troop training and indoctrination. For this reason party members and candidates for membership present reports at party meetings and sessions of the party committee. Sr Lt V. Tolcheyev, for example, received a great deal of useful advice at a session of the party committee. His more experienced comrades helped him grasp the essential features of the comprehensive approach to organizing the entire process of indoctrination and how to apply it in practice. Furthermore, they recommended that he rely on party activists and the Komsomol organization at all times. The communist himself learned to make better use of many forms of work with subordinates and means of influencing them. The subunit headed by the young officer is now one of the best in the unit and deservedly carries the title of outstanding.

The statement that it is difficult to increase the effectiveness of a party organization and its influence on the life, work, and training of personnel without developing criticism and self-criticism can be confirmed by referring to the work of the ship party organization where Sr Lt A. Polivets is secretary. At the present time several communists there have fallen back from positions attained earlier. How could such a thing happen? The lack of self-criticism brought them down. Lulled by past achievements, they tolerated formalism in competition, closed their eyes to the fact that certain officers were not checking properly on the level of technical training in their subunits, and ceased being advocates of strict regulation order. CPSU members substituted glorification of past successes for criticism and self-criticism. Even those directly responsible for serious omissions, in particular communist Lt N. Babyak, who slacked off in work with his subordinates and did not fulfill his own personal socialist obligations, were not watched by the party organization. The political agency was forced to correct the party organization. It now evaluates the results of the labor of communists objectively. And the party criticism that is being developed helps the collective eliminate shortcomings.

It follows from what has been said that party organizations are expected to show special concern for the development of criticism from below. They must keep track of how remarks by communists are taken and what is done to put their suggestions into practice. This will be repaid richly. Let me refer to the working experience of the missile boat subunit party organization headed by officer P. Kurnasov.

I recall how certain young officers of this subunit had gaps in their tactical training. The party bureaus studied the attitude of the communists toward performance of their immediate duties and took account of the commander's opinion here too. Then it invited the young communist lieutenants M. Konstantinov and I. Voyka, who for a time had stopped improving their tactical skills, to attend a session of the bureau. A principled discussion, exacting criticism, business-like advice and recommendations, and then practical assistance to the lieutenants straightened matters out.

Another factor in raising the activism and initiative of communists and indoctrinating them in a spirit of high principle and intolerance of shortcomings is the fact that each party member and candidate for membership knows that his criticisms and practical suggestions will be taken in good spirit, receive support, and concrete actions will follow them. For example, at one party meeting communist Capt-Lt V. Sivoplyas proposed the form of training where officers prepare research papers on timely questions of the tactics of naval battle. While preparing the papers and creatively summarizing accumulated experience in waging naval battle, he said in support of his proposal, great advances can be made in solving fire problems. The party meeting backed the communist's proposal. It is noteworthy that the CPSU member who made this valuable suggestion was one of the first to begin a research paper and he involved other officers in this activity. During exercises at sea he successfully employed a tactical innovation which was developed in the paper. His idea received support and spread to other ships.

In this way, a party organization which supported a communist's proposal on the basis of a critical analysis of the situation at one of the decisive sectors of combat training made a notable contribution to improving the tactical skills of its officers. A refusal to be satisfied with past achievements or to stay with a procedure developed in the past and the persistent hunt for more effective training methods by rejecting everything that is outdated and old unquestionably produce positive results. The commander says that the party organization is directly responsible for the fact that the subunit of missile boats has held the lofty title of outstanding for eight straight years and won the naval championship for fire and special training six times.

V. I. Lenin taught communists always, in all circumstances, to evaluate a situation critically and soberly, not cover up mistakes and shortcomings, look the truth in the face no matter how unpleasant it may be, and not fear repeating work over and over and correcting mistakes. In his work "Iz Dnevnika Publitsista" [From the Diary of a Publicist], he emphasized that "The militant party of the progressive class does not fear mistakes. What would be frightening would be to persist in a mistake, to feel a false shame at admitting and correcting the mistake" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], vol 34, p 263).

Unfortunately, there are still comrades who are inclined to persist in their mistakes or simply ignore criticism of their errors and

omissions. Of course, such a position does not lead them to correct their mistakes, certainly not to achieve success. "The person who underestimates criticism or ignores it," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev points out, "deliberately dooms himself to failure."

Not long ago we removed officer I. Romanov from his position. Before this happened he had been criticized for omissions in his work and abuse of his official position several times. Romanov did not draw proper conclusions from the remarks by the communists, but rather took them as personal affronts and on occasion even got back at some of his critics. In the interests of the work this communist had to be removed from the work.

It is true that such cases are extremely rare. But they certainly cannot be disregarded. Article 49 of the USSR Constitution reads: "It is forbidden to persecute for criticism. Persons who persecute for criticism will be held liable." Fleet political agencies and party organizations explain this constitutional demand to communists constantly. In their work they rely on the great strength of public opinion and try to use it to cure the ill as quickly as possible.

Incorrect responses to criticism sometimes arise from a mistaken understanding by certain communists of the sources of their authority. For example, some believe that criticism diminishes their authority. They should beware of V. I. Lenin's well-known idea that "The authority of military workers is not undermined by the person who points out harmful extremes and corrects them, but rather by the one who opposes such correction" (Ibid., vol 42, p 244).

The ability to listen to criticism closely and draw correct conclusions from it is an essential condition of success in any work, but especially in the military where the slightest laxity may bring about a situation fraught with serious dangers.

Criticism and self-criticism are the norm of party life, fixed in the CPSU By-Laws and the rights and duties of every communist. Straightforward criticism and self-criticism is one of the indexes of the ideological level, activism, and selflessness of a CPSU member, his ability to play the part of a real party political fighter. The communist, as was observed at the July Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, cannot and must not ignore cases of negligent attitude toward work.

It is true that at the present time all our communists do not yet fulfill this party duty with honor. The symptoms of the illness which may be described by the words "It's none of my business," once appeared in the party organization of the submarine where Capt-Lt A. Kostenko is secretary. The ship was one of the last in the unit, but this did not disturb certain communists very much. Some of them did not even set a good personal example in work, training, and public life. For example, senior lieutenants G. Luk'yanichev and A. Solovey evaded

personnel indoctrination under the pretext that it was time for them to study the combat equipment. Because they were unaware of the wants and moods of their subordinates and did not carry on careful individual work with them, the senior lieutenants were naturally unable to mobilize the seamen to struggle for better indexes in training and work. But then comrades from the political agency began working hard to establish an atmosphere of high party standards in the collective. They presented discussions and reports on party principles and criticism and self-criticism as a means of fighting shortcomings and they directed the party organization into this kind of work. In addition, the party bureau became more demanding of communists. As a result, the crew of this submarine is now on the path to changes for the good and has achieved more stable results in socialist competition.

The value of criticism, it was stated at the 25th CPSU Congress, lies in its truthfulness and the social significance of the questions raised. It is truthful, objective, thoroughly supported criticism that creates a healthy atmosphere of high standards and intolerance of shortcomings in any collective and promotes active work to eliminate shortcomings. In turn, the value of self-criticism is determined by its sincerity and readiness to begin correcting mistakes and taking care of omissions immediately. I think that it is also relevant here to recall the nature of criticism. When we say that it must be sharp-edged, we certainly do not mean cutting expressions, we mean cutting to the heart of the matter. I once witnessed a discussion during which it was said of a certain esteemed communist that he had "gone too far." But all he had done was come a few minutes late to a meeting. Needless to say, such criticism is insulting. In his book "Vozrozhdeniye," Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev remarks that when criticizing a person from the podium he would immediately emphasize that he considered it necessary to add that he valued the person as a worker. This kind of criticism does not diminish the communist's feeling of his own worth; it confirms his faith in the possibility of rooting out all negative facets and repaying his comrades' trust in him.

As experience demonstrates, criticism and self-criticism cannot develop uncontrolled. The main thing necessary is for party organizations to keep a strict watch on observance of the CPSU By-Laws and Leninist norms of party life. Every communist or non-party member expressing his views on questions that concern him should be confident that he has support and that shortcomings which are revealed will be taken care of. And we demand that leaders and all activists not sidestep critical questions themselves, that they set the tone and show how to remove obstacles from the path.

Party meetings are a true forum for criticism. They give every communist an opportunity to share his ideas, observations, and criticisms on any subject. Party meetings thoroughly analyze party work and its influence on the life and training of personnel, take note of the strong and weak points in the activities of the party collective, and lay out ways to improve this work. It is at the meeting that

communists discuss burning issues, not in casual conversation outside. The public nature of such criticism, as V. I. Lenin so accurately put it, is a sword which itself heals the wounds it inflicts. Needless to say, if a meeting of communists is to fulfill its role there must be good preparation and the participants must be set for business-like, practical talk. There is reason to say that party meetings on the ships and in the units of our fleet have begun to be conducted on a higher ideological and organizational level. They review the most vital and pressing problems and create proper conditions for free discussion of issues and high-principled, comradely criticism of shortcomings. But this cannot be said of all meetings. There are cases where "peace and harmony" reign, where an atmosphere of high principles and mutual demandingness is not created.

In the CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "Practices in Conducting Party Meetings in the Yaroslavl' city party organization," it is stressed that the development of criticism and self-criticism is being retarded by the fact that the party committees and leaders sometimes fail to give attention to the criticisms and suggestions of the communists. Unfortunately, we have not completely eliminated such things either. Take this case, which became the subject of a serious discussion at the fleet political directorate. Last year political worker Capt 3rd Rank I. Rakitin reported that no critical remarks had been expressed at the report and election party meetings. This did not correspond to what we, political directorate workers, had seen ourselves when we attended report and election meetings there. This unprincipled position of one of the workers of the political branch was motivated by a desire to represent the situation in the party organizations in a more favorable light and to cover up shortcomings. Several comrades in this political branch had to be given serious admonitions.

This example is, of course, an isolated one. And we did everything we could to see that it was not repeated. Strict records of critical remarks and suggestions expressed at party meetings and during the report and election campaign were established at the political directorate, political agencies, party committees, and party bureaus and precise plans to follow them up were written. When traveling to the local areas workers of the political directorate always check on fulfillment of these plans. For us criticism and self-criticism are a unique monitoring tool and an effective weapon in the struggle for unconditional fulfillment of party and government decisions, the demands of the USSR Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, and of our own resolutions.

The party commissions of fleet political agencies do important work in this area. For example the party commission at the political directorate recently made a check on how communists of the escort patrol ship commanded by Capt 3rd Rank V. Yelovskiy are fulfilling their regulation duties. It was found that several communists did not take full responsibility for meeting the requirements of the CPSU By-Laws

and interparty work in the collective had slacked off. The question of developing criticism and self-criticism in the party organization had not been brought up for discussion at party meetings or sessions of the bureau recently even though the need for it was more than apparent. Members of the party commission found similar problems in several other party collectives of this unit of surface ships, which was reason to ask the chief of the political branch to present a report at the fleet political directorate. The political agency took our recommendations into account and improved its work on raising the level of responsibility among communists for fulfillment of regulation duties. In their turn, other political agencies also drew the essential conclusions for themselves and took steps to use various means to develop criticism and self-criticism.

But the chief condition that promotes the establishment of an atmosphere of business-like, principled criticism and self-criticism in party collectives is a rise in the level of Marxist-Leninist education and ideological conditioning among the communists. The higher their ideological level is, the further they can see, the more demanding they are of themselves and others and the sharper their response to shortcomings and mistakes will be. They are fully aware of the significance of criticism and self-criticism and the need to use it in their practical activities.

Criticism and self-criticism in our party are not an end in themselves; they are an effective way to improve organizational and political work and eliminate shortcomings. But they can only serve in this way if thoughtful practical steps follow critical signals. This is understood very well by the communists of the naval missile aviation unit where Maj V. Levchenko is one of the members of the party committee. This committee reinforces its party forthrightness and principle with thoughtful organizational work and precisely arranged checks on performance. The communists of the unit believe it is useless to speak frankly and heatedly about shortcomings at meetings if the resolution adopted is soon to be forgotten. To avoid this the party committee is constantly improving its monitoring. It gives broad publicity to steps taken following critical statements and at every meeting informs the collective of progress in carrying out resolutions adopted earlier.

For example, the party committee monitored the problem of strengthening contacts between communist aircraft navigators and specialists of the radar equipment service groups for a long time. This problem, which was raised at a report and election party meeting, has now been resolved. At the recommendation of the committee Sr Lt S. Drozdov, senior technician of the service group, helped navigator Capt S. Romanov and navigator-operator I. Unishkov make a deeper study of the equipment which they use in flight. Similar cooperation has been established in other crews.

At one meeting critical remarks were expressed about the need to improve exchange of know-how. Masters of missile launching should not be working alongside people who have a poor knowledge of their

work — that is how the question was put at the time. The party committee recognized this as a fair criticism. After consulting with the commander the members of the party committee organized additional training periods and drills. Physical facilities for training were improved at the initiative of the communists. A special month of efficiency work was declared in the unit, and several dozen proposals were introduced in practice during it. The commander himself set an example of practical work to carry out the party resolution. With his help military pilot 1st class Maj Ye. Terent'yev performed his combat training mission very well.

What is the value of organizing things that way? It is good because it inspires communists to take the initiative and be active and develop in them the feeling that they are the masters of their party organization. Criticism and self-criticism become a daily weapon for them in the struggle against shortcomings. Communists are beginning to understand that this weapon cannot be used sporadically or before you know it people will become accustomed to omissions and stop noticing them. Following the criticism the organizer must go into action and direct the efforts of the entire party collective to eliminating the shortcoming and straightening out the work. If this is not done any critical statement or proposal, even the best-founded one, will hang uselessly in the air.

Our press has become a mass forum for criticism. We could understand Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in the book "Vozrozhdenye" when he wrote, "From the press we expected not only praise but also severe criticism." Yes, the press pays tribute to the good, tells about those who are outstanding, and passes on the best know-how. But at the same time it is expected — the party obliges it — to fight consistently and persistently against shortcomings, against everything that obstructs our forward movement. The fleet newspaper STRAZH BALTIKI regularly runs critical material in its pages. The editors receive responses to these statements which report on steps taken to eliminate the shortcomings that have been pointed out. Nonetheless, there are still a few workers who underestimate the social significance of statements in the press. As was pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress, they are pleased to accept praise of themselves, but they cannot listen to criticism and draw correct conclusions from it. For example, the organization of socialist competition on the ship where officer Yu. Gzoim serves was harshly but fairly criticized in the fleet newspaper. The editors soon received a response which said that they considered the criticism to be correct and had taken concrete steps to straighten out the omissions. But not much later workers from the political directorate visited this ship and found that the situation in the crew had not improved and they were in danger of not fulfilling their socialist obligations. The comrades who had substituted paper excuses for organizational work to eliminate the causes of the critical remarks had to be corrected. We consider it essential to see that party organizations and communist leaders help make the criticism contained in our fleet newspaper effective.

One effective way of developing and maintaining business-like, meaningful criticism is timely review of servicemen's letters and taking the necessary steps with them. Many letters, of course, express the outrage of the authors at all kinds of violations of orders and instructions, regulation order on ships and in units, cases of abuse of official position and falsification of reports, and other abnormal phenomena. It is the party duty of every CPSU member to be attentive to everything that alarms people, to their ideas and suggestions. At the military council we recently analyzed work with letters. Persons who permitted bureaucratic red tape in treatment of them were held strictly responsible. Steps were taken to put an end to cases of indifference to critical signals.

The question of criticism and self-criticism is not isolated from other problems of life and the multifaceted activity of party organization. It is inseparably linked with the entire process of developing party democracy and with the ideological and political growth of communists. When we work to develop criticism and self-criticism we are at the same time striving to improve all aspects of intraparty life and discuss pressing questions of party life at meetings of party activists and assemblies and seminars of commanders, political workers, and the secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations. In this way we can increase the activism and militance of party organizations and all communists in accomplishing the missions facing our ships and units.

Criticism is like a rising wind. It helps us avoid the quiet water of mistakes and laxity in our work. Unconditional fulfillment of CPSU demands with respect to the development and increasing the effectiveness of criticism and self-criticism is one of the key conditions for insuring the fighting effectiveness of party organizations and activism of communists and strengthening their influence on all aspects of the life and activities of personnel. Developing the communists' ability to use the tested weapon of criticism and self-criticism at all times and everywhere in the fight against shortcomings is a matter of constant concern for us. Communists of the fleet are making every effort to see that this weapon takes a worthy place in the arsenal of means used in the struggle to carry out the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and its demands with respect to the armed defenders of the Motherland and to raise the combat readiness of the subunits, ships, and units.

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INDOCTRINATION GUIDE ON VIGILANCE, READINESS AND DISCIPLINE

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[Article by Col I. Semenov: "Lenin's Behests to Soviet Fighting Men with Respect to Vigilance, Combat Readiness, and Discipline. Serve the Motherland as the Great Lenin Wished!"

[Text] The purpose of the training period on this subject is to see that every student thoroughly grasps V. I. Lenin's behests to Soviet fighting men on maintaining high revolutionary vigilance, unflagging combat readiness, and discipline, becomes aware of their enormous importance in contemporary conditions, and follow them strictly in his everyday work.

Ten hours are allocated for study of the topic. It is advisable to divide this time as follows: two hours for lecture or talk; four hours for independent study; four hours for the seminar or discussion.

It is recommended that four basic questions be treated during the lecture or talk: 1. V. I. Lenin's teachings on vigilance. 2. A high level of combat training is a key factor in the combat readiness of personnel. 3. V. I. Lenin on Soviet military discipline and methods of strengthening it. 4. The 25th CPSU Congress on maintaining the defense capability of the country at the level of current requirements.

It is desirable to begin the lecture with a brief introduction in which the speaker stresses that V. I. Lenin worked out the doctrine of defense of the socialist Fatherland in great depth and breadth. He taught us that the level of a country's defense capability depends decisively on the combat readiness and fighting effectiveness of the army and navy. The leader of our party and state was the founder of the Soviet Armed Forces and defined the basic requirements made of them and the principles of training and indoctrinating the personnel of a new kind of army. The works of V. I. Lenin contain his fundamental instructions to the party and people concerning the necessity of maintaining high revolutionary vigilance and discipline and strengthening the defense capability of the country by every means.

They also contain his immortal behests to the fighting men of the army and navy to be on guard, in constant readiness to deliver a crushing response to imperialist aggressors and reliably defend our great socialist achievements.

In its work to strengthen the country's defense and improve our glorious Armed Forces, the Communist Party is always guided by V. I. Lenin's teaching on defense of the socialist Fatherland. It is profoundly reflected and creatively elaborated in the CPSU Program, the decisions of party congresses, decrees of Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and in the Soviet Constitution.

Only by fulfilling V. I. Lenin's behests can the Soviet Armed Forces honorably perform the important missions given to them by the 25th CPSU Congress and the entire Soviet people. That is why it is so important for every soldier and seaman to be well aware of Lenin's immortal teachings, to follow them without exception, and to develop the qualities of a reliable defender of our Motherland and the achievements of socialism.

1. V. I. Lenin's Teachings on Vigilance

The young Republic of Soviets found itself encircled by enemies from the very first day after the victory of Great October. In alliance with internal counterrevolutionaries the imperialists did everything they could to strangle the world's first worker-peasant state and deprive the working people of their historic gains. In addition to direct military intervention they organized conspiracies, provocations, murders, and sabotage and entangled our country in a web of espionage.

Under these conditions Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, the leader of our party and state, taught that the highest revolutionary vigilance must be shown. He pointed out that the bourgeoisie would resort to any savagery and crime to protect the decaying system of capitalist slavery. And therefore, "The first commandment of our policy, the first lesson that all workers and peasants must assimilate, is to be on guard" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], vol 44, p 296).

By revolutionary vigilance Vladimir Il'ich meant the ability to expose the intrigues of the enemy, no matter how cunning and clever he might be, and to take all necessary precautions to stop his anti-Soviet activities. He linked these qualities with instilling in the masses and the fighting men of the army and navy political sensitivity and an understanding of the critical importance of all the forms of struggle by the working people to liberate themselves from the yoke of capitalism.

In the fight against the enemies of the Soviet State V. I. Lenin assigned a large part to both specially formed agencies and to the vigilance of the broadest masses of working people. He addressed many letters to parties and Soviet organizations containing appeals to the workers and peasants of Russia and the fighting men of the Red Army.

Vladimir Il'ich directed special attention to strictly upholding party, state, and military secrecy. At the 7th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) in March 1918 he stressed that we were in conditions where military secrets were very important, crucial, matters for the Russian Republic.

V. I. Lenin considered divulging a secret, whether committed deliberately or without intent, to be a grave crime against the Motherland, as aiding and abetting the enemy. "In the personal sense," he wrote, "the difference between a traitor through weakness and a traitor by intent and calculation is very large; in a political sense there is no difference, for politics is concerned with the actual destiny of millions of people, and this destiny does not change whether millions of workers and poor peasants were betrayed by traitors out of weakness or desire for personal gain" ("Poln. Sobl ..." op. cit., vol 40, pp 131-132).

Lenin's teaching on the necessity of strictly maintaining military and state secrecy and steadily raising revolutionary vigilance became law for our people and their armed defenders. His words were constantly recalled during the Civil War and in the years of peaceful building. Soldiers and commanders were always guided by them during the Great Patriotic War. Nothing, not even the threat of death, could force a Soviet fighting man to give away secrets to the enemy. Our people will always remember the names of the courageous patriots such as Gen D. M. Karbyshev, privates Yuriy Smirnov and Nikolai Fedorchenko, Smm Yevgeniy Nikonov, and other fearless, dedicated sons of the Motherland who died in agony after inhumane fascist torture, but did not reveal one word of military secrets to the enemy.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev tells a striking story in his memoirs "Malaya Zemlya" [Small Land] concerning how skillfully military secrets were kept during the Great Patriotic War: "'When is it?' Soldiers, commanders, and political workers asked again and again, without adding the word 'offensive,' because even without it everyone knew what the subject was. The only possible answer to give was one word, 'Soon.' The day and plan of the offensive were kept in strictest secrecy. A plan that the enemy has found out, of course, is half doomed beforehand. Therefore, our first mission was to maintain the strictest secrecy. We prohibited any correspondence related to the operation in preparation. The group of people involved in working out plans was kept to an absolute minimum."

The chronicle of the Great Patriotic War is rich in similar examples. The requirements of the military oath and regulations concerning the need to be vigilant and maintain strict military and state secrecy are very important today. When all the branches of the Armed Forces have new equipment and weapons and many servicemen are involved in performing missions of national importance, the question of preventing leakage of official information becomes especially urgent.

We cannot disregard the growing activities of the intelligence agencies of the imperialist states directed against our country. The imperialist intelligence services and their agents use any means and pay any price to obtain information on the military-economic potential of the USSR, war mobilization plans, and the technical equipment of our Armed Forces, in particular new models of weapons, air defense systems, air-fields, missile launch sites, troop combat training, location of units, and the like. The intelligence services of the NATO countries use the latest advances in science and technology to improve means of espionage and sabotage. Spy satellites, radar, night vision instruments, devices to listen in on radio and telephone conversations, microcameras, and other devices are used extensively. Cadres of professional intelligence agents and saboteurs are being trained intensively. Diplomats, businessmen, journalists, and tourists are also drawn into espionage and subversive activity. Intelligence agents are often members of various delegations traveling to the Soviet Union.

It is important for Soviet fighting men to know the forms and methods used by the imperialist intelligence services in order to be able to recognize and stop their treacherous actions and defend the interests of our Motherland. Here is one example. Sr Smm Gennadiy Logovoy was walking past an important installation one day and saw a person taking pictures of it. The sailor demanded that the stranger show his documents. Instead the stranger dashed away, tearing the film out of the camera to expose it while he ran. WO [Michman] Vasily Miroychev and local residents hurried to help Logovoy. The spy was stopped. He was forced to admit that, under cover of a diplomatic passport, he was collecting secret military information. The diplomat-spy was expelled from the Soviet Union. So the high vigilance of Soviet seamen helped disarm an enemy.

Soldiers and seamen on guard and watch duty need to show special vigilance. These forms of military work are considered combat missions and demand high moral-political and fighting qualities, heightened alertness, self-control, and attention. The popular saying is, "At your post it is like wartime; be doubly vigilant." The enemy is clever and treacherous. He uses many different tricks to confuse the serviceman at his post and to distract his attention from the installation he is guarding. That is why even the slightest carelessness, the most insignificant deviation from regulation requirements, may be harmful to the interests of our Motherland and sometimes cost the guard his own life. Every fighting man must be deeply aware of his responsibility for the assigned work and knows the requirements of the Manual on Garrison and Guard Duty well. Courageous, determined guard and watch personnel who know their duties thoroughly never become confused in the face of danger.

To achieve their dirty purposes the imperialist agents try to find people, among them military servicemen, who are careless with acquaintances, like to show off their information in conversation or

correspondence and to brag, become careless in work with secret material and storage of personal or official documents, and violate the rules of telephone and radio conversations. The enemy spies use promises, threats, and blackmail to get the information they need and they look for people who have taken to drinking, who love the "good" life, and who are afraid to take responsibility for misdeeds or crimes they have committed.

Some inexperienced military men think that secrets are kept only in safes, at headquarters, and the ordinary soldier or seaman has nothing to do with them. This is a mistaken belief. Information that cannot be divulged is carried not only by top officers, but by every regular-term serviceman. The location of the unit, its weapons and combat equipment, the character of combat training, the time and place of exercises, maneuvers, combat fire, and ship cruises, questions of standing combat duty and guard and watch duty, and the names of commanders and superiors — it is forbidden to reveal these and many other types of information to anyone or to mention them in conversation or correspondence, not only with acquaintances, but even with relatives and close friends. Certainly they cannot be revealed to chance acquaintances.

It follows from all this that vigilance must become a solid rule of all life and work for every soldier and seaman. At exercises, on the march, at the range, at the training center, in the barracks, outside the unit area, on work trips, and traveling home — the requirements of high, constant vigilance can never be forgotten anywhere.

To avoid mistakes and be a vigilant fighting man at all times it is important to be guided by the teachings of the great Lenin, who said that in the struggle against enemy intrigue Soviet people "must be skillful, cautious, and alert; they must pay the closest attention to the slightest disorder, the slightest deviation from conscientious execution of the laws of the Soviet government. The slightest illegality or violation of the Soviet order provides an opening which the enemies of the working people will use immediately" ("Poln. Sobr." op. cit., vol 39, pp 155, 156).

It is also essential to remind the audience to exercise high political vigilance. The imperialists are using every means to step up the "psychological" war and ideological sabotage against our Motherland and the other fraternal countries. Their chief idological-political weapon is anticomunism. Its primary content is slander against the socialist system and distortion of the policies and goals of the communist parties and Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Their objective is to undermine the socialist system, glorify the illusory "freedoms" and "wonders" of the Western way of life, and weaken the world socialist system. General Jackson, chairman of the American Committee for Political Information, once openly admitted, "In the idological war against the communists we do not need the truth, we need subversive actions."

All kinds of radio sabotage centers pursue this goal. Among them are Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, located in Munich, controlled by the CIA, and financed from the U. S. Budget. The U. S. administration consistently increases appropriations for radio sabotage, raising the amount to 73 million dollars in 1978. Incitement, lies, and malicious slander against the socialist world are also typical of radio stations such as Voice of America, Deutsche Welle, and others. These radio sabotage centers draw in former Nazi henchmen and present-day defectors, who have betrayed their Motherland and are working off their "Judas' silver" by malicious slander against it, as employees.

Bourgeois propaganda has great hopes for the ideological decay of Soviet young people, who have not gone through the harsh school of life and struggle that was the lot of the older generation. They use every means to kindle attitudes of dependency, petty selfishness, consumerism, and egotism and stir up the nationalistic and religious feelings of people who are unstable in ideological and moral-political terms. Our enemies particularly hope that they will be able to find such people among the servicemen of the army and navy, that in a future war, if the imperialist aggressors unleash one, there will be no Matrosovs and Kosmodem'yanskayas among the defenders of our Motherland.

These hopes are in vain! The young fighting men of the Soviet Armed Forces stand together with all Soviet people in close solidarity around the party of Lenin. They are absolutely devoted to the cause of their fathers and the glorious traditions of the older generation. They are ready to give every effort and life itself if necessary for the defense of our Motherland and the achievements of socialism.

When completing the presentation of material on the first question, it is important to emphasize that vigilance is based on the political maturity, ideological conviction, and class self-awareness of each fighting man and his personal responsibility for defending the achievements of October. This can only be accomplished on the basis of study of the immortal ideas and teachings of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin.

2. A High Level of Combat Training Is a Key Factor in the Combat Readiness of Personnel

V. I. Lenin always demanded that the party of Bolsheviks itself continue studying military affairs and teach the subject to the common people in order to gain power and defend revolutionary gains against encroachment by internal and foreign reactionaries. Drawing lessons from the December 1905 uprising in Moscow, he observed that we had not made an adequate study of the art of armed uprising or taught it to the people.

Vladimir Il'ich called the attention of the party and masses of working people to the fact that if an oppressed class fails to study the art of fighting it deserves to be treated as slaves. "An exploited class,"

he said, "that is not trying to get weapons, learn how to handle them, and master military affairs would be a class of lackeys" ("Poln. Sobr." op cit., vol 49, p 104).

The great leader taught that the best army, with the most devoted revolutionaries, will be immediately wiped out by an enemy if they are not adequately armed, trained, and supplied with food. He commented many times that without equipment and the ability to use it in battle against the enemy victory is impossible. In armed struggle, he stressed, "The winner is the one with the best equipment, organization, discipline, and machinery" (Ibid., vol 36, p 116).

During the Civil War and military intervention, despite the many problems that arose, Vladimir Il'ich always considered teaching the army and people military affairs to be one of the main tasks. His instructions were contained in state documents. On 22 April 1918 the All-Russian Central Executive Committee adopted the decree "Compulsory Training in the Art of War." It said that a country surrounded by enemies on all sides must have well-trained Armed Forces in constant combat readiness. According to the decree every working man between the age of 18 and 40 had to take a course in military training, without leaving the job.

The Communist Party consistently follows the Leninist slogan of really teaching military affairs. Successful implementation of Lenin's teaching made it possible in the prewar years to retrain the army and navy on the basis of combat equipment that was modern for the time and the latest advances of military science. This created favorable preconditions so that during the harsh trials of the Great Patriotic War our Armed Forces were able not only to withstand the powerful blows of the fascist military machine but also to crush the enemy.

The heroes of the fighting were generally masters of their work who had complete control of the weapons entrusted to them. Here is a typical example. During November 1941 the tank crew of officer Lavrinenko took up the defense near the division command post of General Panfilov. Eight fascist tanks were moving toward our position. The officer gave the command, "Forward!" and the Soviet tank raced toward the enemy. Taking advantage of the factor of surprise, the tank opened fire against the Lead Nazi machine almost instantaneously and it caught fire. Now the outcome of the battle would be decided in seconds. Our tank troops fired six more shells one after the other, and each one hit the target exactly! This was brilliant proof of the outstanding training of the gunner and the entire tank crew. The soldiers knew the performance characteristics of their weapon perfectly and had learned how to maneuver the tank quickly and fire accurately. This helped them in the duel against greatly superior enemy forces.

During the war years our glorious infantrymen, pilots, artillerymen, seamen, paratroopers, signal troops, and fighting men of all combat specializations demonstrated great combat skill.

Lenin's teachings on the necessity of a high level of combat training and constant combat readiness are extremely important under current conditions. Today, when truly revolutionary changes have taken place in military affairs, there can be no question of high troop combat readiness without good training and an outstanding level of combat teamwork and organization.

The CPSU and the other fraternal parties are working hard and persistently for peace, advancing proposals to extend detente, ban the production of weapons of mass destruction, achieve disarmament, and many others. However, as was emphasized in the documents of the 25th CPSU Congress, reactionary circles continue to be active in the imperialist countries. Under the false pretext of the "Soviet military threat," they are carrying on accelerated physical preparations for a new war. The cutting edge of their war preparations is directed against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. That is why it is so important to be constantly on guard, in a high state of readiness to repulse an attack by any aggressor, to smash the aggressor. Combat duty is particularly important here. The men standing combat duty are performing a combat mission of national importance. This is why the requirements for their combat readiness are extremely high.

Experience demands that every fighting man going on combat duty understand thoroughly its enormous importance and his enormous personal responsibility for irreproachable performance of this duty.

It is also important to emphasize that under present-day conditions the question of the combat readiness of the Armed Forces as a whole takes on new meaning. Combat readiness today must be high at all times, not by a certain definite time. There can be no seasonality, no ups and downs. The subunits, units, and ships, and every individual Soviet fighting man have a much larger part in guaranteeing constant combat readiness.

Chapter 5 of the USSR Constitution says: "It is the duty of the USSR Armed Forces to the people to reliably defend the socialist Fatherland, to be in constant combat readiness to guarantee the immediate repulsion of any aggressor." This demand comes from the teachings of V. I. Lenin and the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress and reflects the concern of the Communist Party and Soviet State for the security of our great Motherland.

The outstanding combat training of personnel is a key factor in combat readiness. To master combat equipment and weapons means not only to study their physical parts and fighting qualities in detail. It is equally important to use them effectively to accomplish combat missions, hit targets at maximum range on the first shot or launch, and make full use of the velocity, altitude, mobility, protective, and other qualities of new equipment.

The main thing in the combat training of fighting men in all specializations is field, air, and sea training. It is true, as they say, that "the field is the soldier's academy." It is there, at training periods and exercises, firing ranges and missile launches, ocean cruises and in flight, in a situation maximally approximating that of combat, that the defenders of our Motherland learn to defeat a strong, active, technically well-equipped enemy. They learn how to carry out unexpected, decisive actions considering that the enemy can use the most modern weapons, including weapons of mass destruction. The men learn to operate in different weather conditions, in all seasons, and during the day or night.

Combat training achievements are especially high in those military collectives which know the true value of training time, use every training hour with maximum effectiveness, and allow no indulgence or simplification. In these places the soldiers and seamen work their hardest at training periods. It is very important here to listen carefully to the commander's explanations, to try to acquire the essential skills in handling weapons and equipment quickly, and to consistently borrow the know-how of the best men in the subunit.

The combat equipment and weapons are public property and must be taken care of. In the "Red Army Man's Handbook," published in 1918 and approved by V. I. Lenin, it said: "If you are not going to take care of it (strip, clean, and lubricate), it will become ruined and worthless, and without a weapon you are nothing. Therefore, it must be cherished as the apple of your eye."

The demands made of soldiers and sailors today for taking care of equipment and maintaining it in constant combat readiness are much higher. Complex equipment needs to be inspected, carefully tuned, and adjusted regularly. And even a weapon such as the automatic rifle can fail if it is not taken care of well. The rules for maintaining combat equipment and weapons and other devices are laid out precisely in instructions and manuals. It is imperative that every fighting man observe the requirements of these documents strictly and unconditionally.

Military efficiency workers and inventors play an important part in maintaining expensive combat equipment and weapons and training facilities. They make major contributions to mechanizing and electrifying training centers, ranges, tank grounds, and fire posts and help improve the training process.

Socialist competition is especially important in accomplishing all the missions of combat training and troop indoctrination. It covers the entire process of training and indoctrination and provides a powerful means to develop the creative initiative and activism of personnel. V. I. Lenin explained the meaning of socialist competition in a profound way. He said its goals were "to draw a true majority of the working people into the arena of work in which they can show themselves, develop their capabilities, and discover their talents" ("Poln. Sobr." op. cit., vol 35, p 195). Publicity, comparability of results, and

the possibility of repeating progressive know-how and Leninist principles that have been enriched by the vital creativity of the masses and establish ways to make competition more effective.

Socialist competition today has become a powerful lever for increasing the social activism of the fighting men and the combat readiness of the army and navy. Among the many remarkable initiatives that have emerged from competition are those under the slogan "Hit the target on the first shot," "Operate at night within daytime standards," "An outstanding result for every training day, and "None must fall behind the leaders."

Competition among Soviet fighting men rose to a new level in connection with preparations for the historic 60th anniversary of Great October and the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces. The initiative of leading units of the branches of the Armed Forces and the atomic submarine, which called for making the year of the 60th anniversary of the USSR Armed Forces a year of shock military labor, has been taken up everywhere in the army and navy. The slogan of competition, "Reliably defend the socialist Fatherland, remain in constant combat readiness, work hard to master the weapons and equipment, and improve combat skills," is the call to competitive battle.

The movement for the title of outstanding large unit and the campaign for the best indexes in work and training among the groups of forces, which was waged by personnel of the Southern Group of Forces, has continued to develop.

The CPSU attaches great importance to introducing Leninist principles of organizing competition. In the letter of the CPSU Central Committee, USSR Council of Ministers, AUCCTU, and Komsomol Central Committee concerning the development of socialist competition in 1978 it says, "We must improve the publicity for competition, surround leaders and innovators with respect and honor, and disseminate and introduce their know-how and achievements broadly." This applies entirely to competition in the army and navy. And here it is very important for every participant in competition to know who is ahead and who is behind on the particular day and why. The results of competition must be summarized regularly, winners and losers determined, and effective help given to those who need it when they need it.

The essence of socialist competition in the current phase was accurately expressed in the words of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev: "Work better today than yesterday, better tomorrow than today. And better means stressing quality, efficiency." This teaching is personified in the everyday affairs of our military collectives.

3. V. I. Lenin on Soviet Military Discipline and Methods of Strengthening It

V. I. Lenin assigned a special place among the crucial conditions necessary for the victory of socialism and communism to the conscious

discipline of the working people. Vladimir Il'ich devoted especially great attention to strengthening Soviet military discipline.

Lenin's assessment of the role of military discipline is based on a profound analysis of the political, class content of war. Any war aimed at a socialist state has a plainly expressed class nature. Because of the irreconcilability of the political conflicts, combat actions are completely bitter and decisive, precluding any possibility of compromise. In such battle one of the crucial factors that determines the outcome is the high political-moral condition of the troops, their organization and discipline.

Considering the special role of discipline in achieving victory over the enemy, V. I. Lenin demanded that all laws concerning the Red Army and all orders be executed and army discipline be maintained out of conscience, not fear. He underlined very emphatically, "Anyone who does not help the Red Army completely and unconditionally, who does not work his hardest to maintain order and discipline in it, is a traitor, a henchman of Kolchak" ("Poln. Sobr." op. cit., vol 39, p 152).

V. I. Lenin, the founder of the new type of army considered Soviet military discipline to be a special form of national discipline. Its essential features are determined by the socialist system and the revolutionary nature of our Armed Forces, which are defending the vital interests of the working people. It differs fundamentally from discipline in the capitalist armies. Vladimir Il'ich called the old army the army of excessive drilling and tormenting the soldiers. In the bourgeois army discipline is based on the principle of domination and subordination, drill and mindless obedience. It is implanted by forceful means and a system of deceiving and ideologically misleading soldiers.

Disciplinary practices in the U. S. Armed Forces, for example, are based on the principle known as "instinctive obedience," which means completely eliminating the conscious principle in a person's behavior. This condition is achieved by mind-dulling drill, suppressing the slightest deviations of thought, and instilling fear of punishment. "The soldier must go into battle," it says in one of the army manuals, "not because his conscience orders him to or his sense of duty suggests it; he must go because his commander has ordered it." The U. S. military bulletin COMMANDER'S DIGEST admits that for most American servicemen "the word discipline is usually associated with the word punishment."

In the army of the socialist state discipline is based on the consciousness of the servicemen and their personal responsibility for defense of the Motherland. High, conscious military discipline is a key principle of Soviet military development which our party has consistently and steadily followed since the first days of our army's existence. A few years after adoption of the decree on organization of the Worker-Peasant Red Army V. I. Lenin observed: "The Red Army has established unprecedentedly strong discipline, not with the club but on the basis of the consciousness, devotion, and selflessness of the workers and peasants themselves" ("Poln. Sobr.", vol 38, p 240).

It is precisely the conscious nature of Soviet military discipline that gives it enormous force and serves as the inspirational principle in the many heroic feats of Soviet fighting men in battle against the enemies of the socialist Fatherland. Capt. G. P. Maslovskiy performed one of these feats during the last war. He was ordered to destroy a large fascist ammunition dump. Before setting off on the assignment he wrote a letter-testament to his son Yuryi. It contained these words: "Well, my dear son, we will never see each other again. An hour ago I received an assignment from which I will not return alive. The glorious city of Lenin, the cradle of the revolution, is threatened. Its further welfare depends on performance of my assignment. What strengths help me perform this courageous act? Military discipline and party duty. You will grow up and come to understand; you will treasure our Motherland. It is good, very good to treasure the Motherland." The heroic officer carried out the order with honor, but in so doing died the death of the brave.

And here is a case which occurred in our day and shows how conscious discipline helps the heirs of the glory of the war veterans perform their military duty with honor. Pvt Leonid Panchishkin was guarding an installation. He did not see the criminals approaching stealthily because of the darkness. Shots rang out. Wounded but surmounting the pain, the sentry managed to give the signal to the guard shack, took a defensive position, and prevented the criminals from hiding before his comrades arrived. For this he was awarded the Order of the Red Star.

Later, when asked what helped him perform his duty in such a difficult and dangerous situation, Leonid said: "I think discipline was the main thing." Why did this bleeding soldier continue to act courageously and consciously at such a difficult moment? It was because he had already developed the habit of always following the oath, regulations, and the requirements of military discipline.

Because, like discipline in general, military discipline is a social phenomenon, it is always developing, changing in content, and imposing higher demands. Therefore, the Communist Party, guided by Lenin's teachings and its own Program, demands that commanders, political agencies, and party and Komsomol organizations continue strengthening political indoctrination work aimed at bolstering military discipline, maintaining regulation order in every unit and ship, and insuring that communist and Komsomol members set an example at work and in their personal behavior.

The significance of military discipline has grown under contemporary conditions. V. I. Lenin's words, "To achieve victory takes a majestic struggle and iron military discipline" are especially timely today ("Poln. Sobr." op. cit, vol 40, p 220). Qualitative changes in military affairs have greatly increased the demands for military discipline, precise performance, and self-discipline. Today as never before there must be conscious and rigorous adherence to the rules and

regulations established in the army and navy. It is vitally necessary for every fighting man to be irreproachable in performance of orders and regulations and meeting the requirements of all documents that control the use of combat equipment and weapons and standing combat duty.

The CPSU Central Committee decree entitled "Steps to Improve Party Political Work in the Soviet Army and Navy," dated 21 January 1967, contains one of the party's most important teachings: "Insure that all servicemen understand thoroughly that in current conditions, when the army has nuclear missiles, the role and importance of military discipline are even greater. Absolutely precise and exact fulfillment of the military oath, military regulations, and orders of commanders and irreproachable performance and organization are demanded of every serviceman because the slightest carelessness or lack of discipline may have grave consequences. This fundamental demand was elaborated in subsequent decisions of the party."

The demands of V. I. Lenin and the CPSU with respect to military discipline are reflected in the military oath and regulations. The regulation principles have taken account of the enormous historical experience of Soviet military development, the combat experience of the Great Patriotic War, and modern changes in military affairs.

The Disciplinary Code of the USSR Armed Forces states that military discipline means strict and exact observance by all servicemen of the procedures and rules established by Soviet laws and military regulations. It is founded on each serviceman's consciousness of military duty and his personal responsibility for the defense of his Motherland.

The conscious character of Soviet military discipline also determines methods used for strengthening it. V. I. Lenin always considered persuasion the primary method. To persuade fighting men means to explain to them the policy of our party, the historic mission of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the necessity of remaining in constant readiness for heroic defense of the Motherland. In his day M. V. Frunze said that our soldier "can understand completely that military discipline is a heavy burden only for those who do not understand its goals and significance. It is entirely possible to understand the meaning and spirit of the rules of military order and the commands that are given."

The method of persuasion as the primary form of strengthening military discipline does not exclude the method of coercion in relation to servicemen who violate regulation order. The interests of defending our Motherland demand that the commander react to every misdeed by subordinates. Whoever violates discipline, whether he wants to or not, harms the combat readiness of the subunit, unit, or ship and undermines their fighting effectiveness.

To be disciplined is a regulation requirement and, at the same time, the moral duty of every Soviet fighting man. The norms of behavior

in the regulations are inseparably linked to the principles of the moral code of a builder of communism. The demands of the 25th CPSU Congress for moral indoctrination of Soviet people and instilling in them an active posture in life and conscious attitude toward public duty apply in full to Soviet fighting men.

The role and responsibility of military collectives in strengthening discipline in the army and navy have increased. Their moral-political unity, working harmony, and influence on each fighting man constitute one of the decisive factors in successful fulfillment of all missions, raising combat readiness, and achieving victory in battle.

The commander has a decisive role in maintaining strong military discipline in the subunit, unit, or ship. He receives vital help in this important work from the political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations. They carry on a great deal of purposeful political indoctrination with personnel and see that each communist and Komsomol member sets a personal example of observance of regulation norms of behavior and in work and training.

In conclusion it may be observed once again that the conscious character of Soviet military discipline and the personal responsibility of each serviceman for the defense of our Motherland are one of the most important sources of the might and invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces founded by the great Lenin.

4. The 25th CPSU Congress on Maintaining the Defense Capability of the Country at the Level of Current Requirements

The 25th party congress thoroughly analyzed the international situation using Leninist methodology. The congress demonstrated that the ratio of forces in the world has changed in favor of socialism. It emphasized that detente today has become the leading trend in world development. The congress outlined a program of continued struggle for peace and international cooperation, security, and independence.

At the same time, the congress noted that although the possibilities for aggressive actions by imperialism have been significantly curtailed, its nature remains unchanged. Reactionary forces are stepping up the arms race, fanning the flames in centers of military conflicts, and strengthening their aggressive blocs.

The broad armed intervention of the NATO countries in the domestic affairs of Zaire confirmed once again the hostility of the policies followed by imperialistic circles in the West to the cause of peace and freedom. It is characteristic that the Peking leaders are harnessing themselves ever more closely to the imperialist forces who are flaunting the elementary norms of international law. From the Pentagon and NATO to the Maoists — that is the front of the forces attempting to thwart the cause of international detente.

Disregarding the grave economic position of the country and the extremely low standard of living of the population, the Maoists are accelerating war preparations, including building nuclear missiles. According to information in the foreign press, China's military expenditures reach 28 billion dollars a year. The Chinese leadership assigns 40 percent of budget appropriations or 25 percent of national income to military purposes. Mao's heirs are continuing the policy aimed at thwarting the peaceful efforts of the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries, continuing the arms race, and moving the world closer to a new war. Peking calls for an armed confrontation with the Soviet Union and the formation of a "united front" against the USSR.

The militaristic preparations in Peking and their effort to poison the international atmosphere find approval and support among the aggressive circles in the West. Certain Western politicians even show a readiness to give China weapons to fight against the "common enemy." The broad world community is well aware of Washington's attempts to use the "Chinese card" in the global game against the Soviet Union. All these things seriously undermine the cause of peace and international security.

The 25th CPSU Congress emphasized that our party will do everything it can to see that the glorious Armed Forces of the Soviet Union continue to have everything they need to perform their important mission: to be the watchguard of the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and the bulwark of world peace.

There is virtually no important area of the life of the Soviet Army and Navy which is not an object of attention for our party and its Central Committee.

The party uses the advantages of the socialist social order and economic system and the advances of the scientific-technical revolution to provide the best possible material-technical base for the defense capability of the Soviet State and defensive might of its Armed Forces. Soviet fighting men are rightfully proud of the technical equipment of the army and navy and give due credit to the labor of the workers, kolkhoz farmers, scientists, designers, and engineers whose hands and minds built the first-class combat equipment and weapons to defend our Motherland against the imperialist aggressors.

Sociopolitical factors play an important part in further bolstering the defensive might of the country. All the advances made in our country thanks to the party's Leninist social policy — the highly mature social relations, the convergence of classes and social groups, the establishment of communist ideology, Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism among the masses, and the feelings of national pride shared by Soviet people — are also reflected in the state's growing military might. They give rise to the internal solidarity and unity of personnel and relations of true comradeship and brotherhood among servicemen who come from different classes and social groups and represent all the nations and peoples of our country.

The Leninist social policy followed by the CPSU insures that the unity of the army and people will continue to grow stronger. This process is seen, on the one hand, in the constant concern of Soviet people for the technical equipment of the army and navy and preparation of young people to defend the socialist Fatherland. It is also seen in the marked improvement in the living conditions of personnel. On the other hand, it insures active participation by fighting men in the economic and sociopolitical life of the country. For example, more than 17,000 representatives of the army and navy or people's deputies are members of rayon, city, oblast, and central party bodies.

Fighting men take an active part in accomplishing various national economic tasks such as gathering the harvest, building residential buildings, and combating natural disasters. The railroad troops who are helping build the Baykal-Amur Mainline are showing true labor valor.

Thanks to the solicitude of the Communist Party and the heroic labor of the Soviet people, the Soviet Armed Forces have everything they need to reliably defend the Motherland: first-class, modern combat equipment and weapons and excellent training. They have an enormous moral-political advantage over the armies of the capitalist countries because our army and navy are inseparably linked with the people. Our soldiers and seamen were raised in a spirit of high communist ideology, political consciousness, and socialist patriotism and internationalism.

The greeting of the CPSU Central Committee, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and USSR Council of Ministers to the fighting men of the valiant Armed Forces of the Soviet Union on the occasion of their 60th anniversary is a document of enormous mobilizing force. It calls on personnel to continue improving military skills, steadily master modern equipment, constantly raise the level of organization, and fulfill the military oath strictly.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's trip through Siberia and the Far East was very important for building up the defense capability of our country and increasing the vigilance and combat readiness of army and navy personnel. During the trip Leonid Il'ich met Soviet fighting men, held warm, sincere talks with them, inquired about their combat and political training, and attended training periods and exercises. He had high praise for the training of army and navy personnel and their readiness to give a worthy rebuff to any aggressor. Speaking at the 18th Komsomol Congress soon after returning from the trip, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said, "The boundaries of our Motherland are reliably guarded against any surprises; our defense is in experienced, loyal hands. And I can assure you that the young people of the USSR who are defending its peace and tranquility have everything they need to carry out their lofty mission with honor."

The Komsomol members and all young fighting men of the Soviet Armed Forces, together with the entire Komsomol and millions of young Soviet men and women, are preparing to celebrate a glorious anniversary, the 60th birthday of the Leninist Komsomol. The best of them represented the army and navy Komsomol at the 18th Komsomol Congress, and today they and their peers are setting the tone in combat training and in competition for the right to sign the Report of Armed Forces Komsomol Members to the CPSU Central Committee on the 60th anniversary of the Leninist Komsomol. The high praise given by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev for the military labor of the defenders of our socialist Fatherland while he was traveling through Siberia and the Far East and in speaking from the podium of the 18th Komsomol Congress inspires Komsomol members and all fighting men of the army and navy to heroic military labor, to serve our Motherland even better.

The memoirs of Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, "Malaya Zemlya" [Small Land] and "Vozrozhdeniye" have become very popular among Soviet fighting men. They refer constantly to the wisdom and ideological wealth contained in these books. The writings on the heroic military and labor deeds of our people teach them to live and work in a Leninist fashion, to be ready to give every effort and life itself, if necessary, on behalf of defense of the socialist Fatherland, and to keep sacred loyalty to the heroic traditions of the Soviet people.

Our valiant Armed Forces are performing their important mission in rhythm with all the working people of the country. The constant leadership of the great party of Lenin guarantees their unfading might. Speaking at the Kremlin reception in honor of the graduates of military academies in late June, Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Minister of Defense, said: "The Central Committee and Soviet Government are watching the development of international events closely and are constantly alert to see that the Soviet Armed Forces meet in every respect the high requirements of guaranteeing the security of our country and all the countries of the socialist community."

The decisions of the July 1978 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the laws and decrees adopted by the 10th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th convocation, called forth a new surge of work and political activism among fighting men. The defenders of the Motherland, like all Soviet people, take pride in the achievements of their country and warmly and unanimously approve of the steps planned by the party to continue implementation of the decisions of the 25th CPSU Congress. The country's successes inspire personnel of the army and navy to new achievements in military labor.

At the ninth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet it was observed that there are still many enemies of disarmament in the world, both declared and concealed. Above all, of course, they are the militaristic circles of the Western powers. Talks about arms control which are used as a cover while in fact military arsenals continue to be

expanded — that is what one usually hears from the representatives of these countries, according to deputy A. A. Gromyko, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, who presented a report at the session. The present Peking leadership acts together with the most diehard enemies of disarmament. They elbow others out of the way, so to speak, to stand in the front rank of the opponents of any agreement aimed at disarmament or even limiting the arms race.

Some people in the West today are mounting a loud, almost hysterical campaign against detente and trying to push the world to the brink of war again. The U. S. Government has recently taken a number of actions which have worsened Soviet-American relations. Washington has announced the administration's decision to introduce new discriminatory restrictions on trade with the Soviet Union. They have not stopped their attempts to interfere in the domestic affairs of the USSR under the false pretext of "defending human rights."

In conformity with the decisions of the recent session of the NATO Council in Washington, the United States is rapidly building up its armed forces and strengthening its ties with its allies in all parts of the world. Spurred on by the military-industrial complexes, the NATO politicians and generals are hastening to carry out their sinister plans to produce the neutron bomb. These facts and phenomena of recent international life remind us once again how important it is to show constant vigilance and steadily build up the defense capability of our Fatherland.

When completing presentation of material on this topic, the propagandist observes that reliable defense of the socialist Fatherland has been and remains a crucial condition for building socialism and communism. It is the sacred duty of every Soviet fighting man to constantly build the military might of the Soviet armed forces and reliably guard the peaceful, constructive labor of Soviet people. The party teaches all the working people of the country and the fighting men of the army and navy in a spirit of absolute devotion to the socialist Motherland and readiness to defend the achievements of socialism courageously and skillfully with weapon in hand. This is done on the basis of Lenin's immortal ideas of defending the socialist Fatherland and the leader's teachings concerning the necessity of strengthening vigilance, combat readiness, and discipline by every means.

During the hours of independent study it is desirable for the students to study V. I. Lenin's works "Address to the Red Army" ("Poln. Sobr." op. cit., vol 38, pp 234-235), "Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Occasion of the Victory over Kolchak" (ibid., vol 39, pp 152, 155, 156), the CPSU Program (Politizdat, 1976, pp 110-112), the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (chapter 5), the report by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev entitled "Report of the CPSU Central Committee and Forthcoming Tasks of the Party in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy" ("Materialy XXV S'yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 25th CPSU Congress], pp 75-76, 83), Comrade

L. I. Brezhnev's speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress (PRAVDA, 26 April 1978), the speech entitled "Sixty Years Guarding the Achievements of Great October" by Mar SU D. F. Ustinov, USSR Minister of Defense (PRAVDA, 23 February 1978), and the fourth chapter of the textbook for political training periods "V. I. Lenin o Zashchite Sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [V. I. Lenin on Defense of the Socialist Fatherland] (Voyenizdat, 1977).

In the evening arrangements can be made to show the artistic films "Private Aleksandr Matrosov," "Ballad of a Soldier," and "Jump at Twilight," the documentary films "Loyal Sons of the People," "I Serve the Soviet Union," and "Our First Commandment," and the film strips "The Behests of V. I. Lenin to Soviet Fighting Men on Vigilance and Constant Combat Readiness," "Vigilance Is Our Weapon," and "Always Remain in Combat Readiness."

During preparation for training periods it is advisable to use the albums of graphic aids entitled "XXV S'yezd KPSS ob Ukraylenii Oborony SSSR" [The 25th CPSU Congress on Bolstering the Defense of the USSR] (Voyenizdat, 1976), "Vypolnyay Trebovaniya Ustavov" [Fulfill the Requirements of the Regulations] (Voyenizdat, 1976), and "Bditel'nost' — Nashe Oruzhiye" [Vigilance Is Our Weapon] (Voyenizdat, 1977).

At the seminar it is recommended that the following basic questions be discussed: 1. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the significance of revolutionary vigilance. 2. The requirements of V. I. Lenin and the CPSU for combat readiness in the army and navy. 3. V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the significance of Soviet military discipline and its fundamental difference from discipline in the bourgeois armies. 4. Fulfill the behests of V. I. Lenin and the requirements of the CPSU as a sacred duty, always be on guard, in constant combat readiness.

Recommend Reading for Propagandists

1. Lenin, V. I., "Letter to the Workers and Peasants on the Occasion of the Victory Over Kolchak," "Poln. Sobr." op. cit., vol 39, pp 151-159.
2. Lenin, V. I., "Everything for the Battle Against Denikin!" Ibid., vol 39, pp 46, 49, 55, 56.
3. Lenin, V. I., "Watch Out for Spies!" Ibid., vol 38, p 399.
4. Lenin, V. I., "Speech at the Expanded Worker-Red Army Conference in Rogozhskiy-Simonovskiy Rayon on 13 May 190," Ibid., vol 41, pp 120-121.
5. "Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Politizdat, 1976, pp 110-112.

6. "Constitution (Basic Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," Chapter 5.
7. Brezhnev, L. I., "Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Upcoming Tasks of the Party in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy," "Materialy XXV S'yezda" op. cit., pp 22-25, 75-78, 83.
8. Brezhnev, L. I., "Speech at the 18th Komsomol Congress," PRAVDA, 26 April 1978.
9. Brezhnev, L. I., "Speech at the Ceremonial Meeting Dedicated to the Awarding of the Order of Lenin and Gold Star Medal to the Hero-City of Minsk," PRAVDA, 26 June 1978.
10. Ustinov, D. F., "Sixty Years Guarding the Achievements of Great October," PRAVDA, 23 February 1978.

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CSO: 1801

ACTIONS TAKEN ON SERVICEMEN'S COMPLAINTS

Delays in Pay, Paperwork

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 6, Jun 78 signed to press
22 May 78 p 40

Text Private A. Bodrov reported to the editors that he was not paid the severance pay due him at his previous place of employment upon his being called up for military service. Directing an inquiry in August 1977 to the director of the Geomash manufacturing association in Shchigry in Kurskaya Oblast, the editorial office asked that there be an examination of the merits of the complaint and that measures be taken to satisfy the legal requirements involved. But when we received no timely response, we turned again to the management of the association and only in March of this year did we receive a reply from the director, Comrade V. Aleksikov, stating that Private Bodrov's severance pay had been transferred. As it was reported, the reason for the delayed reply was the illness of the head of the personnel section. But it seems to us that were it not for the indifferent attitude of the enterprise personnel involved here toward their direct responsibilities it would not have taken 8 months to discuss the question of vindicating the legal rights of this serviceman.

Warrant Officer Obosevich wrote to the editors that the chief of his unit's ('chast') finance service, the officer Minakov, unjustifiably in his opinion, failed to pay him his monetary reward for qualifying for his class rating. Responding to our inquiry, Lieutenant Colonel Kabanov reported that the reward authorized Warrant Officer Obosevich has been fully paid and that those responsible for the delay have been disciplined.

Warrant Officer Bondarenko, too, addressed a similar letter to the editors, according to which he has not been paid his second year's monetary reward for his class rating because the finance

section does not have a copy of that part of his orders. As reported by Comrade Levchuk, due to the negligence of one of the officers, V. Bondarenko's name was omitted from the extract from the orders for persons raising their class rating within the specified time. He will be paid his bonus in accordance with the current regulation.

Warrant Officer (Res) B. Belozerov lodged a complaint with the editorial office stating that due to improper preparation of the paperwork involved in his transfer to the reserves and a delay in transmitting his service record to the military commissariat, as a result of which he still has not been able to obtain his passport and start to work. After directing this letter to the unit ('chast') in which the warrant officer served, the editors received a reply from officer Pichugin stating that through the fault of Captain V. Orlov, the service record of the former active duty serviceman was actually sent to the wrong military commissariat. The error has now been corrected, and the documents have been forwarded to their proper address. Officer Orlov has been disciplined for his negligence in preparing the paperwork.

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Action on Administrative Complaints

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 78 signed to press
22 Jun 78 p 40

Text 7 Warrant Officer (Res) A. Dachkin has turned to the editors with a request for assistance in obtaining action to remedy deviations from current procedure which occurred in the process of his discharge from active military service. As a result of the investigation which was conducted it was established that these departures from regulation procedures actually occurred. Officer Gurtovoy reported to the editors regarding the satisfaction all the legal claims of Comrade Dachkin. In particular, the pay due him for leave unused in the year in which he was discharged has been sent out to him at his place of residence; and the "60th Anniversary of the Armed Forces of the USSR" anniversary medal has been sent for presentation to the regional military commissariat where his records are located.

Warrant Officers M. Shchekin and K. Davydenko wrote to the editors with regard to the fact that they had not received their monetary reward for having achieved their master's class rating. Upon our request, their letter was discussed in the finance section of the twice-honored Red Banner Baltic Fleet. Colonel of the Quarter-master Service A. Plenkin reported that the delay in this payment occurred as a result of the improper preparation of the paperwork involved on the part of certain responsible individuals, who have been brought to account and disciplined. The error has been corrected and Comrades Shchekin and Davydenko have been confirmed in their "master" class rating and have been paid the amount due them in accordance with the regulation.

The letter from Warrant Officer B. Khoblenko spoke of specific instances of the violation of accident prevention regulations and of lack of tact displayed by certain authorities in their relations with service personnel. In response to the editors' inquiry, Colonel Ye. Kostenko, deputy chief of the political administration of the Red Banner Baltic Military District, reported that are, generally speaking, borne out as alleged. A meeting of unit personnel was held, along with training on the observation of safety regulations while working with equipment and tighter supervision of adherence to the requirements of the labor law. Officer Aryutin has been disciplined and punished for his displays of rudeness toward service personnel.

Warrant Officer A. Balyuk complained that one-third of his monthly pay had been withheld, unjustifiably in his opinion.

In his reply, Lieutenant Colonel Shelkovnikov reported that repeated inquiries had revealed that Warrant Officer Balyuk, the commander of a supply platoon, failed to check on the drainage of the water from a motor vehicle cooling system, which led to the thawing of the engine. He was legally held materially responsible for damages caused the state as a result of his negligence in the performance of his official duties as specified in the manuals and orders.

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ARTILLERY GUN CREW CHIEF DESCRIBES FIRING PROCEDURES

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 7, Jul 78 signed to press
22 Jun 78 pp 12-14

[Article by Sergeant S. Chaplyuk: "Artillerymen, More Accurate Range!"]

[Text] We do not have to prove how important it is under the conditions of today's dynamic battle of maneuver quickly to take up a fire position and prepare for firing. The law of combat is severe: to those who anticipate goes the victory.

In deploying a battery from the march it is especially important that crews be able to act quickly and skillfully. While the senior battery officer gives the main line of fire to the reference gun, the other crews set up their systems approximately parallel with this gun, which substantially reduces the time required for orientation after taking the reading from the aiming circle, since the barrel of the gun will be lying approximately in the main line of fire. Without waiting for a command, each crew then levels its gun, determines the angle of crest clearance and independently adjusts the sighting mechanism, which assures a rapid preparation for firing. Our general guiding principle in taking up a fire position from the march is to do what is necessary for the quickest preparation for firing.

For example, after the main direction is given to the gun, it is necessary first of all to record and fix this direction, for the purpose of which it is noted with respect to the aiming point, and not to wait until the collimator is adjusted. This notation with respect to the aiming point requires several seconds, while setting up the collimator takes several times as long. It is, of course, easier with a collimator to execute firing procedures at night or in fog.

In the process of trying to prepare for action as quickly as possible, we should not forget several methods of operation which increase the speed of preparation for firing, as well as accuracy.

Here, for example, is how we lay the 1938 model 122mm howitzer for direction when firing from a covered fire position. After adjusting the sighting mechanisms for the range, level and deflection given him, the gun layer, PFC Sergey Ivanov, aims the gun roughly at the aiming point (collimator) and levels the longitudinal and cross bubbles. Then with the traversing handwheel he carefully matches the cross hair of the panorama with the aiming point. But if initially the gun is accurately laid and the bubble then levelled, the cross hair of the panorama is deflected to the side. It requires more accuracy in laying and takes up an excessive amount of time.

In order to save time in the laying process, it is useful to know how many notches on the scale of deflection are contained in one full turn of the traversing handwheel. On our howitzers, for example, it takes 6 full turns to change the angle by 1-00. If the command "Right 2-00" is given, it will require 12 full turns. If he knows this, the gun layer can operate the handwheel with maximum speed and confidence: there is no way he can "overshoot" the aiming point before finishes making his 12 turns. Initially, therefore, one may not look at the panorama, but rather concentrate all one's attention on vigorously operating the handwheel. The norm has this being accomplished in several seconds.

The same principle applies to laying for elevation as well.

But there is more. Every artilleryman knows how important it is before firing to check his zero sight setting and his line of sighting at zero settings. The line of sighting at zero settings is usually checked with reference to a distant aiming point or the cross hair of a special bore sight. As we know, this requires that threads be stuck on the muzzle end of the barrel and the firing mechanism removed from the breechblock. However, if there is not enough time one may make a quick check by noting the panorama with respect to the muzzle end of the barrel, which reduces by several times the time required for checking. How is this done? With an adjusted line of sighting at zero settings on our 122mm howitzer, the panorama reading with respect to the barrel face is 29-04. So after taking up his fire position, the gun layer makes his reference with respect to the barrel face and takes his reading. If it is 29-04, the line of sighting at zero settings is in alignment. If the reading is different, the sighting mechanisms must be completely checked.

This method of adjustment insures sufficient accuracy (error does not exceed 0-02).

There is yet another bit of know-how to consider--setting up the collimator. By convention, we always set up our gun collimators at a single deflection of 55-00. But in doing so we have to know this point exactly. It has been shown that with a deflection of 55-00, the collimator has to be set at 3 meters in range with a left trail. There is then only to set the panoramic sight at 55-00 and its head will be directed exactly toward the collimator. There is no need to move the instrument at all. So here are more seconds saved.

Or take another small item.... Putting the panoramic sight in its socket. This would seem to be an elementary operation. If so, why did it take one gun layer 15-16 seconds to perform it, while another did it twice as fast? As it turns out, this operation, too, has its own special features. Training, of course, is training; but proper handling and arriving at the correct sequence of operations are also of no little importance. On one occasion, our gun layer, PFC Ivanov, demonstrated this operation to the battery's new gun layers.

"Look here," he said, turning to his comrades, "I first release the catches on the case with both hands simultaneously. I grasp the panoramic sight with my right hand between the rotating head and the extended portion such that the eyepiece tube is turned toward the rear. Before I begin to place it in its socket, I press the catch as far as it will go with my left hand and hold it in this position; I then lower the panoramic sight, and when its hook makes contact with the shaft of the catch I lower the catch and with my right hand tighten the clamp screw as far as it will go. I now turn the head of the panoramic sight and set the deflection at 30-00. Pay attention to what I do with my hands. The left hand removes the coarse shift lever, while the right turns the head of the panoramic sight and the deflection micrometer."

Then the training drills begin. Within 10-15 minutes the new gun layers are performing this operation almost as quickly as PFC Ivanov.

The time can be shortened! All of our training drills on equipment are conducted under this motto. The men have clearly assured themselves that if they approach their military training in a creative manner and carry on a persistent search for untapped potential, they will unfailingly achieve substantial success.

This also applies to an equal degree to operations from an open fire position.

These operations involve a great many special features, without knowledge of which one cannot destroy his target with the first round. And it has, without fail, to be destroyed with the first round. Otherwise one's own gun becomes a target. The enemy will not be slow to take advantage of our mistakes. For he, too, will be striving to accomplish his fire mission in the shortest possible time.

Any firing always becomes a test of skill and wills. Firing with direct laying significantly increases the amount of effort and tension involved. The question of who will destroy whom is answered in a short few seconds.

One sergeant coming back from the firing range with a "poor" rating could not understand how in the world he could have miscalculated so badly. He had, after all, laid accurately on the moving "tank" and had taken his proper lead; but every last burst had been short.

During the critique of the firing, the battery commander analyzed his performance in detail. And what had happened? His basic mistake consisted of the fact that he had determined his range by eye and had been overly hasty in plotting reference points on his range card, which he had also done by eye, as a result of which there was a gross error in the calculation of his range and he had opened fire before the "tank" had come within point-blank range.

Every gunner should have an especially solid knowledge of the rules governing firing and delivering fire at point-blank range, that is, when the shell trajectory does not exceed the height of the target.

In this regard it is necessary to distinguish clearly between the basic types of target movements with respect to the gun's plane of fire. This helps the crew successfully accomplish its combat assignments and destroy its targets in the shortest possible time and with the minimum expenditure of ammunition. At this point the unsuccessful firing performance of yet another sergeant comes to mind. He delivered fire on a stationary target but had also made a gross error in his calculation of the target range. He, too, had been guided by a range card which had been careless in filling out. His large error had resulted in his rounds' falling beyond the target by a great distance. At this point the magnitude of the deviation of the burst from the target should have been calculated in meters and the correction made in the sight setting. But this time the sergeant

made another mistake. Instead of standing 10-15 meters windward from his gun, he stood practically right by the shield itself. The smoke and dust created by the rounds fired made it difficult for him to observe the bursts. One of them he did not even notice. All of these things resulted in an unnecessary expenditure of ammunition and prolonged the period of adjustment fire.

We say that there is only one plus to any failure: the lesson that can be learned from it. After our mistakes have been identified and analyzed and discussed, it is easier to correct them. To the credit of these NCO's, whose last names I have deliberately left unmentioned, let it be said that they learned their lesson and later began to fire with success.

Our battery adheres to a hard-and-fast procedure: all firing is carefully analyzed. For us, this training has proven highly effective. From my own personal experience, as well as from that of others, I have drawn several conclusions. I believe they will be of use to junior NCO's.

In addition to our special training exercises, we also utilize every opportunity to train in putting our guns into action, repulsing tank attacks and destroying stationary targets with direct laying. In the course of all tactical and tactical drill exercises the crews train in rapidly deploying and delivering fire with direct laying. Correctly calculating the distance to the target, accurately laying the gun on the target, taking account of corrections and operating in a harmonious, well-coordinated manner--all these things can be learned without firing one service round.

Training exercises are regularly held for the battery in an instructional facility. An optical sight is mounted on a stand such that it can be turned in both horizontal and vertical planes and laid on a moving dummy target. Gun layers receive instruction in proper laying procedures in firing on moving targets.

We devote a great amount of attention to studying the rules governing firing with direct laying. To the study, that is, of these various positions and not to simply cramming information about them into our heads. We must, of course, have a solid knowledge of the rules governing firing. But it is above all necessary thoroughly to comprehend and substantiate them.

In the classroom the battery commander, Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Zenchenko, sketches out a diagram on the blackboard: the target is a tank advancing toward the gun. The first burst is short. What action do you take? Some NCO's change their aiming point. An incorrect solution. You have to continue

firing at the center of the target. The second burst is over. You now have to lay on the base of the target. But now look what happens.... The shell strikes the ground behind the target, but there is no direct hit. That is why after the over it is necessary to lower the aiming point with respect to the height on the half-figure.

The battery commander explained to us in a very graphic manner the process involved in adjusting fire by recording with reference to the burst. Here, for example, it is very important to recreate the laying. Otherwise the shell will miss the target again.

When you develop a good comprehension of the reasons for taking one action and not another, you work much more confidently than before. You can then reach the point where you can make these movements automatically.

During a recent fire training exercise I was in the process of executing a mission at dusk, and it was overcast to boot. Under these conditions the correct calculation of distance plays an especially great role. Of course, the range card had been filled out beforehand. The range to the reference points was calculated with the range finder. The target, an entrenched tank which I had to destroy, appeared somewhat closer and to the right of the third reference point, the range to which was 950 m. How was I to calculate the target range more accurately? By eye I estimated that it was 300 m this side of the reference point. But at this time I took into consideration that in overcast weather, and even more so around dusk, distances appear greater. In this case it was better to rely on the field glasses grid. I knew that the target, the entrenched tank, had an upper width of approximately 2 m at an angle of 0-03. Accordingly, the target range was 750 m.

I performed all these calculations quickly and immediately gave the setting command to the layer. But these calculations can be thought of as not difficult only from the purely mathematical point of view. When you know your time is being measured in seconds it is not difficult to make a mistake. So you have not only to act quickly, but carefully and dependably as well. And this always puts a strain on your mind and nerves.

I managed to destroy the target with the first round. I don't have to say how pleased I was to see that the target had been smashed to pieces. But immediately there appeared a new target in a completely different location and at a different range. It was a good thing that my delight at my first success did not take the edge off my alertness. Another round...and another target smashed. The entire crew performed in an outstanding manner, especially the gun layer, PFC Sergey Ivanov.

Other gunners in our battery also had success in their firing that day--Senior Sergeants Viktor Masharskiy and Kadyr Mustafin, they all destroyed their targets with their first round.

So they have taught us well; not for nothing have been those persistent training efforts and those constant attempts to find more rational methods of operation.

We often use the expressions "Work by night as by day" or "Work at night by daytime standards." When we use these expressions we have in mind precisely those norms or, more accurately, that mastery, thanks to which these norms can be achieved. But to operate at night exactly as one does in the daytime is impossible. Nighttime is nighttime. It has its own peculiarities, and so we have to adjust to them.

I will begin with illumination. We maintain all illuminating equipment and batteries in accordance with all rules in the service manual and prepare them for operation before nightfall. This gives us an opportunity to check out the equipment and, in case of any malfunction, to eliminate it in short order. It is much more difficult to do this at night. But I repeat: everything required for night firing must be in full readiness and the crew thoroughly trained for night operations.

Our crew, like all the others, have prepared their luminous marker posts. An opening has been hollowed out in a wood or plastic rod. In it has been fitted a small bulb, from which extends an electrical cord to a Luch-4M battery. With an easy turn of the battery crank a small, narrow, sharp beam of light flashes out. The light from these markers makes it easy for the senior battery officer to determine by his panoramic sight for which gun he is taking his reading. One of these marker posts is also placed on the aiming circle.

We execute laying procedures at night with the aid of a collimator. But at the same time we do not forget about our night aiming point. This usually a preprepared aiming point which we set in range with the daytime point. It is an extendable marker post with cross lines where a light bulb is located. The light does not burn in the daytime, but at night we turn it on. All daytime adjusted and recorded target deflections are thus preserved without change for night fire as well.

Certain difficulties arise in the process of measuring angles of crest clearance. In the daytime this is not difficult to do with the aid of the panoramic sight. But at night? You see nothing in the optical instrument except the luminous grid. But even so, there is still a fairly simple solution. We make use

of an old front-line method. Through the open breechblock the layer lays the lower generatrix of the barrel on the top of the mask (even at night it is projected against the background of the sky), levels the bubbles and, pressing down the drums of the appropriate charge, reads the angle of crest clearance in elevation micrometer scale units.

The angle of crest clearance should be measured especially carefully, since an error in calculating the minimum range on the short side may produce a burst of the shell as it grazes against tree branches, bushes and other objects.

In occupying a fire position by night it is necessary to make a careful survey of the area in which the gun is to be set up. Unnoticed rocks or ditches make it necessary to call in the prime mover once again and change locations.

Of course, everything is more difficult at night. Sometimes the prime mover gets stuck, or the trail hangs in the air, or the ground proves to be soft. And if with all this there is commotion and controversy, it means that the people are lacking in the requisite psychological preparation and artillery training standards. And so, a word about artillery training standards.

This involves not only the way personnel behave, their discipline, or their efficient quickness, but also the way generally in which they perform their job, their ability to do things in a rational, dependable manner. It refers to good training facilities, equipment and material. It includes the procedures followed at the fire position and everywhere artillerymen are at work. We strive to adhere unfailingly to this procedure. Protective coverings, entrenching tool and other equipment in exactly their proper places. On the gun shields in front of each layer hangs a board recording the settings for firing. This board also holds the gun's range card. They are made out of plastic. Arresting devices made by skilled battery personnel have been fitted on the traversing and elevating gears. These prevent firing at dangerous range and deflection settings.

Prior to delivering fire, the grease is cleaned off the ammunition, which is then sorted and laid out by artillery attack. Then immediately charts are posted showing the designation of fire, the charge and shell expenditure.

The gunner's record card is made out of polystyrene. The graphs are lined with India ink. Old pencil marks are easily rubbed off with a rubber eraser. On the opposite side of the card is a diagram of 122-mm howitzer emplacement. This is immediately followed by calculations: the amount of dirt that had to be excavated for this purpose and the corresponding number of man-hours.

The signals are drawn in on the handles of the command flags.

I keep close watch to see that the gun's set of spare parts, tools and accessories is in proper order. The metal parts of the entrenching tools have been greased, and there are always spare light bulbs on hand.

While we work at our fire position, I teach my men to avoid excess conversation and only to report their readiness to perform one operation or another. We want to have all of our capacities available for the purpose of achieving still greater accuracy of fire! There is clearly more potential yet to be tapped. And if there is one who possess sound ideas, a chance inspiration, advanced experience, let him set it out, as we say, on the table so that all may partake. It will be a boon to the common cause; it will provide shoring for our combat readiness.

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NCO COMMAND TRAINING DESCRIBED

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22 Jun 78 pp 36-37

[Article by Major G. Aksenov: "The Leader and Discipline:
The Authority of an NCO"]

[Text] As I had been told, the motorized rifle training company commanded by Aleksandr Tsyplyak was one of the best in the unit ('chast'). So when I met the commander I naturally wanted to find out how he had been able to achieve high ratings in military and political training and what contributes to the company's achievement of consistent success. His answer was brief: "Discipline." Then, as he developed his idea, Captain Tsyplyak spoke enthusiastically of the lower level command personnel, on whom, to use his expression, "almost everything depends," and told about what is being done within the company to maintain the authority and importance of the NCO cadres at the necessary level and to develop leadership qualities in them. In this regard I was especially interested in the NCOs' disciplinary practice.

"By glancing at a soldier's service card one can get a full idea of his attitude toward the service and his duty within it." The company commander took a folder of cards out of a cabinet and spread them out on the table. "And now we'll divide them up by platoon and squad and we'll get quite another mirror, one in which we will see reflected the work of each NCO with his subordinates, his ability to make use of the rights with which he is invested by the regulations, and even his character. Here is the platoon led by Senior Lieutenant Yevgeniy Nabokiy. It's our best platoon. The assistant platoon leader in this platoon is Senior Sergeant Petr Romanyuk. What is noteworthy about his work?" Aleksandr Petrovich spread the platoon's cards out in a fan and picked one of them at random. "Trainee Yevgeniy Mokrynskiy. He has two letters of commendation from the assistant platoon leader. I recall why it was that he received this

encouragement. They were recently in the course of delivering training fire from individual weapons aboard their BMP [infantry combat vehicle]. It was foggy and visibility was poor. But Mokrynskiy nevertheless performed the exercise in an outstanding manner. The next day the company had its turn at guard duty. While at his post Mokrynskiy performed his duties in an exemplary manner and was again given encouraging recognition by the senior sergeant. Another leader might perhaps wonder whether it was worth while recognizing a soldier this way for performing his duty if he had already been recognized only the day before. But Romanyuk thought differently: the man deserved it and should be shown that his performance is valued. And so you should announce before the unit formation the reason for this recognition.

"And then another NCO comes along and requests that a commendation be entered on the card of not one, but of several subordinates. 'For what?' you ask him. 'For effort and application to duty during training,' he replies. You then begin to try to find out the specific reason for his announcement of a commendation in the case of each soldier individually, but the NCO can tell you nothing definite. It appears that he is showering recognitions as if from a horn of plenty to appear a good ol' boy in the eyes of his subordinates.

"And then you meet with the other extreme, in which the NCO is dealing out reprimands at every turn. We try to get them to understand that both attempts by bestowing favors to influence their subordinates and enthusiasm for administrative measures are incompatible with true exactingness on the part of a leader. There is, of course, no ready recipe for all cases life presents, for each serviceman behaves differently. That means that determining the actions to take to influence a subordinate is something that is done on a strictly individual basis. Only then will rewards and punishment have an educational effect."

As he talked about the work of an NCO, Captain Tsyplyak continually returned to the idea of the impermissibility of mindless, unimaginative routine in the education of subordinates, of the importance of pedagogical expertise on the part of lower level leaders.

"Above all an NCO must have a good idea of what he can demand and from whom, who is trained and prepared and to what extent, who possesses what personal qualities. In a nutshell, work on an individual basis should occupy a prominent place among the means available for influencing the consciousness and feelings of military personnel. But when this is not the case, serious mistakes and miscalculations are inevitable.

Taking the cards for the trainees in the squad led by Sergeant Nikolay Lepetyukhin, the company commander told about several incidents from the practice and experience of this junior commander.

"....It was after evening roll call and the trainees were getting to sleep. Noticing that one of them had been careless in folding up and putting away his uniform, Sergeant Lepetyukhin commanded, "Squad, On your feet!"

The trainees jumped out of their beds, dressed and fell in. Lepetyukhin explained his mistake to the one in error.

"Lights out!"

The men again undressed, folded up and put away their uniforms in the proper manner and laid back down.

When the company commander pointed out to Lepetyukhin the impropriety of his actions, that only one man was at fault but that all had been disciplined, Lepetyukhin replied, "That's all right, it's good training for all of them."

The company commander recalled that Lepetyukhin sometimes adopted the wholesale approach during instruction and training as well. For example, one of his trainees was weak in one area of norm fulfillment or had performed what was required of him improperly. Rather than doing extra work with the one who had fallen behind, the sergeant had the entire squad go through the training. If we can't move faster than that, he said, we'll try this.

The officer had to break into the course of the training and explain to the sergeant that this was not the correct "method" and that he was not taking the soldiers' individual characteristics into account: for those who had achieved the performance norm were now no longer interested in studying that material, and what was happening, essentially, was that they were parrying his move and that it had become ineffective; they were now more impatient than ever for the end of the training session.

This approach using a single measure and not considering people's individual characteristics has also been reflected in the sergeant's authority. His subordinates have avoided turning to him for advice and assistance. And the absence of a cordial intimacy between the leader and his subordinates has had a negative effect on the state of affairs within the squad. Mutual relationships within the unit took a turn for the worse as well. People were not only offended by the sergeant's unwarranted exactingness, but they developed a negative attitude toward the comrade, for whose poor performance they had all been found guilty.

In the opinion of the company commander, all this happened as a result of inattentiveness toward people. For each soldier is a complex personality, and to find the right approach to him is no simple matter. Not for nothing do the regulations state that a leader must continually and thoroughly study his subordinates and know their capabilities, inclinations and character traits. Only then will he be able to influence them and develop in them a conscious discipline and an ability to perform their tasks quickly and efficiently.

It should be pointed out that the greatest variety of work is done with the NCO trainees in this motorized rifle company. Thus, they report each day to the commander concerning the recognitions and punishments they have awarded. These official meetings are the occasions for discussions of the basics of the achievements and deficiencies of the NCOs in their educational work and of their pedagogical sense. These detailed critiques teach the NCOs much. It is here that junior commanders such as Senior Sergeant Petr Romanyuk and Sergeants Gennadiy Matytsin and Anatoliy Povazhnyuk share their experience and talk about the most effective methods of training their subordinates. And they have much to teach. They are skillful in their use of the greatest variety of methods of influencing their subordinates.

When we met Sergeant Gennadiy Matytsin he had just returned from a training session he had had with the squad. Over his shoulder hung his leaders kit , in his hands a case with the flags. Unhurriedly and in detail he spoke about the men in his squad. He characterized each trainee and his capabilities and habits. One could sense that he attentively followed their growth as they improved their military skills. To my question as to whether he had dealt out any commendations or punishments that day he replied in the affirmative. During drill exercises he had announced a commendation to trainee Leonid Dunis for his outstanding mastery of turns in movement, and for his good preparation for the drill review he lifted the punishment he had previously imposed on trainee Sergey Starchak.

From further conversation it developed that Starchak initially had been negligent in the performance of his duties. Matytsin warned the man several times and then finally reprimanded him before the unit formation. This had its effect, and Starchak gradually changed his behavior. His successful performance that very day demonstrated this. Matytsin had noticed his efforts. The leader's attention, of course, encouraged the soldier and reinforced his faith in his own efforts.

Captain Tsyplyak strives to insure that no NCO fails to take action on a single deficiency on the part of his subordinates. But this is done independently and with a sense of personal responsibility, not waiting to be prompted by the officers.

"Independence is a leader's most important attribute," he points out. "But inexperienced NCOs frequently avoid solving critical problems involving discipline; they appeal to the orders of a senior commander and act in his name; they turn to other authority for assistance.

"The following instance comes to mind. Relatives had come to visit Private Sergey Daniyelyan. Without informing anyone and without receiving permission, he had left his subunit (podraz-deleniye) and gone to the KPP [control and check point]. He stayed too long and was late to the beginning of the formation. The company first sergeant, Senior Sergeant Yuriy Polushin, turned to me with the request that I exercise my authority and punish Daniyelyan for his gross violation of discipline.

"I had to explain to Polushin that his own authority was entirely sufficient to make the trainee feel his guilt. All the more so as Daniyelyan was a young soldier, inexperienced, not yet fully accustomed to military procedures; and in addition, this was his first disciplinary violation. The company first sergeant should have considered all this and exercised his own rights and not turned immediately to the company commander. Only exceptional cases require the intervention of an officer. The NCO rights specified by the Disciplinary Regulations are very broad in scope and one has only to apply them with skill.

"It also happens," continued Captain Tsyplyak, "that some NCOs simply behave slyly, attempting to remain to the side. It is not I, they say, who am demanding this of you, but the senior commander; it was not from me, they will say, that the man received his punishment, but from the company officer. These attempts to be demanding by drawing on someone else's authority I cut short immediately, and I insist that junior commanders exercise their own rights. I also explain to NCOs that punishment is not an end in itself, but rather only a means of instilling in personnel a respect for order and discipline.

"Polushin no longer turns to the company commander with every trifling matter and has begun to direct his subordinates without one eye on the senior commander and to act in his own name as a person of official authority. He himself soon sensed that his authority had become greater, and it became easier for him to arrive at independent solutions of disciplinary problems."

Every trainee in this motorized rifle company is himself a future NCO and trainer. It is needless to say how important for them is the example set by their own immediate superiors. Each one of them should be a model of the proper mutual relationships within a military unit. That is why the company officers, and above all, the commander himself, Captain Tsyplyak, are so assiduous in their

training of NCOs and thoughtfully analyze their disciplinary practice. There has been created within the company an atmosphere of strict adherence to regulation requirements, discipline and order. Evidence of this is provided by the results of military training and duty performance. For several years in a row now, all the trainees graduating out of this company have proven themselves outstanding NCOs. In addition, reports from units ('chast') to which these graduates are assigned testify that they are dependable assistants to the officers in the development and training of subordinates and in strengthening discipline.

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TROOP BILLETING, MAINTENANCE IMPROVEMENTS NOTED

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pp 30-31

[Article by Engr-Lt Gen A. Fedorov, chief of billeting maintenance directorate of USSR Min Def: "Housing Resources: The People's Property"]

[Text] Speaking at the All-Army Conference on Improving Troop Welfare, USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov said: "The first and most important thing to which attention must be directed is housing and barracks construction. And the quality of housing must meet the demands not only of today, but of tomorrow as well."

The Soviet barracks is a place for training and indoctrinating the soldier of a socialist society, a person of foremost culture and high political awareness, a person who is utterly devoted to the Leninist Party and the socialist homeland, and one who is ready to give all his energy and, if necessary, life itself for the freedom and happiness of the people. The Party Central Committee, the CPSU CC Politburo and Comrade L. I. Brezhnev personally attach great importance to improving the everyday and housing conditions of personnel of the Soviet Army and Navy. Comrade Brezhnev, who recently visited ships of the Pacific Fleet and units of the Far East and Transbaikal military districts, showed interest in the daily routine of privates, seamen and officers in addition to other problems, and he emphasized in his speeches the need to display constant concern for service personnel.

The Soviet Government allocates the necessary monetary and physical resources to create the best everyday conditions for personnel. And it must be said that workers of rear services and construction subunits have tried to put the resources to use in the most effective and purposeful manner.

A considerable amount of housing has been constructed for service personnel in recent years. New officers' clubs, polyclinics, sanatoriums and rest homes have been turned over for use. Significant changes also have occurred in our compounds.

They basically have been provided with central heating, water lines and sewer systems, and housing and offices have been well arranged. Some of the military compounds are rightfully considered models. Among them also are compounds with old, prerevolutionary buildings and structures, but they sometimes look better than certain new ones. This is the result of a businesslike attitude toward work, rational use of allocated funds and supplies for improvements and capital and current repairs to the housing, and the active participation of commanders, political officers and specialists of rear services and billeting entities in the work of satisfying urgent everyday needs of soldiers. Much depended here also on the organizational abilities of sergeants and warrant officers. We have many examples of skilled work of initiative of this category of service personnel.

Company first sergeant WO I. Gusak has been serving for 30 years in the Army. He arranges the contents of barracks accommodations in strict conformity with requirements of the Internal Service Regulation. There is cleanliness and order in all living and nonliving areas. Servicemen's beds are in exemplary condition, bedside tables are provided with everything necessary, and the other barracks furniture and accessories are in outstanding condition. The warrant officer pays special attention to the condition of sanitary technical equipment and appliances and fittings, and he eliminates defects opportunely. A Sunday work day held by the subunit for improvements and plantings of post grounds was productive. WO Gusak planned all the work ahead of time and readied the tools, plants and paint. After the work day was over he summarized results and recognized the best personnel.

Company first sergeant WO Yu. Shchidyakin works well. He also is convinced that the barracks is the soldier's home. The warrant officer pays special attention to creating a proper amount of coziness in it. Floors always are polished until they gleam, lamps have been made with taste and there are live flowers in the barracks and the Lenin room. Shchidyakin constantly explains to personnel the need for keeping the premises in regulation order and requires the soldiers to take a thrifty attitude toward equipment, furniture and accessories and to use water, power, heat, fuel and other domestic services sparingly.

The party and government view the safekeeping and upkeep of housing as one of the most important socio-economic tasks. This requirement also relates fully to resources of the Armed Forces, and we still have a great deal to do here. Above all we have to bring order to the organization and conduct of repair work and see that the primary structural elements and technical equipment of buildings and structures are kept in serviceable condition, for which we have to introduce integrated repairs more persistently. We should attach the very same important significance to extending periods of time between repairs as we do to extending the service life of combat equipment.

Unfortunately, some workers of rear services and the billeting service pay insufficient attention to this serious matter. Interruptions in providing heat, water or electrical power are allowed to take place in a number of garrisons due to shortcomings in equipment maintenance and also to the low quality of construction.

The condition of buildings and structures depends largely on maintenance personnel and the level of their professional training. Interesting experience in setting up emergency restoration teams has been gained in the Far East Military District. Staffed with qualified specialists and provided with appropriate repair means, materials and transport, they efficiently eliminate interruptions in the operation of garrison engineer support systems and facilities. This experience must be disseminated in every possible way, especially in the Transbaikal, Central Asian, Siberian and Leningrad military districts.

Company first sergeant WO V. Kosmatskiy enjoys deserved authority among maintenance personnel. He believes that the basis for the subunit's successful work is firm military discipline and high professional expertise on the part of each soldier. Vladimir Aksent'yevich especially works a great deal and enthusiastically with the young replacements and passes on his rich experience to subordinates. The maintenance personnel's work is restless. They have to perform technical inspections and scheduled preventive repairs on time. Any emergency must be eliminated immediately at any time of year, day or night. WO Kosmatskiy and his coworkers always cope successfully with their duties.

The interior of military buildings has improved noticeably in recent years. For example, floors have appeared with a hygienic covering, and there are veneered night tables, desks and cabinets. The basic models of new troop furniture already have been created, and our enterprises are preparing to begin serious production of it. Each year the troops receive more and more communal cleaning equipment, instruments and tools needed for the upkeep and maintenance of buildings, structures and the grounds of military compounds. It should be taken into account, however, that renewal of barracks property will be gradual. For this reason we must continue to see to the upkeep and timely repair of available furniture. Unfortunately, it is far from everywhere that this is done. Much furniture becomes unserviceable earlier than the established periods of service are over. Its current repair often is poorly organized. Communal cleaning equipment is not always properly maintained. In places proper attention is not given to the safe-keeping of firefighting equipment and means of extinguishing fires or to keeping them constantly serviceable. Therefore the practice of the best warrant officers, sergeants and petty officers in caring for and keeping up the barracks merits all possible praise.

For example, WO M. Zhukov, first sergeant of one of the foremost subunits, devotes much attention to these matters. He arranges for a proper upkeep of living and nonliving areas as well as the parts of military compound

grounds assigned to the company. He instils in privates and sergeants the necessary skills in maintaining cleanliness and proper order in barracks and places of common use, and in necessary instances he arranges for simple repair work by company personnel. WO Zhukov taught his subordinates to use modern communal service appliances and building equipment. He constantly relies on Komsomol and party members in his work and draws the soldiers into competition for outstanding upkeep of furniture, equipment and barracks assigned to them.

A special pamphlet recently developed by the Ministry of Defense Billeting Directorate and containing necessary recommendations on technical maintenance of military buildings and facilities, of their equipment, heating, lighting, sewer systems, water supply and so on may provide much help to the company first sergeant in the upkeep and technical maintenance of military buildings.

There is now intensive preparations for winter underway in all units and subunits. Repair plans and schedules for performing some of the most difficult projects were drawn up back in spring in foremost units and subunits. Primary attention is focussed on objects on which the combat readiness of subunits and the soldiers' everyday conditions primarily depend. The well organized labor of integrated repair teams largely is ensured by timely supply of building materials and by mechanization of laborious processes. Commanders and party organizations constantly monitor the progress of work, direct socialist competition and provide a moral stimulus for the people. All this leads to an increase in labor productivity and an improvement in the quality and effectiveness of all work. In some garrisons, however, capital and current repairs were begun late, planned activities still are being done slowly, or they are being postponed to an even later time. We cannot be reconciled with this situation.

It is the urgent task of officers and junior rear services specialists to repair the barracks and housing. This must be completed opportunely, before the beginning of the heating season. This means that they must once again check the progress of work, update deadlines for its accomplishment and focus attention on heating facilities. In addition to repairing boilers, they must carefully inspect auxiliary equipment, shut-off fittings and control-measurement instruments, and check the status of thermal insulation of pipes in attics, underground ducts and especially in sectors of external heating lines which are subject to inundation by waste or ground waters. Defects in the heating system inevitably lead to considerable heat losses and an overexpenditure of fuel.

Under conditions of the Far North, in areas of heavy snow accumulation and where there are increased wind loads, barracks must have covered external passages, additional snow vestibules with a top entrance and barriers to movement through the compound during windstorms, lack of visibility or heavy snowfall. In permafrost areas we must ensure the reliability of natural year-round ventilation of the underground space precluding any

amount of thawing of the ground foundation of the barracks. In these areas it is inadmissible to pile snow around the base of buildings, which sometimes is done in remote garrisons.

The method of construction using the organization's own resources is important for improving the building and repair of barracks and housing. If organized properly, it provides very good results. It permits maximum use of cheaper local resources, saves on supplies and time for erecting objects and with the appropriate supervision, it increases work quality. We must step up the tempos of this method of construction in military compounds, especially in projects involving the sheltering of equipment and reserve supplies.

Many warrant officers have shown themselves to be remarkable organizers in the method of working using the organization's own resources. For example, warrant officers V. Glubets and B. Aliyev skillfully allocate the people assigned to them to construction projects while striving to divert soldiers from combat training classes to the minimum extent. They keep a regular watch on the quality with which production assignments are accomplished and arrange socialist competition among the soldiers. These warrant officers know that constant technical supervision is especially important in this method of construction and they allow no deviations from project decisions.

Proper maintenance and timely repair is the primary condition for the upkeep and long life of garrison buildings. The barracks is one of the chief objects of a military post. It must not only be a good soldiers' or sailors' home, but also must support the performance of precise military service and be a real center of training and indoctrination. "We can and must turn the barracks and the soldiers' teahouse into a center of cultural enlightenment work," said USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU Ustinov, "so that there are the latest newspapers and journals there, it is possible to view a television broadcast, hear an amateur soldiers' concert, or hold talks, technical quizzes and other interesting activities."

Maintenance and upkeep of housing is constantly the center of attention of party entities of the billeting service. Party members regularly review fulfillment of plans for construction, repairs and winterization. They effectively influence all aspects of the life and work of their units and subunits. Every soldier must realize that the barracks and housing resources are the people's property.

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PURPOSE OF MILITARY PREPARATORY COURSES EXPLAINED

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press 20 July 78 p 36

[Article by Col Justice V. Korneyev: "Legal Knowledge for the Soldiers: Training for Those Worthy of It!"]

[Text] In their letters to the editors, journal readers ask about procedures for entering preparatory departments of higher educational institutions for service personnel released from the USSR Armed Forces. Following are answers given to these questions by a military lawyer.

[Question] Why were preparatory departments set up under higher educational institutions and what are the conditions of training?

[Answer] These departments were set up for purposes of increasing the level of general educational preparation of the working and rural youth and of service personnel released from the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces, and providing them with conditions for entering higher educational institutions. Preparatory departments accept persons with a completed secondary education from among foremost workers and kolkhoz members having a period of at least one year of practical work, as well as service personnel released from the USSR Armed Forces. Training classes can be conducted there in day, evening and correspondence types of training. The training period is 8 months apart from production or 10 months without leaving production.

Students of preparatory departments have use of the necessary auditoriums, training rooms, laboratories, libraries and other auxiliary training establishments of the higher educational institution. They are obligated to follow rules of internal order of the higher educational institution and of student living. Students from other cities who are studying apart from production are given places in the dormitory under conditions established for students of higher educational institutions. Students registered for training apart from production are paid a stipend in the amount established for first-year students of training institutions under which the preparatory departments are set up.

Persons who have completed these departments and have successfully passed graduation exams are registered for the first course of higher educational institutions without taking entrance examinations.

[Question] What is the procedure for selection and training of service personnel released from active military service?

[Answer] The work of selecting and sending military personnel released from active military service to preparatory departments of higher educational institutions, conducted in the Army and Navy, is the responsibility of commanders of military units and heads of establishments, military educational institutions, enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

A serviceman who has expressed the desire to enter a preparatory department must be given a positive performance appraisal by the command element and must receive the recommendation of the party organization, Komsomol organization or general meeting of subunit personnel. Worthy privates, seamen, sergeants and petty officers are recommended for training both after completing the full term of active military service or after being released ahead of schedule for illness or family reasons, and who have served in the Army (Navy) at least one year. Officers, warrant officers, extended-term service personnel and servicewomen released from the USSR Armed Forces who are not over 34 years of age and who have received positive performance appraisals also can be sent to preparatory departments.

The unit commander (establishment chief) signs the order sending a serviceman for training at a preparatory department of a higher educational institution, in the prescribed format. The order along with the performance appraisal is presented to the serviceman being released at a ceremony. In some cases, when these documents were not presented to the servicemen on being released from active military service, they are sent out at the request of the higher educational institution or to the servicemen.

[Question] What documents must be submitted by a person entering the preparatory department and when, and what are the procedures for being registered for training?

[Answer] Persons entering a preparatory department submit a petition, the order, the performance appraisal and a document on secondary education (in the original). They also submit six photographs (without headgear, 3x4 cm in size) and a medical certificate on state of health confirming the capability of training in specialties of the given higher educational institution (Form No 286).

Petitions are accepted from 1 October through 10 November for training apart from production, and from 1 August through 10 September for training without separation from production. Classes begin from 1 December and in the period from 1 through 15 October respectively.

Service personnel released from the USSR Armed Forces in November-December can submit documents and be registered for daytime preparatory departments even after the established deadline, as the petitions are received from them, but no later than 15 January of the next year.

Orders issued by the command element for going to preparatory departments of higher educational institutions are valid for one year from the day of the serviceman's release from military service. Personnel released to the reserve who have an order from the command element and who do not enter preparatory departments because the deadlines for acceptance have passed can enter preparatory departments the next training year by submitting positive performance appraisals from their place of work in addition.

Acceptance to a preparatory department is by a commission set up at the higher educational institution, which selects persons from those sent for training by interviewing each applicant. Registration in the preparatory department is accomplished from results of the interview by order of the rector of the university. A student card is issued to persons registered in the preparatory department.

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COMMENTS ON ROLE OF ARMY IN CHINA

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press 20 Jul 78
pp 38-39

[Article by B. Gorbachev, candidate of historical sciences: "Fulcrum of the Maoist Regime"]

[Text] The development of events in China shows that Peking's present leaders have not given up the Maoist course or great-power hegemonic plans. The line taken for militarization of the country and for further strengthening all levers of the military bureaucratic machine, and primarily the army, which has retained its role as the primary fulcrum of the Maoist regime, is particularly noticeable.

Reliance on armed forces is far from accidental. The Maoists have long viewed the army as the chief instrument for inner-political struggle, and militarization of political and economic life as the most suitable form of the organization of society. They constantly have emphasized that China's political problems, both domestic and foreign, can be resolved only with the help of arms and that for this reason the armed forces must be viewed as the deciding factor in conducting policy.

Back at the beginning of the sixties the army was declared to be an unsurpassed model and an example for emulation by China's entire population, large and small. The Chinese people were directed to strive for wartime asceticism. Peking's leaders pictured Chinese society as a large army consisting of divisions, regiments and battalions which unquestionably march in the indicated direction.

Guided by Mao Tse-tung's slogan "The rifle generates power, everything is obtained with the help of the rifle, the world can be reorganized only with the help of the rifle," Peking's leaders applied a maximum effort to convert the People's Liberation Army of China [PLA] into its own obedient tool for implementing anti-Marxist policy.

Having revised the Marxist-Leninist thesis of the army of a socialist state, Maoists in military uniform forced the army to perform functions not

inherent in armed forces of a socialist state. The PLA, which previously defended revolutionary achievements of the working people, became an army against the people and a tool of coercion against workers. This was particularly true in the years of the "cultural revolution," which was a new stage along the path of China's conversion into an enormous barracks, and the Chinese Army's conversion into a tool of the Maoist regime. It was the army which was given a deciding role to play in carrying out this anti-socialist plot directed against the party, against constitutional organs of authority, and against the foundations of socialist democracy and proletarian dictatorship.

The armed forces were invested with alien functions of directing the entire life of the country. The military occupied key posts in organs of power and took control of industry, agriculture, educational institutions and the country's entire social life. Military supervision, which actually was converted into a system of military command and control, was supplemented with ideological conditioning of the populace conducted by army propaganda detachments.

Views on the army's special place in the country's political machinery also are typical of China's present leaders who replaced Mao Tse-tung. Their hopes of strengthening their position, eliminating enemies and strengthening the existing regime are connected with support of the army, which retains the role of the most powerful and organized force in China.

It is quite obvious that Peking's leaders continue to believe that the ideal of Chinese society is barracks communism and conversion of the country into a large military camp, the inhabitants of which must be fit into a single stereotype of the "rustproof screws" and "steel soldiers" implicitly carrying out any orders. Those in Peking continue to refer to Mao's statement that "the people throughout the country must learn from the PLA" and "the army must be a great school." So the army continues to remain an important and sometimes a deciding factor in the country's political life. Its representatives occupy command heights at all levels of party, economic and administrative control, beginning with individual enterprises and establishments and ending with higher state and party entities. In conducting their reactionary course, Peking's leaders continue to rely on the army.

Speaking at the 1st Session of the All-China Meeting of People's Representatives, 5th Convocation, Hua Kuo-feng stated that the "army represents a powerful and stable support of our dictatorship." This purpose of the armed forces was legalized in the 19th Article of the new Constitution of the PRC [People's Republic of China], adopted in March of this year.

The Chinese Army is faced with the mission of combating so-called "class enemies," but actually of combating those who are dissatisfied with the existing military bureaucratic regime and against broad masses of workers who are waiting for and demanding changes.

The army newspaper CHIEHFANGCHUN PAO wrote: "War is the highest form of class struggle. The PLA is the chief tool of proletarian (read: Maoist--B.G.) dictatorship both in class struggle in the international arena and in class struggle within the country. Isn't the conduct of class struggle really our strengthening of preparations for war against our enemies, and especially social-imperialism?" (the Maoists slanderously refer to the Soviet Union in this way).

The newspaper further emphasized: "If the army is not to conduct military-political preparations and does not learn to defeat enemies which will hinder the cause of strengthening dictatorship, then what kind of class struggle can there be?"

By giving the army punitive-repressive functions, China's leaders make wide use of military units for defending the foundations of the Maoist regime. Troops are sent to various parts of China under the pretext of "protecting public order in connection with the struggle against adherents of 'the Band of Four'." Recently army subunits blockaded the city of Hsia-men of Fukien Province, in which disturbances had broken out. The army often performs police functions with the help of so-called "agitation teams," which come to industrial enterprises, educational institutions and rural areas allegedly to "give assistance in studying the ideas of Mao and Peking's line."

For example, according to a report from the Hsinhua Agency, fighting men and commanders of Military Unit "X," stationed in the border area of Hsishuang-pan of Yunnan Province, set up several agitation teams and set off to "propagandize" Peking's political lines among the Thai and Hani nationalities. It should be noted that China's leaders devote special attention to the army's exercise of military supervisory functions over vast areas populated by national minorities.

In striving to step up organizational development of the armed forces by "revolutionization and modernization," China's leaders are broadening the influence of the military on all spheres of the country's socio-economic life.

An important step was made in this direction at the 11th CCP Congress: The proportion of military in the new CCP CC rose to 45 percent, while they occupied 15 of 26 places on the Politburo.

The military council of the CCP CC occupies a special place in China's political machinery. It is placed over other entities of the party-state apparatus. It manages the affairs of ground forces, the air force, the navy and the militia throughout the country. It manages military districts and, through them, local entities of state power, inasmuch as district commanders in chief and political commissars usually are at the head of provincial "revolutionary committees."

The growth of the army's political influence also is shown by the fact that at the last session of the VSNP [All-China Meeting of People's Representatives], military "deputies," among whom was one of Peking's leaders--Teng Hsiao-p'ing--made up one-seventh of the total number, i.e., over 500 persons, while in 1964 the military was represented by only 120 deputies.

Lately the Peking leadership has been intensifying its openly inflammatory course toward provoking a world war. Allegiance to this Maoist course was again confirmed by the Chinese leaders during their meeting with workers of the Academy of Military Sciences on the occasion of its 20th Anniversary.

Missions also are assigned to troops in conformity with the line on the "inevitability of war." They must "continue to increase combat and political qualities and raise to a new level the work of preparing for the possibility of war and the work of revolutionization and modernization." The Maoists emphasize here that the primary danger for China is represented by the Soviet Union, and a "head-to-head" struggle must be waged against it for a long while.

While pursuing hegemonic goals, China's leaders are intensifying the country's militarization, building up all types of weapons, including nuclear weapons, and laying territorial claims on its neighbors. USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov noted that the preaching of the inevitability of a new world war, open calls for stepping up the arms race and opposition to any peace initiatives represent Peking's policy.

China's leadership conceals its own preparation for war while trumpeting the "threat from the North." China's military potential is growing with accelerated tempos. China's science and economy are working for war needs.

The national economy has been assigned the task of arranging the work of one-third of all enterprises and districts according to the "Tach'ing" and "Tachai" example.

According to Chinese propaganda statements, these Maoist examples for emulation manage to achieve success only thanks to training in the army. But the essence of the Tachai and Tach'ing method is "reliance on one's own resources" through local resources, physical overexertion and the introduction of militarized forms of labor and everyday living. China's workers are called upon to give all their energy to the cause of the country's militarization. They are directed to work, for example, as does deputy battalion political instructor Lin Tse-chuan. He has served 14 years in the army but, according to estimates of his superiors, his term of service equals 16 years since he dedicated 700 days off to work, not counting the nighttime, which he also spent for the sake of the "ideas of Mao." After receiving his first leave after eight years of service, according to the journal PEKING REVIEW, he only spent one day at home, and used the remaining 19 days to visit relatives of his coworkers.

In the opinion of the Peking leadership, that is how not only the military, but all citizens of the PRC should serve the Maoist regime.

It would be incorrect to believe that all servicemen actively support the antipopular course of the Maoists. Many fighting men and commanders of the PLA are not satisfied with the shameful role which today's Chinese leaders give them--the role of châtisers and the fulcrum of the military bureaucratic regime, which is an obstacle on the path to the country's socialist development.

Many facts indicate the presence of opposition sentiments in the army. The military press is forced to admit that there are among the troops "gossips, political weathervanes and swindlers striving for personal glory who adhere to the order of seniority and interdepartmental barriers." A notification by the PRC State Council and the CCP CC military council set the task of "continuing the detailed exposure and criticism of the 'Four,' which acted against the army and disorganized the PLA, and which undermined the solidarity of the army with organs of authority and the populace."

It is typical that "regulation of the army," i.e., the organizational and ideological purging of army ranks, is considered one of the chief tasks of military organizational development at the present time. The newspaper CHIEHFANGCHUN PAO wrote: "'Regulation of style' is an important component of regulation of the army. Now, after removal of the 'Four,' there is every opportunity for carrying out the urgent aspirations both of the higher echelon of the army and the army's lower ranks. The problem is that a number of leading cadre officials at all levels lack the revolutionary spirit of persistent, selfless struggle and have no desire to give all their energy to it." The newspaper called upon the command element of the PLA to set up management groups without "a narrow-minded attitude or factionalism, without concealing one's own mistakes out of egotistical considerations, setting the example not only in overcoming everyday hardships, but also in improving the style in political and ideological indoctrination and in work." It should be emphasized in particular that under the stamp of struggle against the "Band of Four," the Maoists also are repressing army cadres who express dissatisfaction with the regime itself.

Many measures are being taken to impose order in the army which suits the Maoists. Thus, wide practice is made of sending command-political personnel among the troops as rank-and-file soldiers. On the one hand, command control is being intensified at the lower level and, on the other hand, commanders are given to understand that only persons loyal to the regime can again return to management posts. For example, workers of the political department of Artillery Regiment "X" of the Peking Military District spent an average of 150 days a year as fighting men, "thoroughly studying experience on the spot." Command personnel of divisions and regiments often head up special detachments which are sent among the troops for "explanatory" work. Recently 32 "working detachments" were set up in

Division "X" of the Foochow Military District and were sent off to remote subunits to propagandize the "party's guidelines" among personnel, chiefly among new recruits.

The CCP CC Military Council Decree "On Improving the Work of Military Academies and Schools," adopted at the end of April of this year, is permeated with alarm over the state of affairs in the army.

Meanwhile, Maoists still are succeeding in keeping the army in check and with its help they are ensuring control over the situation in the country. The military bureaucratic regime is inseparable from military violence and coercion and from militarization of state and public life. Being the chief element of militarism, the Chinese Army retains the role of the primary tool of power in the system of Maoist dictatorship.

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REPORTS OF ACTIONS TAKEN ON SERVICEMEN'S COMPLAINTS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press 20 July 78 p 39

[Article: "Conversation With the Reader: Although A Letter Was Not Written"]

[Text] Judging from letters coming to the editors, payment of a monetary award to service personnel for class ratings still has not been properly arranged everywhere. For example, WO M. Lelet wrote us that he affirmed the rating of master on time, but he is not being paid the appropriate remuneration. Warrant officers N. Chagin, G. Luk'yanenko and M. Zaprovskiy also informed us of an instance of their not receiving monetary reward for class ratings, while WO V. Malashevskiy wrote that he not only ceased to receive remuneration, but money previously paid him was being deducted.

Because of all these and other similar letters, the editors sent queries to senior chiefs and received answers that the queries have been studied carefully and resolved in a positive manner, while persons guilty of incorrect or late completion of appropriate documents have been given disciplinary punishment.

Pvt M. Boltabayev wrote to the editors about his losing his driver's license, which he reported through command channels, but no steps at all were taken. The memorandum of the editors was answered by the unit commander where Pvt Boltabayev serves. He stated that the private's coworker, Pvt E. Turgunov, really did take the driver's license from the serviceman, but then lost it. An administrative investigation was held by the unit and the guilty party punished. A request had been made to send to the unit the driver's record and a certificate of course completion by Comrade Boltabayev for subsequent issue of a duplicate driver's license to him by established procedures at his place of service.

WO V. Shchekut'yev twice complained to the editors about his being held materially liable allegedly without substantiation. Col M. Dovzhenko answered the editors' queries. He informed them that an administrative

investigation of the circumstances, causes and specific guilty parties for the damage was held a second time and a decision made in conformity with law. The investigation established WO Shchekut'yev's guilt. He exchanged new objects of flight-technical clothing for those which had served the periods of wear. Therefore the fact of causing material damage was deemed factual, in connection with which WO Shchekut'yev was held materially liable on a legal basis.

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FACTORS INVOLVED IN AVIATION CADET TRAINING DISCUSSED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 78 signed to press
1 Aug 78 pp 1-3

[Article by Hero of the Soviet Union, USSR Distinguished Military Pilot,
Col Gen Avn S. Gorelov: "Worthy Training for the Future Pilots"]

[Text] Each year lifelong dreams bring new detachments of young men to the flight schools to replace graduates. These young people have chosen a difficult but interesting, engrossing occupation about which they had dreamed in school but about which they had an extremely fuzzy impression. In a little while they will come to understand that the need to fly will become the meaning of their entire life and future activity, that the sky is intolerant of indifference and carelessness, that it can be subjugated only by purposeful people wholly devoted to flying.

But to earn their wings the young men will have to stubbornly and persistently study theoretical and practical disciplines, display initiative and diligence with the very first steps in the sky, and be examples of performance of duty. The young airmen will find large classrooms containing modern equipment, and they will be taught by remarkable teachers--true experts of aviation science and technology, artful instructor pilots.

The military pilot's occupation requires everything without exception from the individual devoting his life to it. The Soviet air warrior is first of all an ideologically mature officer wholly devoted to the motherland and the Communist Party, a highly educated, brave, disciplined, efficient, and honest individual. In addition to good political, tactical, and special military training, within the walls of the school he will receive fundamental knowledge in general engineering and acquire sound flight skills permitting him to effectively use modern aviation equipment.

Experience shows, however, that young officers encounter certain difficulties at the start of their independent activity. The main problem

is their lack of experience in performing various tasks in the air, independence, the ability to analyze the situation quickly, conceive of a plan of action, and direct their efforts at unconditional achievement of assigned goals.

In this connection flight schools face important tasks: Without increasing the established training time they must improve training quality to the maximum, make the young people morally and politically mature, and provide theoretical training and many hours of practical flying to them. These are not simple tasks, and they require further improvement of the training and indoctrination process, improvement of the methods for teaching social and special subjects, improvement of flight training, and continuous improvement of the skills of the teachers. All of these directions are closely dependent, they supplement one another, and this means that they have a direct reflection upon the level of training afforded to flight school graduates.

It is the honorable duty of teachers and instructor pilots to carefully and competently nurture politically mature, ideologically stable, psychologically seasoned, technically prepared air warriors. For this purpose every educator must first of all be an example of untiring improvement of his knowledge and skills, and he must follow all of the glorious traditions of Soviet aviation.

The practice of cadet training persuasively demonstrates that wherever ground (theoretical) and flight training are organized competently and wherever the work goes on smoothly and there is good interaction and mutual trust within the "instructor--instructor-pilot--cadet" system, high effectiveness is achieved in every hour of lessons and in every flight. As a result the aerial proficiency of the young airmen increases.

As an example instructors at a branch of the flight training department of the Yeisk Order of Lenin Higher Military Aviation Pilot School imeni Twice-Awarded Hero of the Soviet Union USSR Pilot-Cosmonaut V. M. Komarov travel to the airfield during the time the cadets are flying and render objective assistance to the pilots and their teachers. As an example in the field phase of the program instructors from the department of aviation equipment design and operation help the cadets develop facility with the cockpit's fittings, during flights within the zone instructors from the department of aerodynamics and flight dynamics describe specific features of piloting, and during the time of flight over the practice range specialists of the department of combat application make sure that the students get the best in developing their skills and learning how to perform tactical maneuvers and plan the standard maneuvers.

Through joint efforts the teachers, instructor pilots, and cadets have prepared and introduced recommendations on the techniques for performing some elements of flight associated with combat application of the aircraft against ground targets, and on the methods for teaching these elements. Officers V. Ginkul, N. Gorshkov, and A. Gubskiy are doing a great deal of work in this direction.

Flight commanders captains V. Kartashov and A. Lyashenko, Instructor Pilot Major P. Gladchenko, and Captain G. Abdurakhmanov have achieved certain successes in training and indoctrinating future air warriors. Being expert pilots and teachers, these officers are able to find the best ways for transmitting their experience and knowledge to their students, and imparting high moral-combat qualities to them.

It stands to reason that young men entering the flight schools today are comprehensively developed and capable, having undergone stiff selection with respect to general education, medical qualifications, and psychological fitness. But the demands imposed on the volume of knowledge and the complexity of the disciplines studied are growing constantly, eliciting a need for continuous improvement of teaching methods and development of the training base. It is no accident that classrooms in all of our military schools have been reoutfitted as laboratories possessing working circuits, models, and displays. A dual goal is achieved in this case: With their assistance the cadet deepens his knowledge, and he acquires the initial skills of working with particular machine units, such as trainers for example. Inventors and efficiency experts are doing a tremendous amount of extremely useful work in this regard. Their fruitful labor, which is promoting improvements in the training process, deserves all encouragement.

Training airfields also have important significance. At them, the cadets acquire the skills of servicing and operating aviation equipment, and they study various flight support equipment. The equipment of such airfields must be of the best kind, and it must correspond to that present at modern warplane airfield complexes. This would help the young airman to unite theoretical knowledge fully with practice and acquire the fullest impression of what they would encounter in line units.

Continuous improvement of the training base is only one aspect of the complex mechanism of training and indoctrination. Another one is the search for and introduction of new efficient methods into the training process.

The many years of experience in training future officer pilots have produced an abundance of good techniques that are successfully employed today. But life demands even bolder introduction of all that is new and progressive. It is very important to implement organizational measures promptly and sharply, and to allocate manpower and resources sensibly, so that safety would be ensured in theoretical and flight training. This is achieved through thoughtful, purposeful planning, through a creative, integrated approach to indoctrinating and teaching future pilots.

The dominant prerequisite of effective cadet training is comprehensive preparation of the cadets for flight on the ground. The time it takes

for school graduates to work themselves into combat regiments and the quality of their work depends on the extent to which they have learned to prepare independently for a flight.

There can be no question that the cadet must be taught to work independently first by his teacher and then his instructor pilot. Being the principal teaching figure, the instructor-pilot is obligated to know his subordinates, to reveal all difficulties they encounter promptly, and take efficient steps to surmount these difficulties.

Inasmuch as the share of independent work has increased in the time allocated for flight preparations to the cadet, the role of determining the cadet's readiness for flying has naturally risen: This is not a one-time act; instead, it is a continuous process of studying the individual's personal qualities in the course of basic, initial, and preflight training and during training, checkout, and solo flights.

Today when preparing for flights, cadets model the flying assignments in their strict succession from takeoff to landing, working on safety procedures and actions in extraordinary situations concurrently. This helps the cadet to gain a clear idea of what it is he will be doing, and it allows the instructor to check his readiness for the assignment more deeply.

Teaching the cadet to model the flying assignments, the instructor shows him how to create a correct image of the flight on the ground and play out the actions and procedures of each element. Teaching cadets to model is a very complex process requiring a teacher with high professional proficiency and great theoretical knowledge and skills.

Without a doubt a student preparing for a flight must exercise his actions in a trainer and in the aircraft cockpit. Through numerous training sessions the cadet develops automatic and, at the same time, conscious habits that relieve the load imposed on him during flight, permitting him to concentrate on the main points affecting the assignment and flight safety.

Instructor training has priority significance in high quality training for future pilots. The overwhelming majority of instructors at flight schools have the necessary occupational and teaching skills, and they are successful at flight training. The evolved practice, in which one instructor teaches a cadet for 2 years--in the first and second or in the third and fourth grades--aboard the same kind of airplane, has justified itself completely. With the assistance of their commanders young instructors acquire the necessary experience and qualifications in a trainer airplane. It is not until after this that they are transferred to warplanes.

The theoretical and practical preparedness of instructors for flight training is improved on a differentiated basis depending on experience through special courses of instruction. In addition special flying days and instructor and command flights are employed to improve occupational skills.

Much attention is devoted in military schools to upgrading the qualifications of instructor pilots. As a rule cadets are taught aboard warplanes by pilots 1st and 2d class. This has significantly upgraded the quality of the cadets' aerial proficiency, permitting them to fly in complex weather conditions. Moreover the cadets now make fewer gross errors, and flight safety has improved.

To upgrade the quality of flight training afforded to future pilots further, we would need to select instructors and teach them pedagogics, psychology, and the ability to study individual features of the cadets, analyze their actions in concrete cases, and utilize suitable procedures and methods for completing the flight tasks.

Fuller use of command flights will heighten the teaching skills of the instructors themselves. These flights are usually organized at the beginning of each month in the winter training period. All squadron and unit instructors participate in them. It is precisely during this period that the instructors learn how to organize and conduct flights and to analyze them with the help of objective monitoring resources; concurrently they enrich their flying and teaching experience. Owing to command flights the personnel of many schools are fully prepared for cadet training; flights begin on schedule in organized fashion and proceed rhythmically. In the fall-winter period the flight personnel (instructors) must thoughtfully utilize their working time to upgrade their flying and teaching skills and broaden their general educational and military horizons.

During the period of the year when cadets are flying, the instructor pilots undergo instructor flights prior to each new phase of training. The goal of these flights is to check out the instructor's own piloting techniques and permit him to develop consistent training techniques and learn how to competently introduce and solve the most typical flight problems and conduct a flight critique in which piloting quality is analyzed. Methodologically correct ground preparation of the instructor pilot and the cadet for flight is a decisive prerequisite of flight training safety. This is precisely the approach taken to organizing this training by the commanders of the best squadrons--Lieutenant Colonel M. Vasenda and Major V. Yakovlev. Their work now emphasizes teaching every airman to be efficient, exacting, diligent, and intolerant of laxity and formalism in flying assignments.

Great is the role of the instructor staff in the training and indoctrination of cadets. To keep up with the times the instructor must regularly supplement his knowledge and constantly satisfy modern requirements. Irrespective of his scientific qualifications and experience, he must prepare himself thoroughly and carefully for his lessons, think out the lesson plan, clearly define the volume of the problem under discussion, and apportion his time sensibly. Inertia, indifference, carelessness, and smugness are intolerable in educational activity. The teacher's labor is a unique sort of labor, in which even the slightest manifestation of irresponsibility has an immediate effect on students. A constant search for new, interesting ways to present the study material heightens the activity of the cadets and makes their knowledge sounder and deeper.

The cadet also acquires command skills in the school. Imparting the habits of working with people to the future officers and teaching them the methods of education are among the most important tasks of the training process. Only an officer having facility with Marxist-Leninist methodology of political and military education, who has undergone considerable special training, who knows how to approach his subordinates correctly, and who conducts lessons competently and instructively can be successful in his responsibilities of teaching his subordinates. Special command training programs have been developed for this purpose at the military schools. The instructor staff plays an important role in this program. It is precisely in the process of their training that the cadets acquire the habits of organizing and conducting combat and political training in the subunits, of developing training materials, and of holding lessons with subordinates.

We cannot upgrade the training level of graduates without developing the future officers' creative thinking, initiative, and habits of solving practical problems independently. This is achieved through active participation of the cadets in military-scientific work, through lessons making use of problematic training methods, and through reliance upon the practical experience of line units. Scientific work develops efficient thinking, forcing the student to penetrate into the essence of the study problems, consequently deepening his knowledge. Developing the topics of their scientific projects, the students must consider the possibilities for transforming them into term projects. The best scientific projects should be entered in interschool competition. Their experience of the best military schools has shown that participation of cadets in scientific circles early in their school careers produces positive results.

Young airmen benefit greatly by meetings with unit and school instructor staffs, experienced pilots, and participants of the Great Patriotic War and exercises.

Experience has shown that the latest achievements of modern aviation must be accounted for in cadet training. Knowledge and habits acquired

in the school must become the young officer's foundation for assimilating new knowledge in aviation, the first stepping stone to flight proficiency. Confident knowledge of airplanes and their aerodynamics naturally promotes the stable piloting techniques typical of the best cadets, for example V. Lastovskiy, V. Sorokin, S. Yesenin, S. Ganichev, and V. Kozhevnikov.

Military flight schools have now achieved positive results in training highly qualified airmen wholly devoted to the Communist Party and the Soviet people and capable of executing important missions in a modern battle. But we must not become self-satisfied with what has been achieved. We must constantly improve all aspects of the work upon which development of future pilots depends. Speaking about the education of young people, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev emphasized: "Manifestations of callousness and formalism are especially intolerable here. The time has come for all workers of the ideological front to rid themselves once and for all of the still-surviving practice of mechanical, mindless repetition of truisms, of meaningless jargon. The time has come to make speaking with people in simple, intelligible language, and writing with life and feeling the rule. This is also an issue of quality and effectiveness, an issue in education of the new man, such an important area of communist construction."

The decisions of the July (1978) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and the laws adopted by the Ninth Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet during its 10th Convocation elicited a new upsurge of patriotic feelings among the military airmen, feelings which are finding their concrete manifestation in the work of improving the combat readiness of the units and subunits.

Implementing the party directives, the executives, teachers, and instructor pilots of the aviation schools have fully resolved to attain new successes in aircrew training. In the course of the training process, on the ground and in the air, the young people are developing dependable wings, reinforcing their love of flying, of the valorous profession of the aerial warrior, a faithful defender of the Soviet motherland's skies.

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HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 78 signed to press
1 Aug 78 pp 16-17

[Article by Sr Lt S. Tolstoy: "'Thank You for the Helicopters!'"]

[Text] The helicopter pad was empty. Silence reigned over the airfield. It was also quiet in the office of the squadron deputy commander for engineering aviation service, Major Technical Service R. Tkachishin. He had just finished analyzing the past day with his subordinates, and now he was bent over his notebook. He confidently wrote the first line: "Preflight Preparations Plan." He wrote down the date, and then he looked over the notes on his desk calendar. Then began the flow of laconic sentences, swiftly and almost without interruptions.

Tkachishin devotes a great deal of time to planning. And Roman Ivanovich approaches it creatively. He attaches special significance to concreteness and efficiency. Because 7 helicopters had to be prepared for flight, the engineer ordered all of the flight engineers and mechanics to be at their workplaces this time. He also called in three more specialists to help each of them. As far as his own role was concerned, he planned to monitor the service group chiefs and the flight engineers, and he selected the helicopter to be personally inspected by him. The choice fell on the craft aboard which Officer A. Bezryadin was flight engineer. The engineer also took account of the fact that one of the specialists might be placed on an unscheduled detail or that someone would have to be sent on a trip somewhere without prior notice. He was ready for anything. Such a knack comes only with many years of service.

Roman Ivanovich has been in the army for almost 3 decades. He experienced many things during this time. After graduating from the aviation engineering school he was assigned to a long-range bomber unit as a bomber flight engineer.

Soon the regiment was rearmed with jet airplanes. New, deeper knowledge was required. Moreover Tkachishin was promoted to chief of the airplane

and engine maintenance group. The young officer devoted all of his free time to his own education. Specialized literature and manuals were perpetually at his side. His development of the skills of working with new equipment was just as persistent.

The weeks and months of such training produced the desired results: Tkachishin earned the authority of a true master of his affairs. People turned to him for advice, and as a rule his word was final in debatable issues. Now, it seemed, the time had come for him to begin teaching others.

But a dramatic change in his career once again forced the officer to sit down with the textbooks. Now his object of study was helicopters, and he had to assimilate what then appeared to be the most unusual operations. As an example, he had to stand by the helicopter with a long rod in his hands like a lance-bearer. This was called checking axial alignment. Without the necessary alignment the helicopter's flight would not be smooth.

Tkachishin mastered the speciality himself and then taught his subordinates.

By the time Communist Tkachishin was transferred to his present place of service he was already the squadron deputy commander for engineer aviation service; he had gained experience in operating four types of helicopters. At his present post he had raised the squadron's engineering service to one of the best in the district's aviation. Such success required a great deal of labor and energy.

It would seem that no special resourcefulness would be needed to familiarize subordinates with the plan. But the engineer does not limit himself to simply listing its items. He mandatorily recalls to his subordinates precisely what they must do. He also tries to place his subordinates into a good psychological mood and to inspire them to a maximally productive work rhythm. Is this really simple to do? Of course not. But the officer knows how to achieve his goal through compliments addressed to an outstanding soldier, through pertinent jokes, and through examples from his own experience.

After formation, the work at the helicopters went into full swing. Everything was proceeding according to the plan. The helicopter with Officer Bezryadin as the flight engineer was inspected: There were no significant remarks, and a grade of excellent was awarded. Preparation of the other helicopter was checked out. All that was left to do was to finish filling out the documents and clean up the helicopter cabin. Repairs on ground equipment by the fitter-mechanical group headed by Warrant Officer A. Zhuravlev were checked out: These were top-notch specialists, and other groups could learn a thing or two about organization from them. The only mistake made was that the drivers had parked their specialized vehicles in the wrong place. This had to be corrected.

Then once again back to the helicopters. In the next half hour Tkachishin inspected the parking pads of the second and third flights. He did not find any violations.

Communist Tkachishin recalled the way it was when he first began working in the unit. The operations schedule was sometimes violated, and discipline was not always as it should have been. Warrant Officer B. Antipovskiy, a helicopter and engine mechanic, is one of those specialists who is said to have golden hands. He did even the most difficult jobs brilliantly. He became a foreman within a short time. Everything was all right, except for certain complaints about his personal life. He violated military discipline, and he drank in excess.

Tkachishin admonished Antipovskiy, criticized him at meetings, and punished him. In addition to imposing disciplinary actions he persistently tried to awaken the subordinate's consciousness with a simple but very important idea: "You're not getting any younger, and what will you think of your actions 5 or 10 years from now?" Roman Ivanovich also found another path to the warrant officer's heart, interesting him in the possibility and need for advanced training.

Of course Antipovskiy did not correct his behavior immediately. But today he is an outstanding soldier, and he is studying hard for final exams at a military aviation school. And he is very grateful to the engineer for the fact that he had helped the warrant officer persistently and benevolently to extricate himself from a difficult situation.

Officer A. Dudinov also caused the engineer many worries when he first assumed his post as flight engineer. The young specialist made disappointing errors at first. There was even a near-accident due to his carelessness: When tested on the ground, the engines failed to operate properly. It turned out that Dudinov had failed to synchronize the rpm correctly. Moreover, on trips away from his unit he often phoned in to get advice about rather simple problems. A special program had to be set up for him, making sure that he would study the subjects deeply. Difficult problems were studied using the helicopter itself. And so, what happened? Today Dudinov has a 1st class rating.

In earlier times the engineer was often troubled by mysterious deviations in the work of equipment. Two incidents can be recalled in this regard. In one of them free play developed in the cyclic pitch control lever of one of the helicopters. The cause of its arisal was sought for a long time, but without success. This was reported to Tkachishin. He thought about it for a while, and then concluded that the bolt securing the longitudinal control (reflenka) had loosened. The engineer explained why he had come to this conclusion, and he ordered his men to perform a preventive inspection of the squadron's other helicopters. As it turned out, this effort prevented other problems from arising later.

In the other incident the pedals in the cockpit were found to jam for short periods of time. Being one of those insoluble mysteries, this problem caused considerable anxiety among the technicians. Everything seemed to be normal on the ground, with the pedals operating smoothly. But once in the air, the pedals would jam. Naturally the helicopter was grounded and a search for the cause was started. The control system was dismantled at all suspicious places, but without success. Some even ventured that the pilot had imagined the problem. But the engineer was in the habit of believing the information offered by the pilots. Time and again he studied the entire kinematics of the foot control. At last he arrived at the hypothesis that the fault lay with the electric trimmer mechanism, which reduced the load in the air. This turned out to be the case.

Today most problems are revealed and solved by the flight engineers themselves; after all, three-fourths of them are masters and 1st class specialists, and the others are on their way to becoming such.

The engineer spares no effort or energy to see that their training is as effective as possible. The training base is being improved and new diagrams, models, and trainers are being acquired under his guidance. As a rule the airmen fabricate their own training aids and their quality is such that they are sometimes indistinguishable from centrally requisitioned training aids. Take as an example an engine cross section made by Senior Lieutenant Technical Service V. Babay. Not only representatives of the higher staff but also many of the subunit's specialists at first doubted that this was not a factory-made training aid.

Individual assignments make up the foundation of independent training in the squadron. This is not a new form of training; it is employed in other units as well, but Tkachishin has a unique approach to it. He selects the subjects for such training from the unit's experience. Once the engineer asked flight engineer I. Sokolov a question about adjusting the combined pitch-gas control. The latter responded, but not entirely adequately. Tkachishin ordered the officer to work out the flowchart himself and then analyze it with the technicians and mechanics. The result was obvious: Both Sokolov and his subordinates now have an outstanding knowledge of this system.

The work day came to an end. The plan was ready in its entirety. The engineer's ability to predict events once again helped him to avoid wasted time. Summarizing the day's results at a critique, Tkachishin first turned the floor over to the flight engineers and group chiefs. Their reports on the day's work were followed by a brief analysis of the work of the specialists, and their places in the socialist competition were determined. The engineer said some good words about flight engineer Officer V. Molchanov, who had displayed high alertness and prepared his helicopter efficiently. Next the chiefs of the electronic and aviation

equipment groups had to live through a few unpleasant minutes: It was their fault that the drivers had changed their route to the inspection pad.

"It is difficult to work with Tkachishin, but it is interesting," says flight engineer Officer G. Kolesnikov. "He never weakens for even a minute, and he demands that others always be in good form, as the athletes say. The engineer's creativity never stagnates. Whatever the routine problem, he bases his decision not on how things are but rather on how they should be to permit effective, high-quality implementation of an idea."

"Thank you for the helicopters! Everything worked well in the air," the pilots thanked the technical personnel. Short but to the point. Major of Technical Service R. Tkachishin and his subordinates devote all of their effort and soul to seeing that the helicopters remain highly dependable and combat ready.

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PARACHUTE RESCUE TRAINING FOR PILOTS

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1 Aug 78 p 21

[Article by Capt P. Seymov: "In an Extraordinary Situation"]

[Text] Despite the dependability and faultless operation of modern aviation equipment, the requirements imposed on the pilot's special and moral-psychological training are extremely high. In particular the capability for abandoning an airplane in an emergency continues to be an important part of the airman's special training. After all, a situation could evolve during a combat mission in which a parachute jump is the sole means of survival. The outcome of a flight depends on the extent to which the pilot is ready to act competently and decisively in an extreme situation.

Parachute rescue training centers on timely and competent use of rescue resources while in the air, and on the actions of the pilot following forced abandonment of the airplane. In such training the pilots arrive at the proper frame of mind through theoretical lessons, catapult training, and parachute jumps.

Inasmuch as flight personnel are theoretically acquainted with the problems of abandoning an airplane and survival following emergency egress in an ejection seat, we conduct our lessons in the form of seminars. Experience has shown that this is the most effective way to reinforce knowledge. The lesson leader takes examples from flying practice to explain to the pilots the importance of the topic under examination, subordinating everything to a single goal--teaching the pilots what they must do in the air.

A pilot who is psychologically poorly prepared is sometimes unable to correctly assess an emergency situation in the air; he may perform hasty, thoughtless actions, abandoning his airplane in a workable situation or, on the other hand, failing to do so at the needed moment. This is why it is very important for commanders and parachute landing service chiefs to work closely with the unit physician to reveal the weak points in the

training of young airmen, to correctly assess their individual, psychological, and flight qualities, to devote special attention to them in lessons and training sessions in initial flight training, to make them confident of their actions, and, if necessary, to organize supplementary lessons and training sessions. Such work usually begins when the young pilots first arrive at the unit.

Thus the chief of the unit's parachute landing service is invited to participate in preflight training in the air squadron commanded by Lieutenant Colonel A. Smetanin. Together with the commander he explains different problems concerning parachute rescue training. When checking out the pilots he determines how well they know their rescue resources and the order of their use. And it should be said that in this squadron, the young pilots know the procedures well and perform all necessary actions efficiently in the training sessions, which in turn has a positive effect on their development as pilots.

It is no secret that an outstanding knowledge of rescue resources makes the pilot confident of a favorable outcome to a flight, no matter how complex the situation, and that it has a positive effect on his psychological state. It is precisely on this that the combat mission depends in the end.

Experience has shown that a good impact is achieved when pilots do their training in their flight gear, when they carefully practice all of the elements of abandoning an airplane several times. Special attention is turned to pilots that have not flown for a long period of time. It has been noted that if more than a month had passed since the last time a pilot had practiced abandonment of his airplane in a trainer, the efficiency with which he performs particular elements decreases, and following a 2 or 3 month break in training the individual is practically unable to perform as required. This is why training sessions must be conducted more frequently, using down days for this purpose.

Experience assures us that even an experienced pilot who flies several types of airplanes sometimes confuses the order of actions with different ejection seats in his training sessions, trying to locate nonexistent catapult control levers. This is just on the ground! What would happen if he were in the air? The problem of psychologically retuning the pilot when flying different types of airplanes acquires special significance in this connection. The pilot should undergo unhurried independent training in the cockpit in the type of airplane he will fly next.

Psychological and special preparation of the pilot for possible complications in the air is discussed in our unit at meetings of the teaching council. In these meetings we analyze possible emergency situations during a particular assignment as a whole and in its specific phases, and we develop recommendations (in particular on how to train a pilot to abandon his airplane) to be used as the basis for in-depth training.

As an example the most complex phase of fire at ground targets consists of the dive, sighting, fire, and recovery from the dive. It is precisely in this phase that the probability of arisal of an emergency situation is the greatest, since the pilot's attention is wholly concentrated on a single thing--striking the target. When the need arises he would have only a few seconds or even just a fraction of a second to spare in making a decision and abandoning the airplane. And if he is not prepared psychologically for possible emergency situations, even though his special training had been outstanding these precious seconds could be lost.

The personal example of commanders plays an important role in training sessions attended by flight personnel. On one hand they monitor the lessons, and on the other hand they share their own rich experience and can provide valuable advice. Once a young pilot was given the following input during a training session: "One engine failed on takeoff." The pilot made his decision: "I am ejecting!" But more-experienced pilots debated his decision, demonstrating that if the thrust of the operating engine is sufficient to permit a gain in altitude and if there are no obstacles in front, the flight could be continued, and the mission could be completed. The way an airplane's behavior could be assessed from the instruments, the sort of decision that could be made, and the time available were analyzed; various situations were recalled from flying practice. This is also very important because a pilot cannot write everything down when undergoing instruction, and it is precisely during such training sessions that young pilots gain experience and the capability for correctly and quickly thinking in complex situations; it is here that they develop their psychological readiness to act boldly and resolutely.

It is very important to nurture the pilot's confidence in the work of his rescue resources. Thus attendance of flight personnel at a parachute packing exercise, training sessions with an operating ejection chair during repairs, and preflight inspection of rescue resources promote development of an appropriate psychological mood among the airmen.

Parachute jumps make up the concluding stage of psychological preparation of the pilots for abandonment of an airplane. They reinforce knowledge acquired in theoretical lessons and training sessions and impart the skills the personnel would need in the event of forced abandonment of the airplane. Parachute jumps require a great deal of physical and moral effort on the part of the airman. They develop initiative, self-control, resourcefulness, boldness, decisiveness, and other volitional qualities needed by an air crewmember. Parachute jumps are a unique test of the pilot's moral-psychological qualities, since during them the pilot's reactions and his preparedness for surviving an imminent but previously known complex situation are manifested especially clearly.

Parachute rescue training is an inseparable part of flight training and all combat training. It is as natural for a pilot to know his rescue resources and be always ready to utilize them competently and decisively as it is for him to fly. This is why stereotypy and simplifications in lessons and training sessions and, what even still worse, a careless attitude toward them are entirely impermissible. Competent, sharp, prompt, and cool actions and confidence in the work of rescue resources is a guarantee of a favorable outcome in an usually complex flight situation.

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INSTRUMENT TRAINING SHORTCOMINGS OF PILOTS NOTED

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[Article by Military-Pilot Instructor 1st Class Col D. Baynetov:
"Complication and Hints"]

[Text] I was to fly training flights with the pilots. Some of them had experienced an interruption in training in complex meteorological conditions. I had to determine whether or not these comrades had lost formerly acquired habits and whether or not they were ready to perform their assignments independently. Major I. Naumov took his place in the cockpit first. The time of his absence from training was relatively short, but nevertheless he had to undergo the test.

The engine started. The airplane took off. A few dozen seconds, and I covered the pilot's cockpit with a curtain. All attention was riveted upon the instruments. Naumov piloted the fighter neatly, trying to maintain all prescribed climb parameters precisely. Having climbed to the required altitude he reported this to the flight leader and turned the airplane toward the homing radar. He was in a 30° bank. The supersonic fighter was flying at high rpm. I made a mental note that everything was normal.

Then I decided to make the flight conditions more complex. I turned off the gyrohorizon on the panel simulating failures of the piloting and navigational instruments. Ten, twenty seconds passed. But Naumov still did not react to the input. Placing his reliance entirely upon the false readings of the gyrohorizon, he gradually banked the craft in the reverse direction.

The bank angle grew higher and higher. The airplane descended. Forward and vertical velocities increased. The gyrohorizon in my cockpit was already reading 75-80°. But the pilot still failed to switch to backup instruments.

The descent continued. Finally I took over the controls and opened the curtain. Then I told Naumov that he made a gross error in piloting the airplane after failure of the gyrohorizon. I reported the reason for deviation from the prescribed course to the command post.

Consider this in light of the fact that Military Pilot 1st Class Major Naumov was not flying by instruments for the first time and that he had considerable experience in piloting a fighter day and night in complex meteorological conditions. But here in the simplest situation, shutdown of the gyrohorizon, he was unable to complete his assignment. Moreover he not only caused the airplane to deviate from its course but also was unable to recover his position in space for a time interval during which the airplane lost about 1000 meters in altitude, descending with a bank angle of more than 60°. Critiquing the flight I once again tried to explain how this could have happened.

In response to my question the officer said: "I was simply not ready to act in response to the failure, I had not expected it." In other words the pilot had prepared for the assignment thoughtlessly in all respects.

But a gyrohorizon failure can occur even during a training flight. In a warplane the pilot would be able to rely only on his instruments. And it would be difficult to state categorically how such a flight would have ended, had any of these instruments failed.

On analyzing Major Naumov's preparations for the assignment in greater detail it became quite obvious to me that inadequate attention was being devoted to instrument flying in his subunit. Although Naumov had clocked a large number of flying hours, he had flown only a little more than 1.5 hours under a curtain. And he had only flown two sorties with backup instruments. It was believed that this was quite enough for an experienced pilot to permit him to maintain his prescribed proficiency in instrument flying. Practice showed, however, that this was not so.

Another problem is that not all sorties calling for backup instruments were flown as required. As we know an instrument failure simulator must be installed aboard the airplane earmarked for this purpose. And the checker must turn off the speedometer, the gyrohorizon, the compass, the automatic radio compass, and so on without warning to the person undergoing the checkout flight--that is, he must create situations that the fighter pilot might encounter in solo flight.

Here is more. Periodically switching off the instruments, the instructor must invariably clock, with a stopwatch, the time required by the pilot to note the "failure," and he must establish the steps taken by the student to prevent the undesirable consequences of a "hazardous" phenomenon. Subsequent assumption of the landing course and piloting in response to a long-range homing radio station and a short-range homing radio station are performed as rule with backup instruments using the readings from the radar-controlled landing system and the command post. Only training of this sort would produce really good results.

Unfortunately it sometimes happens that a pilot flies with backup instruments but their failure is not simulated. During the flight the instructor simply tells him to turn off the gyrohorizon and so on. It stands to reason that this procedure does not bring any benefit to the student. After all, the hardest and most important thing to learn is how to discover the failure of a particular instrument as soon as possible and immediately switch to backup instruments. I later found out that in his two sorties employing backup instruments, Officer Naumov flew only one with a simulator aboard. Consequently he had not received sufficient training or an adequate moral-psychological load.

Trainer lessons are important in developing the necessary habits of instrument piloting and heightening moral and psychological fitness. But even in this respect things are far from adequate in the subunit in which Major Naumov serves. This officer had clocked very few hours in trainers over a rather long interval of time. Here, I think, was a substantial reason why the experienced pilot was not ready for his assignment.

When a pilot is warned that an instrument will be switched off, he would naturally switch to backup instruments in time and act correctly from then on. Such was the case in the sortie with which we began our discussion.

The second time the gyrohorizon was turned off Naumov did not become confused, and he did not make any major deviations from the prescribed flight mode. Nevertheless the pilot did not receive a high grade.

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AIR CREW SURVIVAL TRAINING EXAMINED

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[Article by Can Med Sci V. Volovich, "In Unpopulated Terrain"]

[Text] A crew that for one reason or another abandons its aircraft by parachute or makes a forced landing may find itself in unpopulated, inaccessible terrain in various climatic conditions. Today's search and rescue service is outfitted with sophisticated resources ensuring a quick search for disaster victims and delivery of rescue groups to the place of the incident to render assistance and evacuate the victims. But inasmuch as various unforeseen situations are not excluded, crews must be prepared to survive autonomously--that is, through their own efforts and resources--for a certain amount of time, perhaps even a long one.

In such a case four basic problems face the crew: Protection from the effects of unfavorable environmental factors; use of available signaling, communication, and ground orientation resources (those regularly carried by the crew and improvised resources); surmounting stress elicited by the uniqueness of the situation; satisfaction of vital needs for water, food, and so on using emergency reserves and natural resources. Successful completion of these tasks would depend mainly on the aircrew's ability to survive--to act actively and suitably, applying their knowledge, resourcefulness, inventiveness, and all available resources to maintain life, health, and efficiency.

The fundamental premise behind survival is as follows. No matter how primitive his gear is, the individual must survive the harshest climatic and geographical conditions, and he can do so if he knows how to utilize in his behalf all that the surrounding world offers him. A number of factors influence the outcome of autonomous survival--the environment, the physical and mental condition of the crewmembers, their training level, presence or absence of survival gear, and many others.

An analysis of the behavior of people in extraordinary situations (airplane disasters, shipwrecks, fires, floods) would show that 50-70 percent of the victims remain calm, though not sufficiently active; 12-25 percent retain their composure, they assess the situation quickly, and they act decisively and sensibly; 12-25 percent of the people exhibit reactive states manifested either as intense arousal and disordered actions or as inhibition, depression, total disinterest in the incident, and the inability to act despite all circumstances.

The concept of "survival stress factors" is often utilized in the literature in defining factors having an unfavorable effect on an individual finding himself confronted by nature alone. They include pain, cold, heat, thirst, hunger, fatigue, and loneliness. Such a classification is doubtlessly arbitrary, but it can help us to systematize these factors to a certain extent, which would make it easier to examine the mutual relationships between the environment and an individual existing independently.

Pain is a normal reaction of the body having a protective function. People unable to sense pain cannot eliminate a threatening factor in time. On the other hand by causing suffering, pain stresses and distracts the individual, while prolonged, intense, unceasing pain affects all of his behavior. But by concentrating himself on completing some very important, critical task he can overcome the pain.

Reducing physical activity and efficiency, cold has a great influence on the mind. As many arctic and antarctic researchers have noted, not only muscles but also the brain and the will become dysfunctional. This is why it is recommended that a crew making a forced landing in a low-temperature zone should begin with finding protection from cold--building a shelter, starting a fire, and preparing hot food and beverages.

High environmental temperature and direct solar radiation cause significant changes in the human body, sometimes within a relatively short time. Overheating impairs the functions of organs and systems and weakens physical and mental activity. High temperatures are extremely dangerous when there is not enough drinking water, when the body experiences dehydration in addition to overheating. Erection of a lean-to to screen off the sun, restriction of physical activity, and economical utilization of water are steps which alleviate significantly the situation.

Thirst is the body's normal signal indicating a need for fluids. When this need cannot be satisfied due to a shortage or lack of water, it transforms into a factor considerably interfering with the activities of an individual attempting autonomous survival. Thirst captures all of his thoughts, concentrating them on a single goal--eliminating the sense of torment.

The aggregate of sensations associated with the body's need for food is viewed as a typical though somewhat retarded stress reaction. We know that people can do without food for a long period of time and still remain efficient. However, many days of starvation weaken the body, reducing its resistance to unfavorable environmental factors.

The emergency food ration in the personal survival kit (NAZ) is intended for only a few days of a below-subsistence diet. The environment must become an additional source of food. The food reserves can be replenished by hunting, fishing, and gathering of wild edible plants.

Fatigue arising due to prolonged (and sometimes short-term) physical or mental tension harbors a potential danger dulling the individual's will and making him susceptible to his own weaknesses, in a sense preparing him for the following psychological set: "This work is not urgent, and it can be put off until tomorrow." The consequences of such a state can be quite serious. Fatigue can be avoided and strength can be recovered quickly through proper, balanced distribution of physical loads and timely rest, which must be made as adequate as possible through all available resources.

Fear, a sensation elicited by a real or apparent danger, the anticipation of pain, suffering, and the like, is a form of emotional reaction, the most dangerous enemy of the victim. To an untrained, weak-willed person the environment is a perpetual source of fear. It transforms any simple problem into one that is complex, and it makes a complex problem insurmountable. (Alen Bombar), a French physician who had crossed the Atlantic in an inflatable lifeboat, noted: "Victims of legendary shipwrecks who have died prematurely, I know you: You were killed not by the sea, starvation did not kill you, you were not killed by thirst! Rocking on the waves beneath the plaintive cries of the seagulls, you died of fear." In this state the individual loses his ability to control his actions and make correct decisions. Fear intensifies the sensation of pain and the effects of cold, heat, hunger, and thirst.

But at the same time fear is controllable and suppressible; it can be a useful stimulus to action for the individual, forcing him to think more quickly and better and perform more actively. It sharpens perception by sense organs and multiplies physical strength, transforming from an enemy into a unique catalyst of energy and decisiveness. Thus this feeling can also significantly heighten the chances of rescue.

A person needs certain personal amenities, food, and water. At the same time, being a member of society, he involuntarily gets used to the idea that many of his needs are satisfied by surrounding individuals. Thus in an unfavorable situation he would also count on someone's help.

A person unprepared for life in extraordinary conditions does not know where the dangers lie, and if he does, he is unable to correctly assess their degree. This uncertainty elicits mental tension. The length of this sort of reaction can vary from minutes to several days, but the better the individual is acquainted with the situation in which he finds himself, the shorter it is.

The environment's physical and geographical conditions play an important role in survival. Actively influencing the human body, they increase or decrease the time of autonomous survival, promoting or hindering success in the person's fight for life. Every natural zone--the Arctic and the tropics, the taiga and the ocean, the mountains, the desert--is typified by its own climate, topography, and plant and animal world. These features are responsible for the unique characteristics of the individual's survival, his behavior, his ability to acquire food and water and build shelters, the nature of illnesses, the measures taken to prevent them, and the individual's ability to travel over the terrain.

Both an aircrew making a forced landing in unpopulated terrain and one landing on the ocean would have to solve the most diverse problems. However, the importance of each of these problems would depend on the region's geographical location. As an example a crew in a desert would concentrate on preventing heat trauma and searching for water. Experience has shown that people are capable of enduring the harshest natural conditions for a long period of time.

The personal survival kit--the NAZ--has great significance to autonomous survival. It contains a radio set and signaling resources which help the pilot to establish communication quickly and transmit his location when search airplanes and helicopters arrive. The pilot can use the camping gear in the kit to erect a temporary shelter, start a fire, and cut firewood. Need we say that absence of a personal survival kit would place the crew in an extremely complex situation.

Survival depends in many ways on the will, persistence, self-control, physical fitness, and endurance of the crewmembers. Nevertheless these qualities alone are not enough to ensure a favorable outcome to autonomous survival in unpopulated terrain. The crew would also need theoretical knowledge of survival problems reinforced by practical skills.

Preparing itself for the event of an emergency landing in unpopulated terrain, the aircrew must not only acquaint itself with the NAZ, know how to use the objects in the kit, learn the methods of ground orientation and erection of temporary shelters, and acquire the skills of hunting and fishing, exploring for wild edible plants, finding water, but it must also be prepared psychologically for living in the conditions of autonomous survival. While undergoing its training, the aircrew must gain an understanding of the importance of all this to survival and of the consequences to which complacency could lead.

The aircrew must also view its gear and the surrounding situation from the standpoint of their utilization in the interests of survival. As an example the pins on the parachute harness are potential fishing hooks, a tree can be a source of shade and fuel, and an anthill can be used to determine the points of the compass, a watchglass can be used to start a fire, and so on.

The lesson leader must set the following practical goals. He must systematically add to the student's knowledge of the climatic, sanitary, and geographical features of the regions over which sorties are flown, and of the environmental factors which might have an unfavorable effect on human health, for example high or low temperatures and poisonous animals and plants. The greatest possible emphasis should be placed not only on the effects of these factors but also on the ways an aircrew can protect itself from them.

If an aircrew is to acquire the skills of using survival gear and rescue resources, it must undergo training. A formal attitude toward training can lead to unfavorable consequences. Thus a pilot who had landed on water with a parachute was soon spotted by a rescue helicopter. But the pilot took a long time to attach the buckle of the cable lowered to him. As a result he was raised aboard after experiencing severe chilling given appropriate training, this problem could have been avoided.

Experience shows that it is best to provide training to aircrews in three stages.

In the first stage the aircrew becomes theoretically acquainted with the general problems of autonomous survival in unpopulated terrain. This stage includes the study of physical and geographical conditions of possible areas of forced landing, and assimilation of the survival gear and especially its use in a particular situation. At this time the aircrew also studies the tactical-technical data of search and rescue resources.

In the second stage the aircrew acquires the skills of ground orientation, of signaling with carried and improvised resources, of building temporary shelters, of using individual objects in the NAZ, and of maintaining radio communication. The aircrew practices the methods of rescue by a hovering helicopter from water and land using various organic resources (chairs, nets, belts). In the third and concluding stage the aircrew undergoes training in natural conditions, simulating autonomous survival following a forced landing.

The knowledge and skills acquired by a pilot in such lessons will ensure the success of his survival and increase his confidence that he would surmount all difficulties encountered.

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COMMENTS ON FOREIGN AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE DEVELOPMENTS

Moscow AVIATSIYA I KOSMONAVTIKA in Russian No 9, Sep 78 signed to press
1 Aug 78 pp 46-47

[Article by Cand Tech Sci V. Yefimov and Cand Tech Sci A. Sadovnikov
based on foreign publications]

[Text] Foreign military experts believe that achievement of air superiority would depend on aircREW proficiency, the combat capabilities of airplanes and, in particular, their armament. It is no accident that projects aimed at heightening the effectiveness of armament systems, especially of air-to-air guided missiles, are gaining increasing scope in capitalist countries, making up an important part of the arms race.

According to the foreign press radar guidance systems are used in long and medium range missiles. Semiactive homing requiring illumination of the target by the fighter's onboard radar set (BRLS) has enjoyed the greatest use. It is believed that this system requires a relatively small volume for its apparatus, it operates at significant range, it is independent of weather, and it permits preselection of targets.

Pulsed and continuous signals can be used to illuminate the target. Continuous signals can detect low-flying targets on the background of interference from the underlying terrain by frequency separation of the signal produced by the target and interference. When interference is present, however, the task of detecting and isolating the useful signal becomes significantly more complex.

This is why "inversion" receivers have come into use abroad. In this case the target signal is selected not at the end of the processing loop but rather at an intermediate frequency. The payoff of the proposed scheme lies in the fact that in contrast to the situation with a conventional receiver, a significant part of the interference is eliminated at the input with an "inversion" receiver. The dynamic range of amplifiers employed subsequently can be narrower, and simpler technical devices would be needed for amplification. Practical appearance of the

"inversion" receiver is the result of improvements in the procedures for making highly selective, high quality intermediate frequency crystal filters, low noise tunable solid-state superhigh frequency (SHF) oscillators, and integrated microcircuits.

An "inversion" receiver can be used with different direction finding methods. The maximum scanning frequency of direction finding systems employing conical scanning is limited by the passband of the crystal filter. Use of the multichannel (monopulse) direction finding method heightens the resistance of the homing head to interference and ensures greater accuracy in guiding the missile to the target, but it requires apparatus of greater complexity. The volume of the equipment is reduced by multiplexing the channels. There is room for a larger engine as a result, and this means that the missile's range can be increased.

Use of a continuous target illumination signal has its shortcomings as well. First of all a special illumination transmitter is needed because the fighter's onboard radar usually emits a pulsed signal. The additional transmitter increases the weight and overall dimensions of the fighter's equipment, which is undesirable according to foreign experts. Moreover activation of a continuous signal warns the enemy of an imminent missile launch. The way to eliminate these shortcomings is seen abroad in the use of a sounding signal from the onboard radar to illuminate the target. A pulsed Doppler signal with a high pulse repetition frequency can serve as a common signal for both the onboard radar set and the homing head.

Use of a single signal reduces the effective range of the radar homing head by 20-30 percent as compared to a continuous illumination signal. One of the ways for compensating for the arising losses is, as an example, increasing the power of the BRLS.

A guidance system in which the target is constantly illuminated by the onboard radar from the moment of launch until termination of flight is sufficiently effective when a fighter must strike a single aerial target from long range. But continuous target illumination restricts the fighter's capabilities when the battle involves numerically superior forces.

Onboard radar sets are now being outfitted with quickly scanning antennas, particularly phased antenna arrays, so that several targets could be illuminated alternately and missiles could be guided to them concurrently. The beam is shifted from one target to another by electric switching of emitters and control of the phase or frequency of the emitted signal. A special digital computer is needed to process the incoming information. Intermittent target illumination also has a certain effect on the performance of the RGS [radar homing head] because the head can produce homing signals only during the time of illumination of the target against which the missile is launched, with flight proceeding at other times in accordance with memorized data. Guidance accuracy is somewhat lower

with intermittent illumination than with continuous illumination; this is why a transition to homing mode is required in the final leg of the flight trajectory.

A pulsed Doppler target illumination signal is used by "air-to-air" class missiles now in use and under development aboard. In particular it can be used by American Sparrow missiles. The latest missile of this sort, the AIM-7F, was placed into production in 1975. It replaced the AIM-7E Sparrow missile. The AIM-7F is outfitted with a semiactive homing head built with integrated circuits.

The flying distance of the AIM-7F missile (45 km) and the effective range of its radar homing head are greater than those of its predecessors owing to higher sensitivity of the receiver. It has also been noted in the foreign press that the missile's dependability has supposedly risen. Experts feel that it can be used in various meteorological conditions to intercept targets in both the forward and rear hemispheres. The AIM-7F Sparrow missile is carried by F-14, F-15, F-4, and F-18 airplanes. Reports have recently been published indicating that this weapon can also be used by the F-16.

The Italian-built Aspid-1A missile also has a semiactive homing head and is based on integrated circuits. Its aerodynamic configuration is similar to that of the Sparrow. But it has a more-powerful engine, and it uses the monopulse direction finding method. The missile's launch range is 45 km at high altitude. The missile is part of the armament system of the Tornado airplane and the F-104 of the Italian Air Force.

The XJ 521 Sky Flash missile has been designed and tested in England. It is intended for use with the English Tornado fighter-interceptor. The semiactive homing head is manufactured by the Marconi Company. It is based on the "inversion" and monopulse design, and it employs integrated components. Initially the guidance system employed a pulsed Doppler target illumination signal. But the need for heightening the radar's power and a number of economic considerations led to a transition to continuous target illumination. The missile can be launched by the carrier at subsonic and supersonic speeds against targets in both the upper and lower hemispheres. The missile's effective range is about 45 km.

The French R-530 missile produced by the MATRA Company can be outfitted with interchangeable infrared or semiactive radar homing heads. The missile is intended for combat missions at medium altitudes on a collision course in simple and complex weather conditions. The launch range of the missile is about 18 km. The improved Super-530 missile, which is outfitted with a semiactive homing head, has been suggested as a replacement for the R-530 missile. The guidance system permits interception of high-altitude targets flying up to 10 km above the fighter at a range of about 30 km. Mirage-F1 airplanes are armed with R-530 and Super-530 missiles.

The desire to increase the combat capabilities of the fighter even more have led to creation of guided missiles with greater effective range. They possess combined guidance systems ensuring accurate guidance coupled with acceptable characteristics for the entire weapon control complex. In the 1960's the USA designed missiles of greater effective range such as the AIM-47A Falcon and the AIM-54A Phoenix. The Falcon missile has a normal aerodynamic configuration. It weighs about 68 kg, and it is 2 meters long. The guidance system employs radar in the middle leg of the trajectory and infrared radiation in the final leg.

The Phoenix missile is the most complex and expensive armament system developed on request of the U.S. Navy. It was adopted in 1973. The effectiveness of this missile, which is large and heavy, is defined in many ways by the AN/AWG-9 weapon control complex installed aboard the F-14A Tomcat. The airplane's onboard radar set has a rapid-scanning antenna intended for simultaneous control of several Phoenix missiles.

The guidance system of the Phoenix missile is combined, consisting of a semiactive system employing a pulsed Doppler sounding signal produced by a BRIS in the middle leg of the trajectory and an active RGS employing a pulsed Doppler signal. The active RGS goes into action in the last 16 km of the missile's flight trajectory.

Nevertheless, the foreign press reports, the existing RGS-equipped "air-to-air" missiles do not satisfy all of the requirements of aerial battle. This is why plans have been made to modernize existing missiles and design new ones.

American missiles such as the Sparrow and Phoenix are to be subjected to significant modernization. They will employ digital computers characterized by smaller overall dimensions, greater accuracy and speed, greater flexibility of use, and higher reliability than analog computers. American experts are also achieving certain improvements in characteristics and an increase in the coefficient of operational readiness and dependability.

In addition to replacing analog electronic devices by digital devices, the Americans are decreasing the number of components used. The transceiver of the active RGS is to be based on integrated circuits, and the dependability of the unit and its weight are to be decreased by 40 percent as compared to the variant employing SHF tubes. Designers are trying to reduce the total number of components by 1.7 times and the number of adjustments by 1.8 times. A signal shaping device employing linear frequency modulation is to be introduced into the unit as a means for making the missile effective against grouped targets that cannot be distinguished from one another.

The new electronic unit and the autopilot will probably increase the possibilities for using the missiles in the presence of interference and when intercepting high-speed, high-altitude targets. An inertial guidance system will also be included in the autopilot.

In addition to introducing digital signal processing, there are plans for using a monopulse "inversion" receiver in the AIM-7F Sparrow missile. Several companies are presently working on a radar homing head of this type.

A promising medium-range missile is being designed in the AMRAAM Project. It is to be supplied to the F-14, F-15, F-16, and F-18 airplanes. Special attention is being turned in the planning of this missile to freeing the airplane of the need for constantly illuminating the target during missile guidance, and to satisfying the requirements of missile compatibility with radar sets producing different types of sounding signals and, in particular, having different pulse repetition frequencies. In the opinion of American experts there is promise in a missile not requiring continuous illumination during the initial and middle legs of the trajectory and possessing a homing head that goes into action in the final leg, since in some cases this would make use of forward-scanning radar to launch the guided weapon unnecessary. Then the attacking fighter could lock onto the target visually or with a passive direction finder, after which the missile can be launched without emitting signals from the onboard BRLS. In this case maximum covertness of actions coupled with minimum probability of jamming by the enemy is ensured. One variant of this missile is to employ a combined guidance system. Guidance will be furnished in the initial and middle legs by an independent inertial system. Target data are transmitted to the inertial system and a microcomputer prior to launch. When necessary, missile guidance can be corrected during these legs by a command radio line. In the final leg of the flight trajectory, 5-8 km from the target, the missile switches to homing mode, employing an active radar homing head. Preference is given to the radar system due to the possibility it allows for using the missile in the European theater of war, where weather conditions often preclude the use of weapons employing optical-visual guidance systems.

Creation of a miniature, sufficiently powerful active RGS with a housing diameter of about 127 mm is believed to be one of the most complex tasks of this project. Apparently the RGS being designed in the AMRAAM Project will make use of the monopulse direction finding method. Some companies have declared that creation of such an RGS is possible. Thus the Motorola Company is working on an active solid-state RGS. The diameter of the homing head's housing is 203 or 127 mm. It is hoped that this RGS will be less susceptible to jamming.

The Marconi Company has developed a microminiaturized semiactive RGS which after slight modification can be transformed into an active or

passive head. The RGS's microcomputer consists of large integrated circuits. The head has a large scanning angle, and it is outfitted with devices homing the missile onto a source of jamming. It also contains a shortrange contactless detonator. The diameter of the RGS's housing is 127 mm.

The several paths of RGS development examined here attest to the great role relegated to improving the guidance systems of "air-to-air" missiles in the aggressive plans promoted by imperialist circles in the West.

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TRAINING ACTIVITIES AT AN AIR DEFENSE RADAR SITE

Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 19 Jul 78 p 4

[Article by officer G. Sverdlov: "Response to a Readiness Signal"]

[Text] The readiness signal resounded above the "site" just after noon. The site came alive instantly. The pounding beat of the soldiers' boots rang out on the asphalt path leading to the command post. The radar operators competing to reduce the norm hurried to take their places. Among the first to arrive at the combat control center were the specialists who operated the automated control system [ASU].

"The ASU is combat ready!" reports Jr Sgt V. Afanas'yev, director of training, convinced that the equipment is functioning.

The operators hovered over the scopes searching for the target blips in the bright returns visible. The officer who arrived several seconds later had to salute the intense combat work. Carefully monitoring the activities of his subordinates, Capt M. Guzar was pleased. Everything is going as it should. But, it could be no other way. It is not for naught that the ASU crew which he commands is rated excellent.

It should be stated by the way that a similar honor has also been bestowed on the operator section, control equipment mechanics, and electricians. Communist Guzar was called upon to do a considerable amount of work in order to achieve high indicators. The best specialists have been released to the reserves, such individuals a first-class operator communist Sgt A. Samus', whose name is well known not only within his own subunit [podrazdeleniye] but also in the unit [chast']. Replacements had come in to

take their place but the latter do not possess any know-how. The novices had to be trained and trained. But, Miroslav Stepanovich's labor was repaid 100 fold. All the young soldiers passed the test for class rating on time and were permitted to stand a combat watch. Here are just a few facts which support their effectiveness. One-half of the troops in the platoon are now working at a level higher than the qualification which had been awarded them. Pvt V. Yefremov has only served a very short time but can, if necessary, replace a technician. Young soldier Pvt S. Shevchenko also carries out his responsibilities at the second-class level while Pvt O. Alimov, who has served only 1 year, is already prepared to take the test for first-class. . . .

The training level possessed by the ASU specialists is embodied in specific achievements. More than 6 months have passed since a piece of equipment failed. On duty the crew received only good and excellent ratings.

. . . Intense combat work is in progress in the equipment bay. Target data are coming in in a continuous stream. Capt Guzar's subordinates are processing them skillfully. At this time the officer himself is working with them, monitoring the situation, and providing assistance to those that require it. And, when a so-called operational pause occurs, the officer does not fail to utilize this convenient time to talk with the people and direct them towards quality accomplishment of the combat mission.

Right now a brief break has been announced and Miroslav Stepanovich discusses the military-political situation throughout the world in detail, then evaluates the means of air attack possessed by the probable enemy. Naming aircraft specifications, the captain skillfully compares them with the characteristics of our own combat equipment.

"We must not," M. Guzar says in conclusion, "relax our vigilance. We must always be on guard and always remember that the short flying times today mean that seconds decide the outcome of battle. All of us must know the equipment well and be able to skillfully operate it. This reduces the time for the passage of data and aids the commander in rapidly making the correct decision on conducting combat operations."

But, the alarm again calls the radar operators to their posts. The number of tracks on the plotting board grows and all specialists are working under full pressure. And, their best reward was the evaluation announced upon conclusion

of the drill: "The crews coped with the mission in an excellent manner!"

The past training year was for the troops a year of quality assimilation of the equipment. Communist officers--master of combat qualification Ye. Bazov, first-class specialist V. Bogovin and M. Guzar--worked very hard so that every soldier would profoundly recognize the importance of using the ASU in the data processing and transmission system and they put forth all their efforts to improve their knowledge and tactical skills. This work is now continuing as the personnel achieve specific successes in accomplishment of the assigned mission. Probably a day did not go by in which the crew did not have a lesson or a drill. A classroom containing operating equipment was set up through the efforts of the commander and the other communists.

But, the main training is done directly in the command post under conditions which closely approximate combat. Planning the party-political work with the personnel, in the subunit they do not forget to place attention on questions of the troops' combat training. They discuss the fact that there is a requirement to profoundly study the equipment. They explain what is required from each soldier in order to more rapidly prepare the equipment and how to approach each specific situation. The moral attitude of the troops toward victory plays an important role in improving combat readiness. Therefore, the communists never slacken their attention on questions of the ideological-political tempering of the specialists. Important events occurring in the country and overseas, proficiently accompanied by the corresponding commentaries, are continually brought to the attention of the personnel.

. . . Often during the days that we have been discussing, the crews have been called upon to take their places in response to a readiness alert. And, Capt Guzar's subordinates always operated diligently, just as in actual battle.

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ACTIVITIES AT THE KIEV HIGHER TANK ENGINEERING SCHOOL

Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 23 Jul 78 p 4

[Article by G. Chernomorskiy: "Such a Profession Exists"]

[Text] I am the same age as Mikhail Fedoseyevich Kolesnikov and we went into the army together. We marched to the company tune in the same formation: "We stand guard always, always, and if the nation calls for labor. . . ." After the war we served in the Transcaucasus MD, and then in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, and fate brought us together again.

Mikhail Fedoseyevich is a lieutenant general and chief of the Kiev Higher Tank Engineering Order of the Red Star School imeni MSU I. I. Yakubovskiy. The conversation naturally was a respectable event. We discussed military service and our comrades and friends. . . .

Then Lt Col I. Vetoshkin, chief of the personnel department, came to talk to the general. He informed him about the selection process, named several candidates whose fathers had graduated from this school in their day, and remarked that there were now many notices coming from troop units. And, this is good. We are getting young people who, as they say, have already proved themselves by deeds.

"It was easier for us," Mikhail Fedoseyevich thoughtfully said. "There was a war on and the time itself selected our profession for us. Everything was clear and unequivocal. . . ."

Yes, of all of the professions of that day, the main one was the military profession. And now the military commissariats are already striking men who have "not smelled powder" from the lists.

The life of an entire generation without a war! But, the military profession is still necessary. Today and tomorrow. And,

the day after tomorrow, policy of detente consistently brought to fruition by our party and government still has many enemies. Therefore, many youths who have decided to link their fate with the USSR Armed Forces write in their applications that "the main profession for me is to defend the motherland."

The Kiev Higher Tank School is one of the oldest military-technical educational institutions in the country. A school of military vehicle technicians, which then began also to train armored vehicle technicians, was created from the Moscow Automobile School for Young Communist Personnel. Already upgraded to an officer's candidate school, it was transferred to Kiev in 1938.

In the summer of 1941 the fathers and grandfathers of today's cadets, occupying a front from the Dnepr to the Zhitomir Road, routed the Hitlerites on the approaches to the capital of Soviet Ukraine. Hundreds, thousands of the school's students excelled on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. All were awarded orders and medals. And, six of the bravest and most courageous--I. Koval', A. Krysyuk, P. Rusin, N. Dushak, N. Mikhno, and M. Lutsenko--were awarded the high rank of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The school has hundreds of auditoriums, but the first lesson--the lesson in courage--is conducted in the museum of combat glory. The cadets hear speeches by veterans, familiarize themselves with documents and exhibits, and literally with their hearts feel the feats.

The museum contains a mock-up of the first Soviet tank: "Fighter for the Freedom of Comrade Lenin." Vehicles from the days of the Civil War and modern tanks. The equipment has changed. The requirements made of the armor officer have also changed. Today an engineer must not only know the design features of a tank and the technology of its manufacture and repair, but also must possess profound theoretical knowledge.

The school has very modern facilities. Electronic computers, teaching machines, television, movie simulators, optical and quantum instruments, and so on are actively used in the training process. But, facilities themselves cannot guarantee success.

"The basic riches of the school," said Col Gen Yu. M. Potapov, chief of the Tank Troops, "are excellent commanders, and an experienced professorial and teaching staff. They possess devotion to duty, they possess mastery, and this is the secret of all achievements."

Dedication to duty. . . Ask Engr-Lt Col P. Dolgoborets what his passion is. He will answer that it is work. And, there is no hint of bravado here. Because all of his thoughts and efforts go into his beloved profession. The system for objective monitoring of tank driving quality elaborated and introduced by P. Dolgoborets significantly increases the effectiveness of the lessons on practical driving skills. There are more than enough similar such examples. The work of teacher V. Dzityuk is also of important economic significance. Engr-Lt Col V. Sablin, Col G. Tyukin, and, of course, Doctor of Technical Sciences, Professor Engr-Col S. Kononov are real enthusiasts where improving the training process is concerned.

In the faculty of vehicle production technology headed by experienced engineer and pedagogue Candidate of Technical Sciences Col A. Avetov, the future officers during lessons on the science of metals skillfully used the electron microscope with a resolution capability of hundreds of thousands, as well as other complex equipment. During the following lesson, they don their coveralls and, in the shop located next to the auditorium, work at lathes or milling machines.

After the lessons many head for the hobby groups in the military-scientific society. The cadets' research projects--group and individual--have a truly scientific character. The report by cadet Viktor Sevast'yanov titled "Use of Galvanized Surfaces for Strengthening Components" elicited great interest on the part of scientists at an interzonal conference in Penza. The scientific work accomplished by cadets Nikolay Tukhachevskiy (grandson of Marshal Tukhachevskiy) and many others deserves attention.

The life of every individual has its starry night--a deed of great citizenship. The path to this deed covers years of future decisions and actions. The entire educational and indoctrinational process is structured so that every young man will be able to more fully recognize his personal participation in the past, present, and future of the motherland, his mission to be its defender.

The deeds of the Marxism-Leninism faculty where the cadets study the history of the CPSU, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economics, military psychology and pedagogy, party-political work, and scientific communism has a vital role here. The chief of the faculty, Candidate of Historical Sciences Docent V. Gatsenko, teachers and Candidates of Science P. Kotelevskiy, N. Cherenkov, L. Isayev, Zh. Bogaychuk, and others indoctrinate the future officers with an active vital position and a sense of high citizenship.

Teachers from other faculties are regularly called upon to conduct lessons in socioeconomic disciplines. The lessons conducted by Candidate of Technical Sciences V. Vandyshov and Engr-Lt Col N. Dobroskok are vivid and passionate. In turn, workers from the Marxism-Leninism faculty give lectures and conduct seminars in the engineering faculties.

Yes, and these engineering faculties are strong points of indoctrinal work. We have already mentioned the technology faculty. Its chief, Col A. Avetov, is an engineer and a scientist but he does not limit his concerns only to technology. You should hear him give lessons on general political themes! He always will find time to attend a meeting within a training group and chat with the cadets. And not only on matters concerning school.

In precise step and maintaining rank and distance, the column of cadets passes by. The formation consists of young handsome men. They are capable of melting steel and sowing grain, teaching children or building roads. . . They will become officers. Their duty, their profession is to defend the motherland. And, along with the others, this means melting steel, sowing grain, teaching children and building roads.

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TRAINING ACTIVITIES ABOARD A LARGE GUIDED MISSILE SHIP

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 78 p 6

[Article by PRAVDA special correspondent V. Verstakov,
Red Banner Black Sea Fleet: "Extended Cruise"]

[Text] It was a lovely southern night. The unusual bright low stars shine as if they were in isolation, not even illuminating the narrow expanses between them. The sea is invisible and only the white foam which flares up and dashes by the ship can be seen. The large missile ship "Smelyy" after an extended cruise is speeding towards its home shores. Now we are still in the Mediterranean, tomorrow we will be in the Black Sea, and we will be home the day after tomorrow. The deck shudders beneath the feet, the powerful engines roar freely: speed is their poetry. The shipboard propellers "bind" the knots one after another and there still is a great deal in reserve before we reach full speed. . . .

The crew in "Smelyy" has spent long difficult months at sea. A time of storms and combat training alerts, watches and training drills one after another with foreign aircraft overhead, taking on fuel and fresh water, "grabbing the rare opportunity" to get mail from home. . . .

"Anyone who has been on an extended cruise knows the weight of sea service," Capt 3rd Rank Viktor Krikunov, executive officer of "Smelyy," said to me that night. "He also knows what the word motherland means." "Smelyy" is returning to the motherland. But, daily if not hourly, the beat of feet roars on the ladders, the metal covers are battened down on the portholes, the brief texts of the commands "a surface target has been detected! Range. . . We are on the combat course!" resound from the ship's intercom.

There are no days off on an extended cruise but there are the busiest, most memorable days--the last day and the first day.

The trip on which I was sent by the newspaper did not allow me to see both memorable days from the same ship. Two weeks ago I went to sea aboard the missile cruiser "Admiral Golovko."

. . . The berth and the ship were in a festive mood, but military strictness still reigned. The orchestra on the shore played "Farewell to the Slavs," officers' wives lifted the children up so that they could see their fathers one more time.

Bidding farewell to a train, a person can shout from the platform and can run after the cars. It is not permitted to converse with anyone aboard ship in the Navy. And, a sailor's family is also part of the Navy.

Unhurriedly, actually restraining its power, the cruiser departs, turning in the roads. Now the orchestra can no longer be heard, once in a while whisps of wind carry the muffled beat of the drum.

Sailors not on watch are still standing with bouquets of flowers sent to them on board by wives and fiancees, but the line-handling crew is already removing the orange life jackets from the hand rails.

The harbor boom defenses fall far behind and the white tower of the beacon drops back into the dark strip of shore. Deputy commander Capt 2d Rank Leonid Miroshnichenko, who had been checking the combat posts during all of this time, rushes on deck, waves to the barely visible shore, becomes upset ("I didn't get to say goodbye to my wife again!"), and then rushes off to the engine room.

The rhythmic sound of one-third speed is replaced by a singing hum--the song of an extended cruise. Confidently, with dignity, "Golovko" cuts through the fierce waves. The sea is the life of a ship. Born on shore, a ship just like a person matures en route.

Externally everything is simple: the screws turn, throwing off the wave, and the ship shoves through the sea. But, beyond the visible simplicity is intense navigational training, worrisome days and sleepless nights for the commander on the running bridge and, naturally, intense watches in BCh-5--the electromechanical division. A cruise for it is not only continuous daily work but, if the circumstances dictate, also an immediate feat: the engines are the heart of the ship and they have no right to stop en route.

There once was an occurrence aboard one of the ships: the boiler pipes leaked. The malfunction "subtracted" several knots from maximum speed but, in the furnace and the headers of the boiler where flames and super-heated steam had just recently stormed, people were already at work. That is the law of BCh-5--malfunctions cannot wait "until later."

Having donned their coats and caps for protection against the plus 100 degrees heat from the boiler which was slowly cooling down, the sailors squeezed through the half-meter black holes. Oleg Belokopytov into the upper header, Vyacheslav Myrsov into the lower header, and Vladimir Charkin into the furnace.

Having selected the next boiler pipe, Vyacheslav plugged it up. Oleg poured water in from above. Vladimir watched to see if there were any leaks. If so, a plug was placed in both ends.

Many hours of work were spent in the severe darkness, hundreds of pipes were tested. . . Comrades replaced the sailors and even the commander of the traffic division worked inside the furnace. . . .

During cruises, the hard workers in BCh-5 rarely go topside. Such is the shipboard specialty: unnoticed but at the same time irreplaceable. So it was on this cruise that they did not see the Bosphorus, they were not photographed on deck by a foreign patrol boat which swerved nearby the cruiser. Nor could the cruiser escape being photographed because the main invincible force of our Navy are these very individuals-- Soviet sailors.

. . . New watches went on duty, the water after passing through the Bosphorus became bluer, the dolphins that played alongside dropped back. The uninhabited hilly shores of the Dardanelles appeared several hours later. The Sea of Marmara replaced the Aegean Sea.

The shipboard amateur art group gave a presentation in honor of BCh-5 during the evening.

Tired, good natured, dressed in black coveralls, standing on the stern superstructure were those who have been called the "soul" of the navy--electricians, bilge crew, and turbine operators. The dancers moved briskly, the comedians were engulfed by laughter, they selected seaman Valeriy Chaplyun's prop from his trick--the "inseparable" rings--and with a friendly push separated them completely. And then, when a song about legendary Sevastopol' flew

above the waves of the Aegean Sea, the sailors quieted down and glanced a bit upwards as if to bid farewell to the song. . . On an extended cruise the motherland is nearby. Close enough for pain, for joy, sometimes for tears.

The following night I was awakened because I rather painfully and consistently was banging my head against the bulkhead. I got up, turned on the light, and was amazed by the decanter which had been fastened down. The surface of the water in it was slanted to almost 45 degrees. I made it to the tank with difficult along the deserted deck as I moved to the bow of the ship. A fresh wind blew and the dissected waves rose above the sides of the ship. . . .

The sea had quieted a bit by morning. At noon the vertical rays of the sun made the steel deck of the cruiser standing at anchor scorching hot.

An extended cruise tests sailors and a ship not only through days of continual movement. At anchorages alerts still resound, intense watches continue, combat readiness is not replaced. Perhaps making things shipshape occurs more often. During the evening for an hour or two fishermen occupy the deck. Sr Lt Gennadiy Sitnikov, a missilier from BCh-2 [fire control division], "opened the season." The rod bent in an arc, the reel screeched, and people ran to the stern. "He is catching a squid. . . A black carp. . . Perhaps it is a small shark. . . .

It turned out to be a sea perch. But there was no special amazement for the main thing is that there are living creatures below us and everyone is happier.

We took on fuel and fresh water from a passing tanker and "Golovko" took its place in the formation of the detachment of ships.

A cruel sea, which separates and approaches the shores! Making furrows in it today are thousands of ships from the merchant, passenger, and naval fleet. Varied in purpose and size but created by man, they separate his character, his fate.

The ships of our Navy are beautiful and modern. They are beautiful both at their home berth and on a cruise, at anchorages and in foreign ports which they visit on business or for pleasure.

. . . The salute by the "forty-fives" happily resounded on the starboard side and, 30 seconds later, a gun sounded to port. Puffs of smoke from the answering shots from the

shore-based battery drifted over the sea from the sandy yellow cape. The Salute of Nations--21 guns--gave notice of the beginning of joyful days that can in no way be compared with the days of the cruise: this was a visit to a friendly country.

This requires strongly salting down the hot sweat of Naval service, assimillating to a millimeter the usual shipboard path of "bunk--office--combat post," for a week or two not to consider a smoke break on the poop deck with the view of the gray cliffs of an uninhabited island as the highest form of exotica in order to feel and evaluate the first step into an unknown city, the smile from a girl you meet on the street, the pungent odor of the smoke above the brasiers of a seething bazaar.

It is difficult to plan the good things in life. But, for a sailor a visit is a planned success. But, it is accompanied by a full selection of surprises. At times they hang a bundle of exotic fruit around your neck, its just like "bread and salt" and one must give it a try, or it is a "laurel wreath" but don't eat it. . . .

Days off, meetings and acquaintances, concerts by amateur artistic groups, sports competitions, bus excursions, but behind all of this is the high purpose of a sailor: far from the motherland to be its plenipotentiary.

Orchestras thundered their farewell and the missile patrol boats that accompanied us turned onto a course back to the harbor.

The next alert followed virtually immediately. . . .

An auxiliary vessel at an anchorage in the Mediterranean Sea took me to the large missile ship "Smelyy," whose extended cruise was coming to an end.

Then came that night on the shuddering deserted deck of "Smelyy" and the separately shining stars, the long talk with the executive officer that was minute by minute interrupted by business.

The same thing resounded from the ship's intercom: "Combat training alert! . . All clear. . . Combat training alert! . . ." After the all clear, the hatches of the gun turrets beyond which the yellow and black shells in their circular sockets dimly reflected the light were visible for a short period of time and the conversations of the gunlayers were audible. The cook hurriedly glanced out of the kitchen--would he be able to make it to the stern with the garbage pail? Half way there he was caught: "Combat training alert! . . ."

An extended cruise "polishes" not only the ship's mechanisms. Months of common work, a common fate, a common responsibility to the motherland indoctrinates and fuses characters and improves the mutual relations between people.

That is perhaps why the calm and smiling Viktor Krikunov appeared to be unlike the "classic" model of an executive officer ("the number of times each day the executive officer comes by means the same number of reprimands"). Climbing the steep ladders, squeezing through the oval apertures of the hermetically-sealed hatches, glancing into a compartment, into a cabin, into combat posts, he does not scare anyone when he appears and no one is seized with trepidation. But, the quiet directives from the executive officer are caught on the fly, are executed smartly, without delay.

. . . The intricate broken line on the cruise chart returns to the starting point. Again the line-handling crew in formation on the poop deck, bouquets of flowers, wives lifting the children up.

There was also an orchestra. But, it played somewhere off to the side as it bade farewell to the neighboring ship departing on an extended cruise.

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RAPID PREPARATION OF OPERATIONS IN WORLD WAR II DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 8, Aug 78 signed to press
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[Article by Gen Arm I. Gerasimov, troop commander of the Red Banner Kiev Military District: "From the Experience of the Rapid Preparation of Operations"; published under the rubric "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period"]

[Text] The experience of the Great Patriotic War has convincingly shown that among the factors which determine the success of operations, the most important role is played by the effectively taken decisions which correspond to the existing situation. In developing the questions raised by Col Gen A. A. Dement'yev and Col S. D. Petrov,¹ in this article let us briefly examine certain problems from the experience of decision taking in preparing offensive operations in a short period of time, as this merits careful study. This experience is valuable in the fact that in a future war which is characterized by dynamic combat, the operations must be prepared for, as a rule, within extremely limited times.

During the years of the past war, particularly in its last period, the Soviet troops conducted a series of operations for which minimum time was allocated for the preparations. Thus, in the liberation of Kiev, the offensive operation of the First Ukrainian Front in November 1943 was readied within 8 days. Some 12-14 days were allocated to prepare certain operations for defeating the Nazi troops on the Right Bank Ukraine in 1944 (Korsun-Shevchenkovskiy, Bereznegovatoye-Snigirevka), and 3 days for the Rovno-Lutsk operation.

The shortest in terms of the time of organization was the Prague Operation which completed the Great Patriotic War. The First and Second Ukrainian fronts which made the main strikes conducted the planning of combat and the readying of the troops from 1 through 6 May 1945, that is during 6 days. Here the troops were moved and a portion of the forces of the fronts was regrouped over a distance of 100-200 km for creating the assault groupings. On the First Ukrainian Front two tank armies were shifted from Berlin to a region to the northwest of Dresden, four combined-arms armies, two tank corps, one mechanized and one cavalry corps, an artillery breakthrough

corps and a number of other formations and special reinforcement units were regrouped, the Sixth Guards Tank Army and the First Guards Horse-Mechanized Group were taken out of combat and concentrated in new regions, and the fresh Ninth Guards Army was brought up and put into the first echelon.²

Under such conditions usually 2-3 days were given to prepare army operations, while in a majority of instances 10-15 days and more were allocated.

However, regardless of the availability of time, the command, the staff, the political bodies, the troops and the rear organs conducted the necessary complex of measures to prepare the operation, and among the most important of these were: The taking of the decision and the giving of missions to the troops, planning, organizing control and command, cooperation and all-round support, and the preparation of the troops and the staffs for the offensive.

With a sufficient amount of time available for preparing combat, the decision for an operation was taken after evaluating the enemy, the terrain and the condition of one's own troops. The commanders of the fronts and armies personally studied the terrain in front of the forward edge and in depth, as well as the nature of the enemy defenses, particularly in the breakthrough areas. This provided an opportunity to thoroughly consider the factors of the combat situation, to weigh all the "pros" and "contras," and take a sound decision corresponding to the conditions of the situation.

As a rule, the work involved in taking the decision and planning was carried out sequentially, initially on the front, and then in the armies, the corps, divisions, brigades and so forth. Such a procedure ensured the high-quality execution of measures on all levels. The availability of time made it possible to conduct training courses with the commanders of the formations, units and subunits, troop exercises, headquarters exercises and military games with the staffs, and as a whole to carefully organize combat on all levels. Here main attention was given to organizing cooperation and to a detailed elaboration of the possible methods of troop combat in carrying out the combat missions. As a result of this, the commanders of the formations and the staffs, in the course of the operation, acted confidently and even under conditions of abrupt changes in the situation successfully achieved the planned goals. In this manner the Belorussian, East Prussian, Vistula-Oder and other operations were prepared during a period of 35-60 days.

At the same time, even from the outset of the war, the necessity arose of organizing troop combat in many instances within the shortest period of time and under a most complex situation. The experience of the first battles and operations showed that success was achieved only when the entire complex of preparatory measures had been worked out and the decision of the commander in the course of combat had been unswervingly executed. But in the event when the operations had been prepared hurriedly, with little elaboration of the basic questions for their preparation, they often

did not achieve the set aims. This can be seen from the example of the counterstrikes on the Southwestern Front in June 1941. They were carried out without proper preparation and with poorly organized cooperation and supply of the troops with ammunition and fuel. All of this significantly reduced the results of the combat of the two armies, the six mechanized and three rifle corps making the counterstrikes.³ This experience required the drawing of a clear distinction between the hurried preparation of the operations and their preparation within a brief period of time.

The preparation of operations within a brief period of time required working methods which would allow the commanders and the staffs, with minimum time expenditures, to carry out a maximum amount of preparatory measures. Year in and year out these were developed and improved. During the second and third periods of the Great Patriotic War the commanders and staffs of the fronts and armies, in using the very rich experience of the preceding operations, regardless of the brief times, as a whole successfully carried out these missions.

The measures related to working out the decision, to planning and organizing an operation under such conditions were carried out simultaneously on the operational and tactical levels on the basis of a verbal briefing on the forthcoming missions and preliminary orders. Here the commanders and staffs endeavored to spend a minimum time on these measures. Basic attention was focused on organizing the combat of the formations and units, their cooperation and all-round support, as well as the questions of troop command.

The commanders of fronts, in preparing operations within limited times, were first briefed on the forthcoming actions of Hq SHC. This gave them an opportunity even before receiving the directives, along with the chief of staff and the member of the military council, to think out the overall plan of the operation and to plan measures which must be carried out in the interests of preparing it. In a number of instances instructions were given to the chiefs of the branches of forces and to the armies on carrying out measures to prepare for the offensive, without disclosing the essence of the overall mission. Thus, the preliminary work of the commander, including the study of various references and calculations prepared by the staff made it possible for him by the time of receiving the directives from Headquarters to outline the overall plan of the operation, to think through the procedure for using the branches of forces, and to solve a number of other questions.

With the receiving of the directive, its content was studied, and changes were made in the previously given orders to the subordinate troops. Prior to taking the decision, the commander of a front usually listened to proposals from the chief of staff, he sought the advice of a member of the military council and clarified individual questions with the chiefs of the branches of forces and services.

After the taking of the decision, the missions were immediately given to the executors in the form of verbal operation instructions and partial

combat orders given over the telephone or by telegraph. These were issued first to the troops which were to fight on the sector of the main strike.

Without waiting for the final formulating of the decision, the commander of the front issued instructions for planning the operation, and when necessary he visited the troops where he personally clarified the missions and carried out work related to the organizing of combat.

Thus, the commanders and staffs of the armies took an active part in the preparation of the operation immediately after the taking of a decision on the front.

Approximately these methods of work were used by the commander of the Second Belorussian Front, Mar SU K. K. Rokossovskiy, and the commander of the Third Belorussian Front, Gen Arm I. D. Chernyakhovskiy in preparing the Minsk and Vil'nyus operations. In the complicated and very dynamic situation, not more than 4-6 hours were spent on taking the decision.⁴ Under these conditions a thorough knowledge of the situation by the commander in the zone of operations of the front contributed to the rapid taking of a decision.

In the combined-arms and tank armies, in preparing operations within a short period of time, they also sought out and used work methods which ensured the simultaneous execution of measures on all levels. The most characteristic of them was the following. The mission which was received verbally or in writing, after study, was immediately issued to the leadership and responsible officers of the staff and to the chiefs of the directorates and departments. At the same time preliminary orders were issued to the commanders of the corps and army units. These gave the necessary information on the enemy, the direction of the offensive and the times to be ready.

The commander took the decision for the operation in the presence of the leadership of the staff and directorates of the army. This was immediately plotted on the map and recorded by the officers of the operations department, and on the basis of this the missions were formulated for the troops. These were issued as combat instructions through the signals officers and were duplicated by radio.

With extremely limited time, an army commander frequently took a decision not for an entire operation but rather for individual stages of it, proceeding from the conditions of the situation, and issued to the formations the missions which were to be carried out first. Subsequently these were adjusted and clarified.

As the experience of the war showed, in using such methods, the army commanders spent from 4 to 8 hours for taking a decision. This provided an opportunity to give the troops a maximum of time available to prepare for the operation. Thus, in the Rovno-Lutsk Operation (January-February 1944) of the First Ukrainian Front, the 13th Army was given less than 2 days for preparing for the offensive. Out of the total time, around 5 hours were spent on taking the decision by the army commander. The corps were given

around a day for organizing combat, while the divisions had 16-18 hours.⁵ In the preparations of the Fifth Guards Tank Army at the beginning of August 1943 for the Belgorod-Khar'kov Operation, its commander, Gen P. A. Rotmistrov, and the staff organized the work in such a manner that the preliminary instructions were issued to the troops in 3-4 hours on the basis of the plan of the operation, while the full missions were given to the commanders of the formations on the spot in the course of reconnaissance 7-8 hours after receiving the mission. Thus, out of the 2½ days available for preparing for combat, a larger portion of the time was made available to the subordinates.⁶

In the Prague Offensive Operation of 1945, the commanders of the Third and Fourth Guards tank armies, Gen P. S. Rybalko and D. D. Lelyushenko, after regrouping, also had around 2 days for organizing the offensive. Under such conditions in the Fourth Guards Tank Army, for the purpose of saving time the missions were issued to the troops in sequence, as the decision was elaborated, initially for reaching the forming-up zone, and then for the offensive. The first instructions for the formations were issued 3-4 hours after receiving the mission. Consequently, the field headquarters of the army spent 10-11 percent of the time which was 30-32 hours. The remainder was available for the subordinate commanders and staffs.⁷

Regardless of a number of merits, shortcomings were also inherent to such work methods. The missions were issued to subordinates piecemeal. For this reason they did not always have complete initial data, and this introduced definite difficulties in the organizing of combat.

As a whole, the experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that an army-level operation could be prepared within 2 days under the conditions of the efficient organization of the work of the military council, the staff, and the chiefs of the branches of forces and services, as well as firm and uninterrupted control over the preparation of the troops. Regardless of the limited time for decision taking, the commanders were not released from responsibility for carrying out the received missions. The commanders and staff in preparing the operations often did not have full information on the nature of the enemy defenses and grouping as well as other situation data. All of this demanded an extreme effort from them as well as creative initiative and diverse military knowledge.

An analysis of the decisions taken under these conditions for various operations by the commanders of the fronts and armies indicates that they were taken after a sufficiently full evaluation of the general and specific situation in one's own zone and the zone of the adjacent units, considering the condition of one's troops, the availability of ammunition and fuel, and the prospects for deliveries. Moreover, many decisions were marked by originality and boldness of concept. Thus, the decision of the commander of the 13th Army, Lt Gen N. P. Pukhov in the Rovno-Lutsk Operation envisaged the making of two strikes on separate sectors and this was a rare phenomenon for an army in the Great Patriotic War. Such a decision was determined by the nature of the forested-swampy terrain, by the limited capacity of the

sectors and by other factors. In particular, on the sectors of the strikes, the enemy had a lower density of personnel and equipment. Moreover, under the conditions of the limited time, this excluded the regrouping of the forces and ensured the striking of the flank and rear of the opposing enemy troops.

Great efficiency was inherent to the work of the staffs of the fronts and the armies in planning operations in a short period of time.

The limited time demanded rigid regulation in carrying out all measures. As a consequence of this, the staffs carefully fought out the calendar plan for preparing the operation. The plan reflected all the measures which had to be carried out in the preparatory period, and specifically indicated the dates, the executors as well as the officials providing control. The army plans also contained measures to be carried out in the corps, divisions, brigades, regiments and subunits. This gave effectiveness and planning to the process of preparing for the operation.⁸ The course of preparing for an offensive was continuously monitored by the staffs of all levels, the troops were given immediate aid, and all measures were taken so that the offensive started at the stipulated time.

The commanders endeavored to give missions to subordinates in person, using all possibilities and existing means for this. The instructions given verbally by the commander in person were subsequently affirmed in written documents. In giving missions to the troops, in addition to the radio and telephone, extensive use was made of mobile means such as the PO-2 airplanes, motor vehicles and motorcycles. Here an important role in delivering written orders and instructions was played by the liaison officers. Continuous control was also provided over the promptness of giving orders.

The decisions of a commander were drawn up on a map, as a rule, without any embellishments. Written decisions were not drawn up on the staffs of the fronts with a shortage of time.

The planning of the operations was carried out in a short time. The purpose here was to determine the sequence and methods for carrying out the set missions, the rational allocation of the efforts of the troops and materiel in carrying out each of the missions, the establishing of the procedure for coordination and the organizing of all-round support for combat and troop command. The chief of staff of the front (army) was the basic organizer of this work. The plan of an offensive operation was an aggregate of the graphic and textual documents, and consisted of an operations part, the plans for the combat use of the branches of forces and support, and the plan for party political work.

An offensive operation by a front was planned in stages with a detailed defining of the order and sequence of actions by the combined arms and tank armies for the first 2-3 days. Further actions were outlined in general terms. For this reason, in the course of the operations, particularly in their subsequent stages, the plans were adjusted and the troops were given additional missions (the Kiev and Iasi-Kishinev operations).

In an army, the actions of the troops were planned in detail in carrying out the immediate mission which in a majority of instances consisted in piercing the tactical zone of enemy defenses to a depth of 12-15 km. The further missions of the troops were defined tentatively. Under the conditions of limited time, the planning of the operations was characterized by the elaboration of a minimum number of documents needed for troop command, and these were chiefly graphic ones. In particular, in the armies written plans of operations were not elaborated, nor were operational timetables worked out in the formations and units. A decision-map and a brief combat order were the basic planning documents. In accord with them, individual combat orders and instructions were given on the use of the branches of forces as well as for operational and material-technical support.

Certain questions of planning and organizing the regrouping of troops (planning the march, reconnaissance of the routes and control on them) in the armies were entrusted to the staffs of the corps. This also saved time. In a number of instances a timing coordination table was not worked out in the armies. All the questions of coordination were reflected on maps or diagrams with brief explanations. Such documents as a whole met the conditions of the situation. At the same time, the insufficient completeness of the data and the ambiguity of certain documents reduced their value in troop command in the course of combat.

At the same time, the plans of an artillery and aviation offensive, the use of tank armies as well as the mechanized and tank corps were worked out more carefully, in addition to the questions of the concentration of forces and means in the sectors of the main strikes.

Many of the most important documents in planning the operations were worked out personally by the commanders, by the chiefs of the staffs, the operations directorates and departments, as well as by the commanders and chiefs of the branches of forces and services. The textual documents, as a rule, were written out longhand.

After the taking of the decision, the issuing of missions to the troops and with the start of planning carried out in parallel on all levels, the efforts of the front and army headquarters were shifted to readying the troops and military equipment for the offensive, supplying them with everything necessary for carrying out the set missions, as well as organizing coordination, command and solving other important problems.

In traveling to the troops, the commanders of the fronts and armies, the commanders and chiefs of the branches of forces and services, as well as the officers from the political directorates (political departments) and staffs on the spot clarified the last data on the enemy, they inspected the degree of elucidating the received missions and the correctness of the decisions taken, and directly on the spot helped the commanders in organizing combat.

During this period the organization of coordination was an important element in preparing the operation. On the front and in an army this was organized in more detail to the depth of the tactical objective. Here chief attention was given to a knowledge of the missions by the commanders of the combined arms and tank armies, the commanders of the formations and units of the branches of forces, as well as those who in carrying out such missions would be involved in mutual support.

In the aim of saving time, cooperation was organized in the process of setting the missions on the map or on the terrain, or by instructions from the commanders of field forces to the commanders of formations personally or through the staff officers. The coordinating of the efforts of the units and subunits in the divisions, regiments and battalions, as a rule, was carried out in the course of reconnaissance. Such an organization of combat on the tactical level directly on the terrain contributed to the successful execution of the offensive.

Effective and concrete party political work also contributed to solving the problems related to the preparation of offensive operations. This was conducted by the commanders, the political workers, the political bodies, by the party organizations and individual communists. The military councils, the political directorates and the political departments of the fronts and armies were the immediate organizers of this work.

As is shown by the experience of many operations in the Great Patriotic War where preparations were carried out in a brief period of time, the taking of a sound decision, the promptness of working out the combat and planning documents and the execution of other measures depended largely upon the level of training, teamwork and organization in the work of the staff and the entire field headquarters of the front (army) as a whole. On the staffs the leading role was played by the operations directorates and departments. Being the first deputy of the chief of staff, the chief of the operations directorate (department) coordinated the work of the staff departments and the headquarters of the commanders and chiefs of the branches of forces and services. Under his leadership the operations officers assembled the situation data, they analyzed them, carried out calculations, they formulated the decision of the commander, they worked out the orders and instructions and the documents of the operations plan, they issued the missions to the troops and supervised the prompt execution of measures stipulated by the calendar plan for preparing the operation. The creation of groups of the chiefs of sectors, information and liaison officers contributed to raising the effectiveness and organization of the work in the operations directorate and departments. The success in solving many questions involved in the preparations for combat depended upon their initiative, effectiveness and resourcefulness.

In preparing the operations, of great significance was the staff organizational structure of the field headquarters of the fronts and armies which was improved each year (the introduction of the positions of commanders of the artillery, tank troops, and so forth). The increased role and

responsibility of the commanders and chiefs of the branches of forces and services noticeably told on the promptness of carrying out all the measures.

The related stricter allocation of duties between the directorates and divisions of the field headquarters of the front and the armies helped to raise the organization and effectiveness of their work. The commander of a front (army) gained an opportunity to focus attention on the basic operational questions. This reduced the decision taking time, it made the decisions sounder, and told positively on troop leadership both in preparations and in the course of an operation.

As a whole the experience of the Great Patriotic War showed that the commanders, the military councils, the staffs, the chiefs of the political directorates (departments), as well as the commanders and chiefs of the branches of forces and services of the fronts and the armies, in preparing operations in a short period of time, showed high organizational abilities and military leadership art. Regardless of the shortage of time, they did everything for the more complete preparation of the operations which in their majority were successfully concluded. And the Prague Operation which was prepared in the shortest time during the entire history of the Great Patriotic War became a model of a rapid offensive by large field forces of tank and mechanized troops.

An analysis of the work done by the commanders and staffs in preparing these operations shows a tendency for all the headquarters levels to endeavor to provide a larger share of the time (up to 80-85 percent) for the troops by reducing the time of taking the decision, setting the missions and planning the operation. For these purposes there was the practice of the preliminary partial familiarization of subordinates with the overall nature of the forthcoming actions. As a result of this a portion of the questions related to preparing the operation was solved in the troops even before the receiving of the specific missions. In taking decisions and in planning work methods were used by the commanders and the staffs which ensured the promptness (parallelness) of conducting these measures in all elements. Decisions on the staffs of the fronts and armies were taken on maps at times without complete data on the nature of the enemy defenses and grouping with the subsequent clarification of them on the spot, if the situation allowed. Missions were given to subordinates with technical communications equipment either by the commander or by staff officers with subsequent affirmation in written orders and operations instructions.

There was also the practice of elaborating a minimum number of documents actually essential for troop command. Preference was given to the graphic combat documents. Duties were clearly allocated between the directorates and departments of the field headquarters as well as between the work groups within them.

Regardless of the limited time, the most important questions in preparing an offensive operation such as the planning of the artillery and air

offensive, the commitment of mobile groups to battle, and the concentrating of forces and means in the sectors of the strikes were worked out sufficiently completely. The carrying out of reconnaissance and the organizing of cooperation on the spot in the tactical levels was compulsory.

The plan of an operation was viewed as the basis for creative troop command. Depending upon the situation, in the course of an operation, adjustments and changes were made in it.

After taking a decision, the efforts of the front and army headquarters were focused on providing aid to the troops in organizing combat. Party political and organizational work was carried out actively in the formations, units and subunits. The execution of measures related to the preparation of operations was strictly monitored in terms of time.

Under the conditions of limited time allocated for preparing an operation, an ever greater role was played by the staffs as command bodies, and their staff organizational structure was continuously improved.

At present the means, methods and procedures of troop command are being improved rapidly. A thorough consideration of the combat experience of the past and the development trends in the methods of control and command are the guarantee that these questions will be correctly solved.

FOOTNOTES

1. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 7, 1978, pp 31-36.
2. "Za Osvobozhdeniye Chekhoslovakii" [For the Liberation of Czechoslovakia], Voyenizdat, 1965, pp 237-238.
3. "Istoriya Vtoroy Mirovoy Voyny 1939-1945" [History of World War II of 1939-1945], Vol 4, Voyenizdat, 1975, pp 42-43.
4. V. A. Maramzin, "Istoriya Razvitiya Metodov Upravleniya Voyskami v Operatsiyakh Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny" [The History of the Development of Troop Command Methods in the Operations of the Great Patriotic War], Moscow, Izd. Voyennoy Akademii General'nogo Shtaba, 1976, p 82.
5. I. M. Belkin, "13-ya Armiya v Lutsko-Rovenskoy Operatsii 1944" [The 13th Army in the Lutsk-Rovno Operation of 1944], Voyenizdat, 1960, pp 23, 30.
6. A. I. Radziyevskiy, "Tankovyy Udar" [Tank Assault], Voyenizdat, 1977, pp 59-60.
7. Ibid., pp 61-62.
8. Ibid.

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IMPROVEMENT IN COMMAND BODIES IN WORLD WAR II TRACED

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[Article by Col R. Portugal'skiy, docent and candidate of historical sciences, and Col N. Fomin: "Certain Questions on Improving the Structure of Command and Control Bodies of the Front and Army"; published under the rubric "The Patriotic War and the Postwar Period"]

[Text] The experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that the success of combat is directly dependent upon the level of troop leadership and this, in turn, is largely determined by the effective organizational structure of the command and control bodies.

The rapid development and continuous improvement in the means of armed combat under modern conditions and the related changes occurring in the organization of the troops as well as in the nature and methods of conducting combat make even higher demands than before on troop command. For this reason, the problem of seeking out the most effective structure of the command bodies is presently assuming particular urgency. A study of the experience of the past war can be of substantial aid in solving it.

The aim of the given article is to examine the basic directions for improving the organizational structure of the command bodies of the front and army field forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War and to disclose certain trends of this process which have maintained definite significance at present for military theory and practice.

The organizational structure of the command bodies of the front and army field forces was worked out, as is known, even in the prewar years. The establishment of an army field headquarters was approved by the order of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense on 13 September 1940, and for the front, on 12 July 1941.¹

At the head of the front (army) stood the military council, the chairman of which was the commander. The military council had directly under it the staff and all the directorates (departments in the army): Political propaganda, artillery, armored vehicle and tank, air force, air defense, engineer,

signals, and quartermaster; there were the independent departments of chemical troops, airborne service, military training, personnel, fuel supply, sanitary, veterinary, financial, as well as the military tribunal and judge advocate. As a total the field headquarters of a front, in addition to the staff, included eight directorates and ten independent departments (along with the military tribunal and judge advocate). The total number of personnel reached 925 men. In addition to the staff, the field headquarters of an army included 15 independent departments (with a total personnel of 391 men).

The staff held a special place in the structure of the field headquarters of a front (army), and it included the following departments: Operations, reconnaissance, military lines of communications, the organization of the rear, supply and road service, manning, troop organization and service, the military topographic service, cipher (in an army the cipher division was part of the operations department); and administration and supply. The total number of staff personnel reached 333 in a front and 182 in an army.

The organizational structure of the command bodies of a front and an army directly before the start of the war took into account those new demands which were then made upon troop command in operations involving the massed use of tanks, artillery, aviation and other military equipment. At the same time it still had the traits inherited from the past of cumbrousness, immobility and excessive oversaturation with personnel. Also not very clearly foreseen was the delimiting of functions and missions between the corresponding elements of the structure in the interests of increasing the efficiency of troop leadership directly in the course of carrying out active and fluid combat. This was particularly characteristic for the organizational structure of the staffs. Here one clearly could observe an unjustified desire to make the staff an all-encompassing organizational center for the entire system of the field headquarters, starting from the carrying out of operational missions and ending with the fulfillment of functions related to organizing the material and technical supply for troop combat.

These shortcomings told in troop command during the very first engagements of the Great Patriotic War which occurred, as is known, in a rapidly changing and uncertain situation. Under these conditions troop command was frequently disrupted. Here also was felt the absence of clearly elaborated provisions on the echeloning and shifting of command bodies. The situation was also weak in maintaining the viability and reliability of the communications system which was based basically upon wire equipment. The staffs of the fronts and the armies were not equipped with radio communications capable of ensuring constant and reliable troop command over a significant space and often with great distance from the command points of the field forces.

For this reason during the first days of the war the question obviously arose of the need for a fundamental improvement in the organization of troop command. It was essential first of all to eliminate the scattering of efforts of the staffs related to the simultaneous fulfillment of functions which varied in their content. Moreover it was essential to

significantly increase the mobility and efficiency of the command bodies by reducing the number of personnel in them as well as centralizing troop leadership.

Considering these demands as well as the 6-month experience of the war, new establishments of the field headquarters of the front and army were worked out and approved in December 1941 (see the table).

Table*

Quantitative Composition of Field Headquarters of a Front and an Army

No.	Basic Elements of Organizational Structure	Prewar Establishment		New establishment of December 1941	
		Front	Army	Front	Army
1	Total number of personnel in field headquarters, persons	870/55**	356/35	391/88	193/29
2	Number of bodies directly under commander (without considering judge advocate and tribunal)	17	16	12	11
3	Total number of personnel in staff, men Including in directorates (departments):	312/21	164/18	132/28	53/7
	Operations	32/3	34/6	24/2	18/3
	Reconnaissance	83/2	12/1	39/3	11/1
	Manning and troop service	32/2	15/2	19/2	--
	Military topographic service	20/2	12/1	10/2	4(as part of operations department)
	Cipher	28/1	15(as part of op'tns dept)	15/1	10
	Military lines of communications	38/3	19/2	--	--
	Organization of rear, supply and road	34/2	38/3	--	--
	Administrative and supply	29/6	19/3	13/6	6/3

*The table was compiled from materials of the Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, folio 22, inv. 159, file 21; folio 202, inv. 36, file 228; folio 382, inv. 8447, file 14; folio 357, inv. 5973, file 11.

**The numerator gives the number of servicemen, the denominator shows the civilian employees.

As a whole the number of personnel in the field headquarters was reduced by almost 2-fold, including by 2.1-fold in the staff of a front, and by more than 3-fold in a staff of an army. The main change in the structure of the staffs was that the departments in charge of the organization of the rear, supply and road service as well as the departments of military lines of communications were removed from them. Thus the staffs were freed from carrying out missions which were not inherent to them. Their efforts were now concentrated on carrying out the operational functions of troop command. For leadership of the rear an independent body was created, the directorate for the rear of the front (army).

The experience of the war showed that the designated structure of the command bodies for the front and army field forces was effective and viable. It existed with certain changes and additions during the entire war. The necessity of the changes and additions was caused by a series of objective factors, the most important being: the continuous and also mass delivery of military equipment and weapons to the troops; the creation of new formations and as a consequence, the increase in the fighting strength of the fronts and the armies; the constantly growing number of different forces and means involved in carrying out operations and the related increase in the scope of measures involved in planning their combat, organizing cooperation between them and providing uninterrupted command in the course of the operation; the significant rise in the scope of the conducted operations; the increase in the maneuverability, speed and continuity of troop combat. All of this enormously influence not only the amount but also the content of the work of the command bodies. In turn this required a clearer delimitation of the functions between the leading command elements and an improvement in work methods. For these reasons the establishment of the field headquarters of the fronts and the armies were revised in March-April 1942 and in June-July 1944. For certain fronts, considering the particular features of their fighting strength, the width of the area and the methods of combat, special establishments were introduced. For example, in February 1943, a special establishment was approved for the field headquarters of the Leningrad Front.²

The newly introduced changes and additions in the structure of the command bodies had a great impact on a further rise in their work efficiency, flexibility and effectiveness in solving command tasks with a rise in the spatial scope, continuity and fluidity of combat.

Here great attention was given to the combined-arms staffs as the basic troop command bodies. Their leading directorates (departments) were strengthened with personnel first. For example, according to the 1944 establishment, the number of personnel in the operations directorate of a front was increased by 2-2.6-fold in comparison with the 1941 establishment,³ and the operations department of an army was increased by 1.4-fold. At the same time, cipher and topographic divisions were incorporated in it. In the autumn of 1942, the number of personnel in the reconnaissance departments was increased by 10-20 percent, and by 1944, it had increased by more than 2-fold on a front and by 1.3-fold in an army. As a result of this, the

reconnaissance departments obtained an opportunity to carry out measures more effectively and efficiently related to the planning and organization of all types of reconnaissance while the leader of the activities of the sub-orginate reconnaissance units and subunits was able to promptly acquire, study and generalize the reconnaissance data, to prepare calculations, information and proposals needed for taking sound decisions for an operation and for conducting combat in the course of it.

Of great significance in improving troop command in the course of the operations (combat) was a further improvement in the organization and moving of command posts.⁴ At the outset of the war, as is known, the field headquarters of the fronts and armies were usually located at one point, without being separated into echelons. This impeded command and did not ensure its continuity. In the aim of bringing the command posts as close as possible to the troops and for their prompt shifting, an operations group was isolated from the field headquarters, and this included the operations portion of the staff and departments of the branches of forces, the special troops and services directly involved in troop command. Subsequently it formed the first echelon of the field headquarters of a front (army), and the second echelon usually included the directorates and services of the rear and other departments. In individual sectors there was the practice of setting up auxiliary command posts (BPU). Initially they were separated from the first echelon of the headquarters of the front (army). In the second half of 1942, on the staffs of the operational field forces, staff positions were introduced of deputy chiefs of staff, chiefs of the basic directorates and departments of the field headquarters. They, as a rule, became part of the BPU. In certain offensive operations, forward command posts were formed. On the defensive usually alternative command posts were set up.

An important place was given to organizing the communications system and improving those elements of the structure of the command bodies which directly ensured uninterrupted and comprehensive use of the communications equipment, and above all radio equipment. The orders of Hq SHC of 23 July 1941 and 30 May 1942 demanded that the radio be considered as the basic means of communications and used fully, in decisively eradicating the "radiophobia." For the commanders of field forces, personal radios were introduced and these were to stay with them during trips to the troops. As a rule, radios were issued to officers of the operations directorates (departments), cipher clerks and signal troops who provided the commander with control from any point wherever he might be. At the same time the methods of using the radio and other means of communications were improved.

In order to ensure continuous troop leadership from the various command posts, in the fronts and armies, starting with the second half of the war, several mobile communications centers were created, including reserve ones, for organizing communications during shifts of the command posts.

The assigning of chiefs of the sectors to subordinate field forces (formations) during the war years proved effective. Their duties included the prompt and accurate reporting on the situation, the issuing of missions to the troops and control over their execution. By the start of 1943, their number on the army staffs had increased. For example, on the staff of a tank army there were seven sector officers.⁵

To a significant degree the improvement in the organization of communications and the ensuring of continuous troop command were aided by the fact that starting with 1943, in the organizational structure of an army staff signals departments were introduced and these previously had been directly part of the field headquarters and were subordinate to the commander through the signals chief.

The improvement of the organizational structure of the staffs was very strongly influenced by the publication in March 1942 of the Provisional Regulation on the Field Service of the Staffs. On the basis of generalizing the acquired experience, this stated the demands on the work of the staff as the basic command body. In the practice of combat work, considering these requirements, not only changes and additions were incorporated in the structure of the basic staff elements, but also the most effective methods of their work were sought out. They carried out their activities on the basis of the decisions and instructions of the commander, ensuring for him the prompt and precise taking of sound decisions, the organizing of combat, and in the course of the operations, firm and uninterrupted troop command.

Considering the particular importance and at the same time the exceptional complexity of the prompt and uninterrupted supply of the troops with all types of materiel, from the very outset of the war great attention was given to the questions of improving the structure of the rear administrative bodies and the centralizing of the work of its various services. For directing them, on the fronts and in the armies, on the basis of the Decree of the USSR Council of People's Commissars of 27 June 1941, by the order of the people's commissar of defense, positions of chiefs of the rear services (deputy commanders for the rear) were introduced and their command bodies were formed. The chiefs of the rear were given duties to organize the rear services, to supply materiel, for leadership over the transport, road, sanitation and veterinary services, as well as the solving of other questions related to troop supply. In accord with this, the following departments were incorporated as part of the rear directorate of a front (army): Organizations planning, military lines of communications, road service and inspectorate, as well as quartermaster, sanitation, veterinary and fuel supply services. As for the services of artillery, armored vehicle and tank, engineer and chemical supply, these were under the chief of the rear only for the general questions of organization, the planning of supply, the delivery of materiel and evacuation. Here direct responsibility for immediate supply of all types of materiel to the troops was placed on the corresponding chiefs of the branches of troops, special troops and services.

In the aim of improving the level of planning for rear support of the troops as well as for the more precise centralization of the work of the various services, in 1942 a decision was taken to transform the organizational and planning departments of the rear directorates of the front and army into the corresponding rear staffs. A major role in improving the work of the rear bodies was played by the introduction of the position of member of the military council for rear services as part of the military councils of the fronts and armies. Moreover, in August 1941, the political departments of the rear were formed for strengthening political work in the rear bodies and units.

All of this contributed to the effective and prompt solving of the questions related to rear troop supply in operations, it significantly raised the level of coordination in the work of all its services, it systematized troop supply for ammunition, fuel, food and other material and technical means, and made it possible to utilize all types of transport most rationally.

In the course of the war there was the continuous growth of the technical equipping and increase in the combat capabilities of the formations and units of the services of the Armed Forces, the branches of forces and special troops. This increased the scope of the missions carried out and strengthened the role of their commanders in planning, preparing and controlling combat. In 1942, air armies began to be created for centralizing leadership of aviation. In line with this, the directorates of the air force of the fronts were transformed into the directorates or headquarters of air armies. During the same year, the chiefs of the artillery and armored troops became, respectively, the commanders of the artillery and armored and mechanized troops. In addition, they, like the chief of the engineer troops, were given the rank of deputy commanders of the fronts (armies). In their directorates staffs were organized and these were given the functions of planning and preparing the necessary calculations, proposals on the combat use of the forces and means, exercising control over their correct use, the organizing of mutual support, technical support, and so forth.

The most substantial changes occurred in the structure of the command bodies of the artillery. In particular, in line with the organizing of a significant number of antiaircraft artillery units, it was advisable to subordinate them to the commanders of the artillery of the front or army. Subsequently the positions were introduced of deputy commander of the artillery for anti-aircraft artillery and for the rocket units as well as a signals assistant. By the summer of 1943, the directorate of the commander of the artillery included: A staff (operations and reconnaissance divisions); departments of antiaircraft artillery, manning and artillery supply, and by the beginning of the second half of 1944, in addition, a signals department and a department for the operational use of the rocket units. In 1944, the number of officers in the artillery staff had increased by almost 4-fold in comparison with 1941 (from 8 to 30 men).

Additional positions were introduced in the signals directorate (department) of a front (army), and in particular the duty officer at a communications center, the deputy signals chief for radio, and others. As a result control improved over the transmission and receiving of operational-tactical information, the time of handling the information was reduced and reliability increased. The establishment of officers in the department of the chief of the engineer troops increased by almost 2-fold. A division for the use of flamethrowing and incendiary weapons was introduced in the directorate (department) of the chief of the chemical troops.

However, with the growth of the fighting strength of the fronts and the armies as well as with an increase in the officials directly under the troop commanders, the latter began to experience great difficulties in carrying out command. Thus a front commander had to give missions to seven-eight direct subordinates and control six-ten field forces (formations). The commander of an army was under even more complicated conditions, as in a number of instances he had under him up to 20 divisions, brigades, separate regiments and battalions. In line with this, the problem arose of freeing the commanders from the excessive number of immediate subordinates in order that he would be able to focus his efforts on solving the main questions of his activities. For this purpose two positions of deputy commanders were introduced into the establishment of the field headquarters of a front and army. The air defense means were taken from his immediate subordination. In the tank armies, the motor vehicle department which previously was under the commander was turned over to the chief of the rear. By the summer of 1943, the process of restoring the corps command level was virtually complete.

During the war years great attention was given to the questions of improving the quality of the operational and combat training of the leadership of the command bodies. Here an important role was played by increasing the number of higher military schools and advanced training courses, as well as effective work to study and generalize the combat experience of the troops. Suffice it to say that in 1943-1945, military personnel for the Soviet Army was being trained by 31 higher schools, 220 military schools and over 200 different training and retraining courses for leadership personnel.⁶ The positive settling of the question of personnel helped to improve the work style of the command bodies.

The combat experience of the troops and the command bodies was studied and generalized from the very outset of the war. For generalizing combat experience, in the autumn of 1941, departments (divisions) for studying the experience of the war were set up on the staffs of the fronts and armies. At that time in the formations the position was introduced of senior assistant chief of the operations division for studying and generalizing the experience of combat. Somewhat later such divisions were organized on the staffs of the artillery commander and the chief of the rear services of the front, and a staff position of an officer was introduced for this work on the corresponding bodies of the army level and in the signals directorate (department) of the front (army). Thus, the staffs of the field forces and

formations, under the direct leadership of their commanders, became the basic center for generalizing experience and disseminating it in the troops.

The departments of combat training of the fronts and armies carried out an important mission in raising the combat readiness and capability of the troops and the staffs, and above all the recently arrived drafts of reinforcements. By the autumn of 1942, the institution of assistant commander for combat training had been significantly widespread. On the fronts and in certain armies, training centers were set up for various branches of forces. This made it possible to improve the planning and organization of combat training, and to improve the level of working out the questions of coordination of the troops for carrying out complex combat missions in the course of operations (combat).

In the command of a front and an army a leading role was played by their military councils. In their activities a consultative form of collectivism was used and this presumed a collective discussion of the fundamental questions and the collective elaboration of recommendations on them. The final decision was taken personally by the commander. He had the right also to personally direct all the subordinate troops. The military councils bore all responsibility for carrying out important and complicated missions directly to the Central Committee of our party and the Soviet government.

The chairman of the military council was the commander, and the first member of the military council was concerned with operational questions, the training and all-round support of the troops. Moreover he was given the duty of directly leading the work of the political directorate of the front (the political department of an army), to supervise the activities of the judge advocate and the military tribunal, as well as solve other problems. The second member of the military council whose position was introduced in the establishment in November 1941 was responsible for the rear services. The membership of the military councils of the fronts also included the chiefs of their staffs and the commanders of the air army and artillery of the front. Thus, the military councils represented highly skilled bodies of military leadership with a clear delimitation of functions and duties for each of the officials comprising their membership. With the enormous amount of work and the exceptional complexity of the problems solved, the principle of collectivism combined with sole responsibility ensured the use of the knowledge and experience of all its members and a unity of actions. At the same time this prevented any willfulness, subjectivism and irresponsibility in the process of taking decisions and implementing them. This most important Leninist principle in the activities of the military command bodies showed its irrefutable vital force. The political bodies played an exceptionally important role in improving the activities of the command bodies during the war and in raising their combat teamwork, responsibility and efficiency. Considering the enormous importance of their work, by a decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of

16 July 1941, the political propaganda directorates (departments) of the fronts (armies) were transformed into political directorates and departments. The institution of political commissars was introduced at the very outset of the war in the directorates and staffs of all levels (they were abolished in October 1942). At that time for strengthening political work among the personnel in the special units of the front (army), their political departments were organized. Moreover, in the membership of the political bodies, departments (divisions) were introduced for working with the local population. This made it possible to carry out explanatory work on the territories liberated from the enemy concerning the great liberation mission of the Soviet Army and the aims and tasks in fighting against the enemy.

As a whole during the years of the Great Patriotic War there was an uninterrupted process of improving the organizational structure of the front and army command bodies in accord with those tasks which had to be carried out by the troops in the different periods of the war. The basic factors which influenced the change in the organizational structure of the command bodies were: The development of weapons, military equipment, and the means of communication and their delivery in mass quantities to the troops; the creation of new formations and the improving of troop organization; the growth of the fighting strength of the fronts and armies; the development of military art and the significant increase in the scope of operations; the mastery by command personnel of the most effective forms and methods for planning, preparing and conducting operations.

In the process of developing the organizational structure of the command bodies of the front and army field forces during the war years such important areas were examined as a constant rise in the role of the combined-arms staffs in troop command; the maximum releasing of them from carrying out functions not directly related to planning, preparation and execution of operations (combat); an increase in the number of the leading staff departments and primarily operations and reconnaissance; a clear delimitation of tasks and functions between the staff departments; a rise in the efficiency, flexibility and mobility of all the command bodies. In practice this was expressed in the desire to reduce the total number of the field headquarters of a front (armies) and in a differentiated approach to determining their composition depending upon the fighting strength of the field forces. An important trend was also a higher role for the chiefs of the branches of forces and the services in planning and preparing the operations (combat) and in directing the subordinate troops in the course of implementing them. There was also a desire to reduce the load on the troop commanders of the fronts and armies by reducing the number of officials and command bodies directly subordinate to them in order that the commanders could focus their efforts on the most important questions of command activities.

In developing the structure of the field headquarters of the fronts and armies, the questions of improving leadership over the rear services occupied much attention. This required constant attention on all levels of command,

since the success of the operations carried out depended largely upon the precise functioning of the rear.

One of the important trends was a rise in the mobility of the command posts of the fronts and armies and the precise organizing of their echeloning and moving. In the aim of increasing the stability and continuity of troop command, there was a constant search for an optimum organization of the communications system. During the war years one could also very clearly see a tendency toward a centralization of command and this presupposed a strengthening of the influence of the superior levels on the activities of the subordinate command bodies. To a significant degree this raised the firmness and effectiveness of leadership over the combat of the troops.

It must also be pointed out that during the war years a very important role in improving troop command was given to training the leading military personnel, to improving their professional skills and to developing high military and moral-political qualities.

The experience of the past war in the area of the development and improvement of the structure of the front and army command bodies merits close attention. A thorough study of it will help to seek out the most effective ways for practically solving the complex problems of troop command under present-day conditions.

FOOTNOTES

1. TsAMO SSSR [Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense], folio 38, inv. 11353, file 981, sheets 4-8.
2. TsAMO, folio 217, inv. 1224, files 10, 11-12.
3. The number of personnel in the operations directorate of a front according to the 1944 establishment was: 69 men in fronts with a fighting strength of from 6 to 10 armies; 54 men from 4 to 5 armies; 41 men from 2 to 3 armies.
4. For more detail on this see VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 3, 1978, pp 17-26.
5. TsAMO, folio 323, inv. 4766, file 11, sheet 4.
6. "Istoriya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945" [History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945], Vol 6, Voenizdat, 1965, p 126.

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PARTY CONCERN ABOUT TRAINING OF MILITARY CADRES DISCUSSED

Moscow AGITATOR ARMII I FLOTA in Russian No 15, Aug 78 signed to press
25 Jul 78 pp 6-10

[Article by Lt Gen M. Shapovalov, Chief of Personnel Directorate, Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "The Party's Concern About the Training and Indoctrination of Military Cadres"]

[Text] This article is recommended for use in preparing for political lessons on the subject, "The activity of the CPSU in implementing the Lenin ideas on strengthening the country's defensive capability at the contemporary stage."

The leadership of the the Soviet Armed Forces by the Communist Party is the very foundation of military organizational development. The party is constantly concerned about strengthening the military-economic and scientific potential of the country and the moral-political and military-technical training of the Soviet people for the armed defense of the motherland. It is doing everything for our Armed Forces to be a sharp and coordinated organism which is accomplishing its assigned missions in an exemplary manner.

The most important field for the Communist Party's activity in leading the Armed Forces is the training and indoctrination of military personnel. This task faced the party immediately after the Great October Socialist Revolution. It was necessary to create its own workers' and peasants' Red Army which was capable of defending the young Soviet republic against the interventionists and internal counterrevolution. New cadres of commanders who were devoted to the cause of the revolution were necessary for this.

It was necessary to build a new type of army in the course of the fierce struggle against the foreign military intervention and the White Guardist movement and under conditions of tremendous devastation, famine, and epidemics. The party proceeded on the strength of the Lenin instructions that "in building a new army we must take commanders only from among the people. Only Red officers will have authority among the soldiers and will be able to strengthen socialism in our army. Such an army will be invincible."

In accordance with the leader's instructions, a broad network of short courses, military schools, and academies was created in the country. The courses accepted workers and peasants as well as soldiers and noncommissioned officers who were devoted to Soviet power. During the period from 1918 to 1921, more than 150 military schools and courses were established which trained more than 80,000 Red commanders. The military academies and the higher schools gave the Red Army 4,538 qualified senior commanders. These command personnel played a tremendous role in the struggle with the interventionists and internal counterrevolution and in strengthening organization and discipline in the army. The party boldly moved up to command positions thousands of soldiers, seamen, and noncommissioned officers of the old army and navy who received their combat experience on the fronts of World War I and were devoted to Soviet power. Many outstanding military leaders and political officers emerged from the ranks of the Communist Party and from among the workers and peasants. Among them were S. M. Budyennyy, K. E. Voroshilov, S. M. Kirov, V. V. Kuybyshev, M. N. Tukhashevskiy, M. V. Frunze, and many other illustrious commanders and commissars.

The party has always been guided by V. I. Lenin's instructions to the effect that cadres are the decisive force of the party and the state in building socialism and strengthening the country's defensive capability. The best policy and the most correct decision, stressed Vladimir Il'ich, will not have the proper influence on the accomplishment of assigned missions if there are no personnel who are capable and devoted to the cause for their implementation.

The Lenin instructions on the role and significance of cadres also remain timely today. Under the conditions of a developed socialist society, the building of communism, and the scientific-technical revolution, the raising of the level in directing all aspects of society's life and organizational and political work among the masses is closely linked with an improvement in the selection, assignment, and indoctrination of cadres.

Great attention was devoted to this question at the 25th CPSU Congress. "A mighty lever through which the party influences the course of social development," it is stressed in the summary report of the Central Committee CPSU to the 25th Party Congress, "is its /personnel policy/" [in boldface]. The party attaches primary significance to seeing that all sectors of party, state, economic, cultural-indoctrinal, and social work are headed by politically mature and capable organizers who know their work. The contemporary leader, it was noted at the 25th CPSU Congress, must unite organically within himself party spirit with profound competence and discipline with initiative and a creative approach to matters.

The requirements imposed on the leader were discussed well by the General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet USSR, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his book "Vozrozhdeniye" [Rebirth]: "The leader is always in view and, therefore, cannot display confusion and weakness. Whatever the burden on his soul, he is required to be well-collected and bold, and his nerves should be kept in check so that people get a charge of confidence from him."

The question of cadres sounded with new force in the report of the General Secretary of the Central Committee CPSU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, at the July 1978 plenum of the Central Committee CPSU. Speaking of discipline and the lofty responsibility of cadres, Leonid Il'ich stressed that "this is one of the most important foundations of our activity."

These requirements also pertain in full measure to military cadres. The Communist Party is devoting constant attention to military cadres, is concerned about their training and indoctrination, and considers them to be the basis and most important cementing force of the Armed Forces.

Officer cadres are the gold fund of the Soviet Armed Forces. The leading role in the entire life and combat activity of the troops belongs to them. They train and indoctrinate the men, instill a love for military affairs in them and display constant concern for the ideological tempering of the personnel, the development of a firm class position among the men, political vigilance, and a conscientious attitude toward the accomplishment of their honorable constitutional duty--to be in constant combat readiness which guarantees the immediate rebuff of any aggressor.

The development of military science and military art, the combat readiness of the troops, and victory in battle depend to a great extent on the level of political, military-theoretical, and military-technical training of the officers and on their organizational abilities and persistence in attaining the assigned goal. The officers with a higher military education, noted member of the Politburo of the Central Committee CPSU, Minister of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, in his speech in the Kremlin to the graduates of the military academies, must be conductors of everything new and advanced, serve as an example in the mastery of contemporary weapons and equipment, conduct a tireless search for the most effective ways and methods for their combat employment, and do their bit in the further improvement of tactics, operational art, party-political work, and procedures for the training and indoctrination of the personnel.

In creating the Red Army, V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party attached great significance to military-political cadres and the party-political apparatus. Back in March 1918, at a conference of military personnel in the Kremlin, V. I. Lenin spoke of the necessity to create the institution of commissars as a monitoring apparatus which represents our party in the army and as a propaganda center which conducts communist propaganda in the troop units. The institution of military commissars was established in April 1918.

The party sent its best representatives to the troops as military commissars. The number of commissars grew rapidly. From July to November 1918 alone, 3,452 men were sent to the army for political work. More than 2,500 communists were sent to the Southern Front in December 1918 and January 1919.

The military commissars were the soul of the army and navy and a mighty organizational and mobilizing force. They created and rallied party organizations, carried the great ideas of the party to the masses of fighting men,

inspired the fighters and commanders with flaming word and personal example, and implanted strict order and discipline among the troops. The military commissars monitored the activity of many old military specialists.

"The party can look with complete satisfaction at the heroic work of its commissars who, hand in hand with the best elements of the command personnel, created a combat-effective army in a short time," it says in the decision of the 8th Party Congress. It is a high evaluation of the outstanding role played by the military commissars in the organizational development and strengthening of the Armed Forces of the young Republic of Soviets.

Along with the institution of military commissars, the institution of political leaders (political instructors) of subunits was introduced in October 1919. They were assigned in companies, batteries, squadrons, and in each separate command. Introduction of the institution of political instructors had great significance for improving the ideological-political indoctrination of the men, strengthening discipline, and increasing the combat capability of the Red Army.

The proletarian military cadres which were nurtured by the Leninist party played a tremendous role in the struggle against the imperialist interventionists and the White Guards and in the attainment of the glorious victory of the young Soviet republic over its foreign and domestic enemies.

The unleashing of war against our motherland by the Hitlerite aggressors required a sharp expansion and acceleration of the training of military cadres. In the war period, all military-educational institutions produced annually 400,000-500,000 commanders, political officers, and technical and engineering officers. During all the years of the war, about two million of them were graduated.

The Soviet military cadres withstood the severe test on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War with honor. This is shown convincingly by the many brilliant strategic operations which were executed successfully by the Soviet generals and military leaders. The defeat of the Hitlerite troops at Moscow, the encirclement and destruction of more than 330,000 men in the army of Field Marshal Paulus at Stalingrad, the victory in the Kursk battle, and the subsequent big offensive operations demonstrated the combat maturity and superiority of our entire officer corps and the bravery and heroism of commanders of all echelons in the Great Patriotic War. For outstanding exploits in the war years, more than 7,000 officers, generals, and admirals were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

"The results of the war," notes member of the Politburo of the Central Committee CPSU and Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, "is brilliant confirmation of the superiority of our arms and shining proof of the high skill possessed by command and political personnel, their unsurpassed organizational abilities, steadfastness, bravery, combat ability...."

The political officers were the soul of the army and navy. They instilled in the fighting men a will for victory, boldness and valor, and a readiness

for self-sacrifice in the name of the motherland. By passionate word and personal example they carried the people along behind them and found the forms and methods of work which were most expedient in a given situation.

Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev was such a political officer. Occupying the responsible posts of deputy chief of the political directorate of the Southern Front, chief of the political department of the 18th Army, and chief of the political directorate of the 4th Ukrainian Front, Leonid Il'ich took an active part in the working out and implementation of plans for a number of big operations and in the bloody battles for Rostov-on-Don, Tuapse, Novorossiysk, and Kerch'. In the fighting ranks of the Soviet men, L. I. Brezhnev fought bravely for the liberation of the Ukraine and for the deliverance of the peoples of Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia from fascist enslavement. He recalls many combat episodes and events. Among them are the events on the legendary bridgehead at Novorossiysk--on Malaya Zemlya--which were exceptional in their intensity and the heroism of the Soviet fighting men.

Leonid Il'ich tells about these events in his book "Malaya zemlya." A shining model of a combat political officer stands before us from the pages of the book. For the chief of the 18th Army's political department there was no matter and no problem with which he was not directly involved as he directed the efforts of the communists and nonparty men to the exemplary accomplishment of combat missions. "A genuine political officer in the army," writes Leonid Il'ich, "is that person around whom the people group; he knows for certain their attitudes, needs, hopes, and dreams and he leads them for self-sacrifice and exploit. And if we consider that the combat spirit of the troops was always recognized as the most important factor of troop stability, then it was the political officer to whom the sharpest weapon was entrusted in the war years." What was stated also pertains in full measure to the author of "Malaya zemlya," Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev.

The equipping of the Armed Forces with contemporary combat equipment and weapons, the development of forms and methods for the conduct of armed conflict, and the important missions now facing the Soviet Armed Forces increased considerably the requirements imposed on officer cadres and on their training, moral-political and combat qualities, organizational skills, and work style.

Acquiring special significance for the practical activity of each officer, general, and admiral at the contemporary stage is persistent mastery of the Lenin work style which presumes high demandingness toward oneself and others and excludes self-satisfaction and any manifestation of red tape and formalism. It presumes self-criticism, the ability to evaluate the results of one's own activity and the state of affairs on the assigned sector from party positions, and the ability to disclose boldly and criticize flaws and eliminate the reasons which give rise to them.

At present, thanks to the tireless concern of the Communist Party and the Soviet government, our Armed Forces have cadres of command personnel who are boundlessly devoted to their people, politically mature and well-trained militarily

and technically, and capable of leading troops successfully in peacetime as well as in wartime. More than 90 percent of the officers are communists and Komsomols. More than half of them have a higher military and special military education. This means that our Armed Forces are always ready to accomplish their constitutional duty--to be in constant combat readiness which guarantees the immediate rebuff of any aggressor.

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